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Abstract 
  




Advisor: David G. Troyansky 
 
Before the Treaty of Rome (1957) established the European Economic 
Community (EEC), French officials made it clear that France’s signature on the Treaty 
was contingent on its partners’ acceptance of Eurafrican policy. Because Algeria held a 
unique legal status among France’s overseas holdings, the way in which French officials 
advocated its insertion within EEC regulation merits particular attention. This status 
stood distinct from that of the associated territories and, when applied to the Treaty, 
would theoretically extend to Algeria and its residents the guarantees of free labor 
circulation, development aid, and tariff preferences open to metropolitan citizens through 
EEC membership. Because French officials hoped to preserve trade relations and sought 
to quell crises across the empire, they negotiated EEC regulations in a bid to retain 
control through the continuity of economic and political ties. Eager for France to join the 
EEC, the other states agreed. Thus, a supranational treaty became a tool with which 
France could attempt to maintain control over its empire. 
This moment in colonial and European relations demonstrates how citizenship 
rights and multilateral diplomacy were influenced by economic as well as political 
pressures. It reveals that Europe’s current borders are strikingly less expansive than those 












In the very beginning lies chaos, but a chaos rich in life; it is the fertile 
primeval slime, where a being is coming into existence, still monstrous, but 
endowed with a principle of unity, and strong enough to dispel 
impossibilities, to acquire the essential organs. 
 




It is thought that even states can marry one another, in part as a new kind of 
industry by which one can effortlessly increase one’s power through familial 
alliances, and in part as a means to expand one’s land possessions. 
 
-Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” 1795.2 
                                                        
1 Cited in J. Ayo Langley, “Pan-Africanism in Paris, 1924-1936,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 7, 
1 (April 1969): 72. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, ed. Pauline 
Kleingeld, trans. David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 68.  
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Introduction 
  




In early January 1963, Brussels was in a state of agitation. On the day of Christmas Eve 
1962, Ahmed Ben Bella—formerly an exiled leader of Algeria’s National Liberation Front 
(FLN) and soon to be the independent nation’s first elected president—had written to the Council 
of the European Economic Community (EEC). He wanted officials in Brussels to know that his 
young government hoped to explore “the possible future relations between Algeria and the 
Community.” He hinted that these relations might be tightly bound, as certain articles of the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), the EEC’s foundational document, were “applicable in Algeria.” 1 
European officials proved divided on how to respond, with France finding itself in a particularly 
uncomfortable position. The letter came at an especially delicate moment, as Algeria had only 
gained its independence from France in July 1962, following nearly eight years of war (1954-
1962) and over 130 years of colonial domination. Meanwhile, the EEC itself had only just 
marked its fifth year of existence. Comprising Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and West Germany (the Six), a map of the original members of the EEC at first 
glance suggests a firmly European endeavor. How could Algeria possibly fit into this landscape? 
In fact, as this work will reveal, prior to Algeria’s independence, French officials had 
doggedly attempted—with success—to include Algeria within the burgeoning EEC. Their 
insistence for its inclusion was part of their larger push for Eurafrique (Eurafrica), a policy they 
defined as the incorporation of overseas trade relations within the Treaty of Rome. French 
officials had done so in an attempt to maintain control of the region even as the war grew more 
                                                        
1  Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) CM2/1963-885: Herbst, EEC Commission, to Calmes, 
Council of EEC, 3 January 1963. 
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violent and untenable, hoping that development funding from the Six would allow for material 
improvements that would quell Algerian unrest. They also hoped to maintain trade relations that 
had been built over decades of colonial rule. Finally, the inclusion of Algeria in the Treaty of 
Rome would give France a supranational document affirming that Algeria was indeed a part of 
France. Thus, when Ben Bella wrote his letter in 1962, it was not strictly speaking written from a 
far-off, former colonized territory. Rather, it was a missive sent from a land that was explicitly 
named and included within the European project.  
In my analysis of this era, I’ve come to view the signing of the Treaty of Rome as 
significant because it shows the French pushing the other members of the Six to sign a document 
explicitly naming Algeria as a part of France and therefore as a part of Europe. In essence, 
France used European integration not to shed its colonies, but to solidify ties with its most 
important imperial holding. Without talking about the war, the French attempted to weaponize a 
supranational treaty in order to justify their continued presence in Algeria. The treaty itself could 
be a tool to win the war. 
How did French officials attempt to convince their European partners that Algeria’s 
inclusion within integrated institutions was the best choice for Europe in the 1950s and early 
1960s? What does this tell us about our assumptions regarding the natural shape—and location—
of Europe and of the people who count as European, particularly when we see that even after 
independence European officials remained (cautiously) open to Algeria’s close ties to the EEC? 
Ben Bella’s letter and the reactions it garnered call into question received wisdom about the 
European project and about the process of France’s decolonization of Africa. An analysis of the 
circumstances that led to and followed this moment challenges the very nature of how we 
understand integrated Europe and Europe-African relations, even to this day. Acknowledging the 
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elastic understandings of Europe’s limits in the 1950s and early 1960s unsettles traditional 
discussions of European integration that too often unquestioningly accept the fixed borders of 
“continental” Europe.  
Rather, French officials charges themselves with the task of asserting that indeed, 
European regulation should extend to Africa and, most critically, to Algeria. This territory, not 
unlike Italy’s impoverished Mezzogiorno, needed Europe’s intervention and represented a 
logical, even natural, extension of Europe itself. I challenge histories of European integration that 
take the current shape of “Europe” as a given, arguing that not only did empire influence 
decisions at the time of the EEC’s formation, but also that the precise borders of Europe even 
after decolonization hardly appeared evident to the administrators of its new institutions. 
This dissertation makes an intervention in three fields of academic inquiry, ultimately 
demonstrating that they must be analyzed in tandem in order to make sense of European 
integration in the twentieth century. Although some chapters or episodes focus on one more than 
the other two, overall, I am in dialogue with international historians (including the new Cold War 
history), scholars of political economy, and historians of France and its empire. My project’s 
focus on the relationship between empire and European integration challenges international 
historians to research bilateral and multilateral ties inside and outside of institutions, in order to 
make sense of policymaking. I contribute to the field of political economy by emphasizing some 
key themes of global political economy, notably the concurrent threads of “conflict and 
cooperation.”2 I also contend that international historians must incorporate ideas from political 
economy, and vice versa, in order to reach a more accurate understanding of the choices made by 
France and its partners in the postwar. 
                                                        
2  Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams, Global Political Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 3rd 
Edition), 23. 
Brown • Introduction 4 
Most histories of the European Union focus on the EEC’s role in facilitating trade and 
labor ties between the Six. Too often, they ignore that four of the six members still possessed 
formal colonies or administered UN trust territories at the time of the EEC’s creation.3 Indeed, 
the EEC’s history is closely imbricated with evolutions in empire and the postwar emergence of 
successful decolonizing efforts. The significance of empire to the foundations of the European 
project is perhaps best illustrated in French attempts to inscribe the crown jewel of its empire, 
Algeria, into emerging postwar institutions.4   
In the early postwar years, French officials understood the empire to be a domestic 
concern, and therefore outside of European integration’s purview. By the mid-1950s, political 
exigencies brought about by the escalation of the Algerian War changed French attitudes. They 
now argued that precisely because empire was a part of domestic France, it must enter the EEC 
as a part of France itself. French officials’ insistence that Algeria was a part of France and thus 
belonged in the EEC reveals that France’s domestic crisis—the Algerian War—directly 
influenced France’s formulation of European integration policy.5 Further, during Treaty of Rome 
negotiations in the mid to late 1950s, French officials’ confused pronouncements regarding 
Algeria’s legal status within France reveal the messiness of seemingly firm juridical distinctions 
                                                        
3 Aside from France, the others were Belgium (Belgian Congo and trusteeship of Rwanda-Urundi); Italy (trusteeship 
of Somaliland); the Netherlands (Suriname and Guyana). Germany ceased to hold colonies after World War I and 
Luxembourg was never a formal colonial power. Recent studies that examine the impact of decolonization on 
metropolitan states include Jordanna Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012) and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
4 For a history of Algeria’s conquest and early colonization efforts, see Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l’Algérie 
contemporaine, tome 1, La Conquête et les débuts de la colonisation,1827-1871  (Paris: P.U.F., 1964); Charles-
Robert Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, tome 2, 1871-1954 (Paris: P.U.F., 1964); Jennifer E. Sessions, 
By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Benjamin C. 
Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009); and David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
5 Martin Evans includes a brief but incisive discussion of the diplomatic impact of France’s pressure to integrate 
Algeria in the EEC. Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
194-196. 
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across France’s empire. As Ben Bella’s letter shows, such confusion carried into the early years 
of Algerian independence.  
Without accounting for the place of Africa—with Algeria at the heart of this Eurafrican 
vision—the significance of empire in the formation of a unified Europe goes unacknowledged. 
We must ask: How did Algeria’s inclusion within the European project complicate the notion of 
borders and challenge the very underpinnings of the “Europeanness” or “nation-stateness” of the 
project?6 We must also ask: how did France instrumentalize supranational economic accords to 
enforce foreign and domestic political claims? In the negotiations for European integration, loud 
cries for Algeria’s inclusion, as well as deafening silences on the same subject, provide a fuller 
picture of the intersections between decolonization and European integration. Such an 
investigation challenges contemporary understandings of ahistorical and “natural” geopolitical 
borders and suggests that the extension of newly defined European citizenship rights to non-
white, non-Christian peoples, and indeed, the extension of Europe to non-white, non-Christian 
lands, remained a distinct possibility in the early days of European integration.7  
My intervention into the history of France and its empire is related to this question of 
borders and the limits of nation-states and empires. I am particularly interested in challenging the 
                                                        
6 Hélène Blais provides an important analysis of the creation and functions of Algeria’s borders, arguing that “the 
territorialization of colonial powers is not a given, but a historical construction.” Hélène Blais, Mirages de la carte: 
L’invention de l’Algérie coloniale, XIXe-XXe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 2014), 288. Useful methodological and 
theoretical frameworks for thinking about the meaning of borders include Adrian Little, “The complex temporality 
of borders: Contingency and normativity,” European Journal of Political Theory 14, 4 (2015): 429-447; Stuart 
Elden’s coda in his monograph The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 322-330; 
Jordan Branch, The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory and the Origins of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); and Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989). 
7 The notion of “making” Frenchmen has a long history and includes even those within France’s metropolitan 
borders. Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976); Leslie Page Moch, Pariahs of Yesterday: Breton Migrants in Paris (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012); Neil MacMaster, Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62 (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Patrick Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un français? Histoire de la nationalité 
française depuis la Révolution (Paris: Grasset, 2002); Gérard Noiriel, Le creuset français: histoire de l’immigration, 
XIXe-XXe siècles (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988). 
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firm divide historians too often make between North and sub-Saharan Africa; this prevents us 
from tracking the links between French policies made to organize or govern one or the other. I 
also want to emphasize the importance of understanding French “domestic” concerns as being 
inclusive of empire in the run-up to the Treaty of Rome. This can explain why French decision-
makers pushed for a version of Europe that integrated France’s empire, even as popular opinion 
for such a vision waned. France’s economic interests in the colonies, still important despite 
economic historians who suggest that their might had already weakened, directly drove political 
policies on the supranational level.8 
 
Integrations 
The nation-state survived World War II, but individual states joined together in 
federations, a form of integration. The most prominent types of integrations that we witness 
today—such as the United Nations or the European Union—are not the same bodies that 
interwar political thinker Eugène Guernier or Senegalese statesman Léopold Sédar Senghor once 
advocated. However, when we examine how the European Union interacts with independent 
African states, we see the results of choices made when postwar integration did account for a 
federated France comprising African holdings. I analyze the impact of concrete decisions made 
as a result of European attempts to adopt that version of federalism. 
European integration, like movements for decolonization, gained urgency after World 
War II. In the postwar era, men like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, and the 
lesser-known but influential Pierre Uri—the “fathers” of Europe—and legions of administrators, 
                                                        
8  Jacques Marseille’s work on France’s imperial economy (and the changes to metropolitan fortunes after 
decolonization) focuses on the benefit to French industry after the end of formal empire. Daniel Lefeuvre takes up a 
similar task, focused specifically on Algeria. Jacques Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme français: Histoire 
d’un divorce (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984) and Daniel Lefeuvre, Chère Algérie: La France et sa colonie, 1930-1962 
(Paris: Flammarion, 2005). 
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civil servants, and support staff attended meetings in Paris, Messina, Venice, Strasbourg, 
Brussels, and elsewhere, attempting to make sense of what the postwar would look like for 
Europe.9 Despite major losses of colonial territory (India, 1947) and outbreaks of violence in 
colonial holdings (including the start of the war in French Indochina and sporadic episodes of 
violent protest in Algeria), for the most part, there appears in these early negotiations an 
unshakable confidence that the larger colonial order would remain. Indeed, colonial mentalities 
did not dissipate when the guns cooled in 1945, demonstrating the sustained influence of 
interwar imperial thinking. In the interwar, particularly with the League of Nations’ emergence, 
we see, as Mark Mazower demonstrates, a “vision of global order established through regional 
state-systems each under the leadership of a hegemon […].”10 While Mazower is referring to 
Germany’s role in the 1940 Tripartite Pact with Italy and Japan, he also notes, “the British were 
supporting the doctrine of self-determination because they believed they would benefit more 
from it than anyone else.” 11  Indeed, “imperial self-interest was grafted onto Wilsonian 
rhetoric.”12 In effect, imperial nation-states in the interwar attempted to harness international law 
to maintain some form of control or significance in their formal and informal empires, even if 
that meant operating within an international—even federal—system. 13  Such “imperial self-
                                                        
9 For a concise history of postwar European integration, see Martin J. Dedman, The Origins and Development of the 
European Union 1945-2008: A history of European integration 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2010). See also 
Gérard Bossuat, L’Europe des Français, 1943-1959: La IVe République aux sources de l’Europe communautaire 
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996) and Alan S. Milward with the assistance of George Brennan and Federico 
Romero, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2000).  
10 Mark Mazower, “An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth 
Century,” International Affairs 82, 3 (May 2006): 561-562. 
11 Ibid., 559-60. 
12 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 20. 
13 Wilder critiques historians who present the form of a nation-state as “normal” and France’s empire as “deviant” 
from such an organization, instead calling the “French imperial nation-state” an “internally contradictory artifact of 
colonial modernity that was simultaneously […] Franco-African and Afro-French, national and transnational.” Gary 
Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 21-22. 
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interest” lived beyond the League of Nations and was manifest in the policies pursued by French 
administrators during negotiations for European integration. 
In order to make sense of France’s push to include Algeria within the European project, 
scholars must engage with a longer history of political economy and of attempts to legislate 
empire. New theories of global political economy assert the importance of geography and legal 
institutions to a study of economic decision-making.14 In approaching the archival material with 
an eye to these elements, I will assert that “politics and economics are inseparable.”15 Through 
my archival analysis, I am in dialogue with scholars who ask how economics impact politics in 
both war and peace, notably through the work of political scientist Dale C. Copeland and 
historian Adam Tooze.16 I will analyze how their theories, mainly focused on the run-up to wars, 
might be understood in light of an institution – unified Europe – whose hagiographic founding 
myth is based upon a notion of perpetual peace.17 I contend that the episodes of pragmatic 
decision-making and of seemingly well-planned but at times disastrously incorrect predictions of 
economic futures are evident in postwar Europe.18 They help to explain when and how France’s 
partners agreed to call Algeria a part of Europe. 
In thinking through the foundations of integrated Europe through the lens of French 
empire, I will also draw on examinations of the emergence of modern French imperial legal 
systems in Algeria and Tunisia, and their relation to domestic and international affairs. Jennifer 
Sessions’ account of the conquest and early rule of Algeria by the French evidences the interplay 
                                                        
14 O’Brien and Williams, Global Political Economy, 14. 
15 Ibid., 12. 
16 Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Adam 
Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order (London: Allen Lane, 2014). 
17  Kant penned “The Perpetual Peace” in 1795, making a case for how a state of perpetual peace could be 
implemented and sustained. Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace. 
18 Throughout this dissertation, I take “pragmatism” to mean approaching diplomatic decision-making with an 
economic or political bottom line as the top priority, as opposed to ideologically-driven choices. As will be clear, 
however, “pragmatic” and “ideological” visions of Eurafrica overlapped.  
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of domestic politics with imperial ambitions and the continuity of imperial ambitions across an 
era fraught with political changes.19 I will take these two themes – interplay and continuity – and 
locate them in the postwar history of European integration. France’s push to include its overseas 
holdings with the European project is demonstrative of the use of the supranational on the 
domestic stage, and vice versa, as France used European legislation to affirm its right to Algeria. 
My project challenges traditional timelines of decolonization as it demonstrates continued ties 
between France and much of its former empire after formal decolonization, here not solely tied 
to the development aid that would earn Jacques Foccart the moniker Monsieur Afrique, but in a 
more ambiguous series of negotiations between France, Europe, and the former French empire.  
Mary Dewhurst Lewis analyzes how the exigencies of diplomacy in the mid-19th century, 
namely the safeguarding of the Concert of Europe, challenged French practices of imperial rule, 
particularly by complicating legal systems in Tunisia.20 I will ask how in the postwar, a new set 
of diplomatic imperatives might serve French imperial interests, or risk subverting French claims 
to empire. By then, advocating empire appeared decidedly less straightforward. The postwar did 
not witness a simple regurgitation of interwar ideology. Shifts in the language used by European 
officials when discussing dominance over, and then partnership with, African states, demonstrate 
that gradual change emerged. The importance of historical contingency rather than the influence 
of ideology alone is imperative in a study of the realization of integrated international 
organizations. It helps to illuminate reasons behind the successful or unsuccessful 
implementation of integrated institutions and points to the specificity of a given historical 
moment in the popularization of such policies. In their collected volume on European 
integration, Jytte Klausen and Louise Tilly argue that “state building is an events-driven process, 
                                                        
19 Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 19-66. 
20  Mary Dewhurst Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2014), 3. 
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and state society relations are in large part shaped by the big events that cast the international 
order. This raises a methodological issue: if state formation is events-driven, it is also contingent, 
apt to proceed in spasms.”21 These spasms, and their results, are key to understanding that the 
forms of institutions seen today (and in the past) resulted not from the execution of precise 
ideology and planning, but from the perceived need to react to specific moments in time.  Thus, 
one must be careful not to ascribe inevitability to the shape of European integration, or indeed, to 
the shape of Europe itself. As I will argue throughout this dissertation, such ideas were 
constantly in flux, and notions of the definition of Europe and its borders could be 
instrumentalized by a variety of interest groups to make very distinct claims.  
Yet European integration and Eurafrica were only two of the integration schemes of the 
20th century. Algeria’s potential role within a range of international organizations is particularly 
noteworthy. Nationalists attended the 1955 Bandung conference, which although not a 
permanent organization, revealed the ability of colonized people to join together to form a 
political force. The Algerian cause’s success in the United Nations in 1960 is well known, and 
historians have made much of the signal that the body had moved to being a force for anti-
colonial pressure.22 As this dissertation will demonstrate, French administrators before and even 
after Algerian independence envisioned Algeria as part of France and part of Europe. But 
Algeria’s strategic geographic location (African, Mediterranean, Maghrebi) and its ethnic and 
cultural make-up (Arab, Muslim, Kabyle, etc.) rendered its leaders capable of making claims to 
any number of international memberships, and, conversely, any number of international 
organizations could make claims that Algeria should belong. 
                                                        
21 Jytte Klausen and Louise A. Tilly, “European Integration in a Social and Historical Perspective,” in European 
Integration in Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997): 17. 
22 On decolonization efforts and the UN, see Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 149-189.  
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Some integration schemes died in the planning stage, while others were actually 
attempted (often to limited success). While this dissertation focuses on the EEC and its 
forerunner, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), as their collective long life allows 
for a fuller analysis of evolutions in Eurafrican thinking, there were many postwar attempts at 
integration. International organization comes in many guises, and can comprise many actors. 
Martin Dedman differentiates between interdependence and integration when analyzing the 
European project; such a distinction can also help clarify international versus transnational or 
supranational. According to Dedman, interdependence can be understood as states organizing a 
unit addressing “certain policy areas,” without “interfer[ing] with the policy-making of their 
member states.”23 Examples of such organizations, which have little power to impose policy on 
their members, are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).24 In contrast, integration “requires the creation of a ‘supranational organisation,’” and 
policy decisions fall to the body of all of the member states. Unlike interdependent organizations, 
integrated—supranational—organizations demand that member states “transfer some power 
(sovereignty) […].”25 This transfer helps explain the success (meaning, the institutions were 
actually established) of European economic integration, according to Dedman and Alan 
Milward, the doyen of integration history. In Milward’s influential Rescue of the European 
Nation State, he contends that the exclusivity of an integrated group creates a “strong cohesive 
force” committed to “the ‘club’ rules.” This “new legal system and framework” encourages 
                                                        
23 Dedman, Origins and Development of the EU, 7. 
24 Postwar administrators puzzled over a tremendous breadth of supranational schemes. These include the GATT 
(1947), NATO (1949), the Council of Europe (1949, critically comprising the European Commission of Human 
Rights), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), the European Defense Community (1952, failed 
ratification in 1954), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom, 1957), the Common Agricultural Policy 
(Stresa Conference, 1958), and the OECD (1960, from origins in the Marshall Plan). The variety of successes and 
failures attests to the difficulties of mounting integration schemes in postwar but still imperial Europe. 
25 Dedman Origins and Development of the EU, 7. 
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following regulations; the lack of a procedure for exit encourages a greater degree of 
adherence.26 
Yet Milward’s assertions are not without issue. Exclusivity can breed discord, as France’s 
rejections of Britain’s applications for EEC membership in the 1960s attest. While Milward’s 
analysis offers a useful theory for how the EEC managed to emerge, it is evident that the 
institution’s birth and life were complicated by internal and external forces beyond Milward’s 
focus. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, agreeing to rules is a different task than implementing 
rules, particularly in a European system of integration that would allow for individual 
exemptions, notably from the Eurozone. In addition, the “irreversibility” of the organization is in 
question, because we see some examples of exit in the history of the EEC, notably with Algeria, 
the subject of this dissertation, but also in the decision of Greenland to leave the EEC following 
its independence from Denmark (1985) and in the recent and controversial "Brexit" vote. 
However, Milward’s thesis remains instructive, as he emphasizes economic and political need, 
rather than ideological discourse, as the driving force in integration. Milward’s contention of the 
primacy of necessity challenges the argument made by Walter Lipgens, who emphasizes the 
influence of European federalist movements before the mid-1950s on the eventual formation of 
successfully integrated institutions. Histories of European integration and, as we shall see, of 
Eurafrica strongly side with either pragmatic or ideological explanations for the successes and 
failures of these initiatives. I contend that pragmatic need about colonial markets drove the 
decisions made by negotiators working to integrate Europe. However, they were able to harness 
older, more passionate visions of integration that emphasized the fraternal, if not spiritual, side of 
the endeavor for unity between France, Europe, and Africa. 
 
                                                        
26 Ibid., 7-8. 
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Assimilations, Associations, and Confederations in France and (Eur)Africa 
 In his classic 1961 work Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-
1914, historian Raymond Betts mused that the term “France d’Outre-Mer,” literally “overseas 
France,” embodied the favored French approach to colonization prior to the late 19th century: 
assimilation. Looking across the ocean, French officials from the Ancien Régime until the birth 
of the Third Republic claimed far-flung colonies as constituent parts of France itself. Even 
overseas, there was simply France. Betts cited a 1900 tome on French colonization that declared: 
Assimilation, by giving the colonies institutions analogous to those of metropolitan 
France, little by little removes the distances that separate the diverse parts of French 
territory and finally realizes their intimate union through the application of common 
legislation.27 
This notion of a vast, yet uniform France, in which identical legal regimes would enforce 
harmony across the empire, remained an ideal; declarations of Algeria’s Frenchness would ring 
out into the mid-20th century (and indeed, in some circles, even later than that). 
 Assimilationist policymakers in 19th-century France believed that France’s duty to 
overseas regions went beyond delivering the light of French “civilization” to foreign lands. 
Rather, France had a duty to itself. A minister under Charles X, the French king whose conquest 
of Algeria was followed quickly by the toppling of his own rule, asked, “Aren’t the colonies 
French? Are they not a part of this large family?,” then answered himself: “The colonies are 
France.” 28  During negotiations for the European project after World War II, this confident 
understanding of belongingness lingered. Algeria was France; therefore, if France joined a 
European community, Algeria would be a part of it.  Assimilationist policy went out of fashion in 
imperial policymaking circles by the turn of the last century, due in part to the complexity and 
                                                        
27 A. Arnaud and H. Méray, Les Colonies françaises, organisation administrative, judiciaire, politique et financière 
(Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1900), cited in Raymond Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial 
Theory, 1890-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 8. 
28 Betts, Assimilation and Association, 18.  
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diversity of France’s growing African and Asian empire, and also to the lessons learned from 
examining how the Dutch, British, and Americans administered their own colonial holdings.29 
Associative colonial practices emerged in their stead, acknowledging differences and local 
particularities while still asserting French dominance.30 As we will see, it was out of associative 
ideology that leaders like the Senegalese statesman Senghor or the Ivoirian Félix Houphouët-
Boigny could promote ideals of a federal or confederal France.31  
However, Algeria, by the first decades of the Third Republic (1870-1940) a settler colony 
and a key part of France’s economy, remained assimilated, rather than being reformed into an 
associative relationship like the ones French officials pursued elsewhere.32  Political theorist 
Stuart Elden argues that “[t]he idea of a territory as a bounded space under the control of a group 
of people, usually a state, is […] historically produced. […] Territory […] can therefore be 
thought of as the extension of the state’s power.”33 Territory as “political technology,” in Elden’s 
view, involves “[m]easure and control,” not just “land and terrain.”34 In the postwar period, by 
claiming to their European partners that Algeria was inherently French (assimilation still taking 
the day), French officials hoped to maintain and even extend their control over the territory.  
These same officials would harness an ideology of defining Africa and Europe as united 
on a single geographic plane, “Eurafrica.” 35 Like French claims to Algerian territory, French 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 33-58. 
30 Ibid., 106-132. 
31 These two had conflicting views of how that federalism would look, with Senghor promoting a federal “tiered” 
system and Houphouët-Boigny fighting for a confederate system in which “each African territory, individually,” 
joined with the metropole. Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and 
French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 11. 
32  Lewis argues that French practices of administration in Tunisia were derived from observing Algeria’s 
administration as a cautionary tale. Lewis, Divided Rule, 11-13. 
33 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 322. Emphasis original. 
34 Ibid., 322-323. 
35 Ageron points out that the term Eurafrique emerged in the interwar period, in an iteration closely resembling Nazi 
ideals of Mittelafrika. Charles-Robert Ageron, “Idée d’Eurafrique et le débat colonial franco-allemand de l’entre-
deux-guerres,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 22, 3 (July-Sept. 1975): 449-450. Some key works on 
Eurafrica include: Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and 
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officials rolled out visions of Eurafrica to impress upon their European counterparts the necessity 
of including Algeria and sub-Saharan African holdings within integrated European institutions. 
This had deep roots. In the interwar, one of the most ubiquitous figures in the European 
integration movement, the Austrian leader of Pan-Europa, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
envisioned Europe extending beyond the continent. His organization repackaged decades-old 
justifications of colonization as a benefit not to an individual state, but to the entirety of Europe, 
with an economic program that argued that unified Europe could enjoy “the communal 
exploitation of the Pan-European colonies […].” 36 According to Coudenhove, “Africa could 
provide Europe with raw materials for its industry, nutrition for its population, land for its 
overpopulation, labor for its unemployed, and markets for its products.”37 His readiness to open 
Africa to all Europeans is illustrative of early visions of Eurafrica. Yet in the wake of World War 
I, ideals of integrated Europe, let alone shared imperial territory, did not resonate widely in 
Europe’s capitals. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Colonialism (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Yves Montarsolo, L’Eurafrique: contrepoint de l’idée d’Europe: Le cas 
français de la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale aux négociations des Traités de Rome (Aix-en-Provence : 
Publications de l’Université de Provence, 2010); Guiliano Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, 
Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Gérard Bossuat (eds.), L’Europe Unie et l’Afrique: de l’Idée d’Eurafrique à la 
Convention de Lomé I: Actes du Colloque International de Paris, 1er et 2 Avril 2004 (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005). 
René Girault, "La France entre l’Europe et l’Afrique," in The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome: 
Actes du Colloque de Rome 25-28 Mars 1987, ed. Enrico Serra (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989): 351-378; Adekeye 
Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012); Louis Sicking, “A Colonial Echo: France and the Colonial Dimension of the European 
Economic Community,” French Colonial History 5 (2005): 207-228; Martin Rempe, “Decolonization by 
Europeanization? The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-African Relations,” KFG Working Paper Series 
27 (May 2011): 3-20; and Véronique Dimier, “Recycling Empire: French Colonial Administrators at the Heart of 
European Development Policy,” in The French Colonial Mind Vol. 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial 
Encounters, ed. Martin Thomas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011): 251-274. 
36 Otto Deutsch, “Paneuropäisches Wirschaftsprogram,” Paneuropa 3, 1 (1927): 7, cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 
Eurafrica, 27. 
37 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Afrika,” Paneuropa 5, 2 (1929): 3, cited in Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica, 28. 
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However, Eurafrican ideology persisted. The League of Nations’ mandates system served 
to “legitimize” imperial practice by internationalizing colonial interests.38 Interwar Eurafrican 
proponents, with their focus on European civilizational superiority and the need for access to raw 
materials and unfettered markets, embraced rhetoric closely tied to the emergence of fascist 
ideology. When the term Eurafrique emerged in the interwar period, it was part and parcel of the 
racialized worldview of French and Germans alike in the midst of rising nationalist 
movements. 39  This period saw the publication of books advocating such sharing of Africa, 
notably Eugène Guernier’s 1933 L’Afrique: Champ d’expansion de l’Europe and Paolo 
d’Agostini Orsini di Camerota’s 1934 Eurafrica: L’Africa per l’Europa, l’Europa per l’Africa.40 
Orsini’s work includes maps depicting three major spheres of world order: An American sphere 
comprising North and South America, clearly dominated by the United States, a Eurafrican 
sphere dominated by Europe, if not specifically France, and an Asian sphere, inclusive of Russia, 
with a less obvious dominant force.41 
Eurafrican proponents had strong views of geographic ties, often linked with particular 
readings of history. The writer Louis Bertrand emphasized the roots of a “Latin Africa” in North 
Africa.42 This bolstered claims that the Mediterranean was an “internal lake” in a Eurafrican 
continent, which fit with the fascist ideology of a Mediterranean civilization promoted by 
Mussolini, among others.  Some Vichy collaborators embraced Eurafrica as part of a new world 
                                                        
38 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 4-5. 
39 Ageron, “Idée d’Eurafrique," 449-450. 
40  The journalist Maurizio Donato was another Italian proponent of Eurafrica. Stéphane Mourlane, “Actions 
culturelles et coopération méditerranéenne: Le projet italien d’Eurafrica au début des années 1950,” in La 
Construction d’un Espace Euro-Méditerranéen: Genèses, Mythes et Perspectives, ed. Houda Ben Hamouda and 
Mathieu Bouchard (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012), 29. 
41 Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica. 
42 Patricia Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” French Historical 
Studies 25, 2 (Spring 2002): 295-329. 
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order and Hitler’s own call for Lebensraum included African territory.43 Africa—its land and 
resources, if not peoples—was inseparable from Europe.  
 
Postwar Eurafrica: A New Imperative 
 
After World War II, the newly installed Fourth Republic renamed France’s empire the 
French Union in a shift that in part marked distaste for overt expressions of European superiority. 
Despite its origins, the term Eurafrica remained elemental to European integration discussions, 
even as the rhetoric surrounding the term came to emphasize partnership between Europe and 
Africa, rather than domination. Wielded as a political tool, Eurafrica offered European (and, as 
we will see, African and Algerian) administrators a way to assert any number of political or 
economic claims in the postwar. These included French claims to the indissoluble bonds across 
the motherland and “her” empire; long-held European convictions that Africa was the “natural” 
region for European trade and expansion; a growing emphasis on Europe’s material obligations 
to Africa; and the notion that Europe, with Africa, could form a third front in the Cold War, 
standing strong and independent of both the United States and the USSR. Indeed, for African 
leaders, language emphasizing links between Africa and Europe helped to further claims of unity 
between the continents, including federal or confederation alternatives to full independence for 
African states.44 
We can approach actors' motivations for promoting Eurafrica with a nod to the "Janus-
faced" nature of nationalism, which is at once "a resource to be exploited by political 
entrepreneurs seeking to maximize their power and influence” and "palpably real to those who 
                                                        
43 Julia Nordblad, “The Un-European Idea: Vichy and Eurafrica in the Historiography of Europeanism,” European 
Legacy – Toward New Paradigms 19, 6 (2014): 711-729; Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi 
Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986): 129-140. 
44  Cooper’s recent monograph interrogates how African and French leaders alike envisioned future relations. 
Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation.  
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participate in it."45 The continuity of Eurafrican ideals, asserted in the postwar era by a range of 
actors in Europe and in the French Union, demonstrates the term's use to galvanize popular 
European opinion.  
For French officials, versions of Eurafrica from the early 1950s onward offered a 
diplomatic tool to assert France’s control over volatile regions, guarantee financial assistance in 
an attempt to quiet unrest across the empire, and secure the signatures of other European states 
affirming the French quality of its overseas holdings. By the time European officials gathered to 
negotiate the EEC at the Conferences of Messina (1955) and Venice (1956), French officials had 
singled out Algeria as a key to the process of enveloping Eurafrican ideals within European 
integration. Such an assertion achieved French goals of maintaining economic control of Algeria 
and harnessing the development aid funds of its European partners (ostensibly to “modernize” 
industry in the French Union), all while reasserting its claim to the territory through the 
signatures on the treaty.46  At the same time, such ideas reflect a longer history of (imperial) 
nation-states harnessing international organizations as a method of maintaining prestige or even a 
measure of hegemony.  
Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson pay considerable attention to the earliest iterations of 
Eurafrica. They argue that although Eurafrica was not officially written into a European 
integration scheme until the second half of the 1950s, the ideological basis for this policy had 
deep influence and was largely at the root of its eventual success. Their survey of Eurafrican 
ideology from the interwar era to the 1960s will be drawn on throughout this dissertation. 
                                                        
45 Weldon C. Matthews is here invoking David D. Laitin's description of nationalism from Hegemony and Culture: 
Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Weldon C. 
Matthews, "Pan-Islam or Arab Nationalism? The Meaning of the 1931 Jerusalem Islamic Congress Reconsidered," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 35, 1 (Feb., 2003): 1. 
46 The language of a “modernizing mission” was a new guise of the well-known “civilizing mission.” Amelia H. 
Lyons, The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during 
Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 1. 
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However, they emphasize the influence the lobbyists and thinkers who espoused Eurafrican 
ideals rather than considering the economic and political motivations that spurred French 
officials to push the policy. I contend that the efforts of lobbyists and ideologues only drew 
action from politicians and civil servants after it became clear that such ideology also offered 
pragmatic solutions to the crises of the postwar era. Giving equal weight to all demands for 
Eurafrica reduces the significance of such a policy when it finally was inscribed into 
supranational treaties.  
The imbrication of the nation-state and the empire had political and economic 
implications. For the French ahead of the Treaty of Rome negotiations, the idea of a West 
German economy that dwarfed that of France was unacceptable; were France to join the EEC 
without its overseas holdings, this would become a reality. In Guia Migani’s words, “the 
association of the overseas lands [pays d’outre-mer] would place France at the epicenter of 
European construction […].”47 But this was not just about prestige. Without financial assistance 
of the other members of the Six, France could not afford planned overseas economic and social 
development schemes and the overseas still represented a critical trade partner for French 
imports and exports.48 Although economic historian Jacques Marseille would argue that the loss 
of formal colonies allowed (the nation-state) France’s economy to flourish, a theme Daniel 
Lefeuvre then applied to Algeria, the French insistence that unified Europe cut deals with 
independent African states well into the 1970s reveals the longer life of the economic 
interconnections of Europe and Africa.49 Thus, we again see pragmatism in French decision-
making, though in a shape different from what historians have argued in the past. 
                                                        
47 Guia Migani, “L’Association des TOM au Marché Commun: Histoire d’un Accord Européen entre Cultures 
Economiques Différentes et Idéaux Politiques Communs, 1955-1957,” in L’Europe Unie et l’Afrique, 237. 
48 Ibid., 235-236. 
49 Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme français; Lefeuvre, Chère Algérie. 
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Hansen and Jonsson’s analysis of Eurafrica is also problematic for its single-minded 
critique of the neo-colonialism embedded within the ideology. Certainly, the interwar versions of 
Eurafrica, so often linked to fascist thinkers, embody the spirit of European colonialism. This 
was not eradicated after World War II, and in the minds of many proponents of Eurafrica, it 
indeed remained a policy intended to strengthen Europe’s grip on African markets. However, 
Eurafrican ideas ranged widely based on who was expressing them and at what moment in time. 
Thus, African elites figure amongst the proponents of postwar versions of Eurafrica; they viewed 
European integration exclusive of Africa as a potential threat to African states’ economic 
privileges vis-à-vis France. Further, they asserted that the link between Europe and Africa was 
more indissoluble than the bond between the European states themselves. 
Frederick Cooper’s thoroughly researched monograph on the elite African leaders who 
promoted federalism and advocated African citizenship within a French electoral system 
counterbalances Hansen and Jonsson’s analysis; read together, these two works can offer a fuller 
understanding of the political actors who embraced sometimes wildly different versions of 
Eurafrica. While Cooper might have delved further into the political and business interests that 
fueled some European visions of Eurafrica—hardly notions of brotherhood—he rightly posits 
that Eurafrica could hold strategic meaning not only for Europeans but also for Africans. Indeed, 
the French Union (and after 1958, the French Community) can be viewed as a type of 
international organization, akin in some ways, yet divergent from, the British Commonwealth. 
Cooper, by his own admission, calls "Africa's connections to Europe after the Treaty of Rome 
[…] beyond the scope" of his analysis. But he emphasizes "the tensions and complementarities 
between two modes of supranational or supraterritorial thinking at this time, one focused on 
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making a new Europe, the other on transforming an old empire."50 The citizenship regimes that 
are his focus were among the preoccupations of the policy makers who populate this dissertation. 
I analyze similar tensions and complementarities among thinkers (comprising Algerians as well 
as sub-Saharan Africans and French administrators), looking at how evolving postwar conditions 
guided particular versions of European borders.  
 
Sources: Repositories and Creators 
Understanding France’s postwar Eurafrica policy is key to puzzling out French officials’ 
strategies in Brussels and beyond. Yet existing studies on Eurafrica largely focus on sub-Saharan 
Africa, reproducing the organization of French administration and the colonial archives that 
separate Algeria, the Overseas Departments (DOM) and the Overseas Territories (TOM), all of 
which were treated under different laws and ministries.51 In fact, concerns about Algeria were 
bound up in policy discussions related to overseas departments, sub-Saharan Africa, and even 
poor European regions like the Italian Mezzogiorno. Archival material reveals that Eurafrican 
ideas dominated some of the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, as the French attempted to win 
from their European partners a commitment to such policies.  
 Research for this project brought me to numerous archives across France and in Italy. In 
France, I conducted research in the Archives Nationales (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine), Archives du 
Monde du Travail (Roubaix), Centre des Archives Economiques et Financières (Savigny-le-
                                                        
50 Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 268. 
51  The organization of extra-metropolitan territory under the Fourth Republic was:  DOM: French Guiana, 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, La Réunion; TOM: Western French Africa (AOF - Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast, 
Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta), Equatorial French Africa (AEF - Moyen-Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad, 
and Gabon), Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoros, Madagascar, French Somaliland, New Caledonia, French 
Establishments in Oceania (today’s French Polynesia), the French Southern and Antarctic lands; and trustee 
territories: the Republic of Togo and Cameroon. 
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Temple), Centre des Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (Aix-en-Provence), and Centre des 
Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (la Courneuve). These archives 
contain official ministerial documents, handwritten missives exchanged between ministers, and 
countless anonymously penned memoranda meditating on the complicated legal puzzles that 
faced France in the postwar era. Further research at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France 
François Mitterand (Paris) and the university libraries and archives of Université Paris Ouest—
Nanterre La Défense (Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine), Aix-
Marseille Université (Bibliothèque de Droit et d’Economie Schuman; Centre d’Acquisition et de 
Diffusion de l’Information Scientifique et Technique; Maison Méditerranéenne de la Science de 
l’Homme), and Sciences Po Paris (Archives d’Histoire Contemporaine) added a breadth to my 
source base, particularly thanks to their stores of publications by the administrators and policy 
makers who populate the pages of this work. The privately run Centre de Documentation 
Historique sur l’Algérie (Aix-en-Provence) and Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie 
(Perpignan) and numerous departmental and municipal archives in southern France provided 
periodicals that gave me a fuller sense of how the public consumed the events and policies on 
which my dissertation focuses. At the European University Institute in Florence, the Historical 
Archives of the European Union house an incomparable collection of documentation related to 
European integration, including records of negotiations for Europe-wide treaties, 
communications from member state governments, and publications. 
 Despite the archives’ disparate locations (Paris extramuros being the common 
denominator for many but not all) and the diverse ministerial affiliations indicated in their 
names, these collections are in conversation with one another, not least because they provide 
evidence of correspondence between ministries. In these records, certain figures stand out as key 
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to the insertion of Eurafrica and Algeria within the European project. These men (indeed, women 
figure only as silent, unnamed typists in these archives) penned memoranda, wrote one another 
personal notes (occasionally even employing the familiar tutoyer), and mentioned relevant 
colleagues and rivals. 
 Among the many men, some were high-ranking ministerial officials and diplomats, some 
acted as African leaders pre- and post-independence, and some are known as founders of Europe. 
Among the ministers, we will meet Christian Pineau, Gaston Defferre, and Michel Debré. 
Diplomats include Maurice Couve de Murville and Jean-Marc Boegner. The loudest African 
voice in the Eurafrican policy discussions was Senghor, but we will also see reformist work by 
the Senegalese statesman Lamine Guèye. After Algeria’s independence, leaders of the new state 
also enter this narrative; Ben Bella, as described above and in Chapter 5, is but one of these men. 
Foreign and French leaders involved in European integration included Robert Schuman and 
Walter Halstein. But very often, the authors of the records I analyze remain unnamed, 
presumably low- and mid-level civil servants compiling data ahead of meetings.  
Charles de Gaulle, a towering figure in modern French history, plays only a minor role in 
this story. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, the Fourth Republic toppling under the 
weight of the Algerian War, his entry had little impact on the Eurafrican policy I discuss. De 
Gaulle was known for being skeptical of European integration, which risked reducing French 
autonomy and raised the possibility of Britain (with America) drawing ever closer to Europe. 
However, I contend that we must see in early Fifth Republic decision-making an embrace of the 
European project as a means of maintaining control in the empire and relevance in Europe and 
the world. By not overstating the significance of the shift from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in 
the early days of European integration, particularly pertaining to Eurafrica, and by highlighting 
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the ways in which Brussels considered continued links to Algeria and Africa after formal 
decolonization, I reevaluate the traditional timeline of the process of decolonization. Thus, in the 
shift from the French Union to the French Community, as the respective postwar republics called 
France’s empire, analyzing continuity is key to understanding what decisions French authorities 
took. 
Finally, my archival data is revealing in its silence. In over 20 months in the archives, I 
can count on one hand the number of times I came across the word “war” in the boxes of 
documents pertaining to Algeria and the EEC. I take this silence as evidence of – initially – the 
lack of concern from French officials who understood the war as merely “the events.” Indeed, it 
demonstrates their conviction that France would win the war, rather than any notion of inevitable 
decolonization. It also showcases France’s sometimes strict, if confusing, bureaucracy, in which 
an administrator responsible for one domain would not delve into a subject far from his 
immediate duty. But most of all, I find that the Algerian War is indeed a spectral, silent presence 
in these archives. My findings reveal that the French saw the Treaty of Rome as a tool for 
diplomacy, allowing French officials to continue claiming Algeria as a part of France. While not 
explicitly talking about the war, these officials nonetheless attempted to enforce l’Algérie 
française’s survival through supranational diplomacy. 
 
Narrative Structure  
As I have already noted, the term “Eurafrica” meant different things depending on who 
advocated or denounced it, and when. It emerged in ideological and economic calls for European 
integration. And at times, those calls were made without evoking the term at all. We will witness 
these fluctuations in the chapters that follow. In the postwar era, French political actors and 
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business people continued to use the term Eurafrica. African leaders in France’s empire also 
employed the term, imbuing it with yet other meanings. Chapter 1 examines these postwar 
iterations of “Eurafrica,” as the word was applied to idealistic visions of a federative future 
between Europe and Africa, but also continued to offer Parisian officials the chance to dominate 
African markets. Eurafrica was but one of a variety of supranational schemes that gained in 
popularity after World War II. Pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism also drew supporters (and 
detractors) in this era and indeed, it was not clear to which, if any of these unions, Algeria might 
link itself. Thus, Chapter 1 challenges firm understandings of geographic limitations to “pan” 
movements of unity. Rather, officials and political thinkers displayed flexible notions of 
belongingness, exclusion, and the limits of “Europe” or “Africa.” 
The consequences of drawing lines were evident for some Eurafrican proponents after 
French officials declined to pursue the inclusion of overseas territories within the European Coal 
and Steel Community. Chapter 2 analyzes the outrage sparked in some Algerian circles after this 
exclusion occurred. These ramifications were especially disquieting in light of recent citizenship 
regime reforms across French Africa, and the increased move toward a new political relationship 
between Africa and the metropole, manifested by Gaston Defferre’s 1956 loi cadre (framework 
law). The question of Algeria and the overseas territories’ legal relationship with the metropole 
appeared far from settled. As legal scholars attempted to make sense of how Algeria’s status 
might be understood within the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, their publications 
revealed that Algeria was not simply the “intégrante” part of France that metropolitan politicians 
were fond of claiming.  
Yet the concerns of Algerian elected officials and French business leaders did not appear 
to have an immediate impact on the French administrators engaged in the European project. That 
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changed, however, soon after the launch of the ECSC. By the mid-1950s, French officials came 
to understand the crises in the colonies as being more serious than they had initially believed. A 
policy of Eurafrica, now inserted in negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, would be a political and 
economic tool through which to maintain control overseas. Chapter 3 analyzes the year prior to 
the treaty’s signature, during which time French officials finally embraced Eurafrican policy in 
the European project. This shift demonstrates that French officials believed they could solve 
problems of empire by offering new avenues of partnership—even federation—rather than by 
entirely ceding their claims to overseas territories. 
The Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the EEC, did little to clarify exactly how 
Algeria and the overseas holdings would relate to integrated Europe. Chapter 4 examines the five 
eventful years between the Treaty of Rome’s signing and the independence of Algeria, years that 
saw the intensification of the Algerian War, the fall of the Fourth Republic, and the 
independence of nearly the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Even as French officials in other 
offices were preparing for the independence of Algeria, officials engaged in Brussels continued 
to assert that the regulations of the EEC could and should extend to Algeria.  
Algeria’s independence in 1962 cannot be viewed as a clear break in the history of 
Eurafrica. Chapter 5 asks how French businessmen and the president of independent Algeria 
alike attempted to clarify, and perhaps maintain, strong ties between the independent state and 
the EEC. The willingness of French officials and some other members of the Six to consider 
these claims serves as evidence that the borders of Europe were still far from fixed, and that it 
remained possible for European officials to consider a Europe that traversed the Mediterranean. 
However, as Algerian leaders pursued other partnerships in the years after independence, French 
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leaders’ enthusiasm for the maintenance of these ties diminished. By the mid-1960s, it appeared 
that a Eurafrica inclusive of Algeria would not survive. 
Despite France’s loss of formal empire by 1962, I contend that the Eurafrican policy 
administrators fought to include in the Treaty of Rome continued to impact European-African 
relations. I conclude with a short case study of an uncomfortable reckoning between 
metropolitan French officials, the local administration of la Réunion, and the diplomatic corps of 
West Germany. In what at first glance appears to be a simple question of visa renewal in the 
mid-1960s, we see the broader implications of applying (or not) European regulations to another 
extrametropolitan department of France. This uncomfortable confrontation between French 
imperial and European interests—embodied in the fates of unnamed, unemployed overseas 
citizens and two West German mechanics—is evidence of the impact of France’s weaponizing of 
the Treaty of Rome in the midst of the Algerian War. Like the example of Algeria itself, 
discussed throughout the dissertation, this event demonstrates the complicated web of alliances 
that France struggled to balance in the postwar. This is apparent, as well, as I briefly address how 
French rhetoric about Algeria and Europe changed, notably in 1965. The episodes presented in 
the conclusion further demonstrate that even after the era of formal independence across Africa, 
France still made decisions as an empire, not as a pared-down nation-state.  
*** 
Returning to 1963, Ben Bella’s letter instigated a divide amongst officials in Brussels 
over their response. This dissertation will analyze the factors that opened the door for Ben 
Bella’s inquiry in the first place. It will then ask how the years of insisting on Algeria’s place 
within France, translated then into Algeria’s belonging within Europe, would impact the relations 
of independent states that continued to look toward Europe for financial assistance and trade 
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partnership into the late 20th century. I argue that European integration provided French officials 
a tool with which to launch a series of economic and political claims over the whole of France’s 
empire, with Algeria at the heart of this imperial vision. Claiming that the European Economic 
Community should be a sort of Eurafrican Economic Community, the French brought their 
“domestic” concerns about empire into the supranational arena. It is now our task to analyze 
when and how such ideas impacted the emergence of integrated Europe.
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Chapter 1 
 
Unions, Vows, and Exclusions in the Postwar 
 
 
In 1958, the pro-business, pro-Eurafrican magazine France Outremer’s cover shouted: 
Eurafrica… marriage of love or of convenience? An unfinished debate! 
[L’Eurafrique… mariage d’amour ou de raison? un débat qui n’est pas clos!]1 
Indeed, if the debate remained open in 1958, the notion of a wedding between or including both 
Europe and Africa was far from new. Marriage has long been a staple of diplomacy, from literal 
marriages of royal families (witness Queen Victoria’s grandchildren going to war in 1914) to 
figurative images of union (political cartoonists depicted the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as Stalin 
and Hitler walking down the aisle). 2  Vows weighed heavy on the minds of top European 
statesmen in the years after World War II. In the immediate postwar, European statesmen 
emphasized the necessity of Franco-German nuptials.3 But marital bliss would be hard to achieve 
if the six members of this marriage vow could not agree on how Africa—part stepchild, part 
jilted lover—would figure into the union.  
 The question of the place of Africa, and specifically Algeria, within integrated Europe is 
central to this dissertation. However, these tensions are often forgotten in favor of triumphalist 
narratives that focus on either European integration (with its current structure as the inevitable 
result) or decolonization (with an Africa fully unfettered from Europe). Such histories forget that 
African states did more than attend Europe’s wedding; for European and African statesmen alike, 
                                                        
1 Looming above this sentence was “Algérie,” in large block letters, although that referred to a different article. 
Centre de documentation sur l’Histoire de l’Algérie (CDHA): France Outremer, 339 [1958], Cover page. 
2 A simple dig through Google will furnish some examples. See, for example, cartoons found at these sites, both 
accessed 4 January 2017. “Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact,” http://inter-wars.weebly.com/nazi-soviet-non-
aggression -pact-1939.html; “Nazi-Soviet Alliance in Cartoons,” https://www.flickr.com/photos/stillunusual/sets/72 
157631606692716/.  
3 Cartoonists commemorated this “marriage.” For a collection of visual sources on the Franco-German union, see 
the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, “The ‘Franco-German duo’ and Europe as seen in cartoons 
(1945-2013),” last modified 24 November 2014, http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/c3c5e6c5-
1241-471d-9e3a-dc6e7202ca16. 
Brown • Chapter 1 30 
they were a critical part of the arrangement, even if disputes arose about exactly what role Africa 
would play.4 In fact, some statesmen understood the wedding bells of the early postwar era to be 
ringing not for the Six, but for Europe and Africa. This version of Eurafrica—romantic and 
pragmatic—reveals the degree to which European integration schemes merged with postwar 
planning for Africa. This, in turn, challenges the narratives that too often divide the histories of 
decolonization and European integration.  
This chapter examines the many forms of “union” imagined by French, European, 
African, and Arab officials in the postwar era. This includes the various diplomatic nuptials 
envisioned by France Outremer magazine and many others. It also includes the range of ways a 
diverse group of administrators and political thinkers employed the term “Eurafrica” in order to 
further a wide set of goals. I argue that understanding this Eurafrican rhetoric is key to 
understanding the assumptions and attitudes of the French administrators who would negotiate 
for European institutions. Although my dissertation’s overarching argument is that pragmatism – 
or at least a French version of what they believed to be pragmatic – had the ultimate influence on 
how such policies were pursued, no history of Eurafrica can be complete without addressing its 
ideological origins. What is more, I emphasize that visions of Algeria factored into such 
understandings of geography and influence; this furthers my insistence that we consider Algeria 
with French sub-Saharan Africa when analyzing postwar decisions. Finally, understanding the 
basic language of Eurafrica, particularly in its interwar guise, will familiarize readers with some 
                                                        
4 Hansen and Jonsson argue that the ideology of the interwar fed directly into postwar concepts of “Eurafrica.” They 
write, “In continuity with the ideational climate during the interwar period, [… a]gain, many asserted that it was 
through colonial cooperation, even integration, rather than going it alone, that the exhausted colonial powers in 
Western Europe were to […] redeem Europe’s global stamina.” This chapter agrees with their basic premise of 
European powers looking toward Africa for European strength, particularly evidenced by the international coterie of 
men who celebrated Eurafrica in the interwar. However, as later chapters will argue, Eurafrican policy remained a 
firmly French objective, with other European powers convinced (or not convinced) to varying degrees of the 
strategic importance of appeasing France, rather than the ideological or geopolitical significance for their own state 
to access the materials promised in a Eurafrican arrangement. Hansen and Jonnson, Eurafrica, 71-72. 
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of its proponents’ claims (though they were myriad and at times contradictory). As later chapters 
focus on trade and labor negotiations, the term “Eurafrica” will appear less, although it never 
entirely disappears. Here, I ask that readers consider the objectives of Eurafrican thinkers, so that 
they can recognize in later chapters the appearance of similar goals, now bundled into European 
economic policy. The keyword of this chapter is Eurafrica, but European proponents of Eurafrica 
held just minor influence over French administrators, who, as will be clear in Chapter 3, 
embraced a policy of Eurafrica only once it appeared to offer pragmatic benefits for France’s 
status as an empire. Those administrators, however, often used the language of the lobbyists and 
thinkers I will discuss in this chapter. They were also operating in an era of flux with regards to 
understandings of citizenship and belonging as it extended to France’s overseas holdings.5 Thus, 
I will address new citizenship regimes in late 1940s France before turning to the many voices 
calling for Eurafrican, Pan-Arab, or Pan-African unity.   
Eurafrica was but one of many visions of postwar unity. By the postwar, goals of a Pan-
Arab or Pan-African union also enjoyed renewed popularity. 6 The Cold War’s apparent bi-
polarity only added to the virulence with which proponents of these union schemes fought for 
                                                        
5 French administrators puzzled and fought over how to define citizenship in much of the 20th century, particularly 
as it related to colonial subjects. Richard Fogarty’s study of French colonial troops during World War I is indicative 
of French concerns about extending rights, particularly linked to fears of Islam that translated into limited or non-
existent rights for the vast majority of overseas tiralleurs who fought for France. Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War 
in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008), 169-201.  
6 Such ideology predates World War II and could include more expansive notions of belonging. Goebel argues that 
anti-imperialism and the precursors to Third World nationalism were in part rooted in interactions between non-
Europeans from all over the world, who found themselves in the same neighborhoods, cafes, and workers’ 
associations in the interwar. Michael Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third 
World Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). The significance of such ideology on the 
international stage should not be discounted. See, for example, G.N. Uzoigwe, “Pan-Africanism in World Politics: 
The Geopolitics of the Pan-African Movement, 1900-2000,” in Pan-Africanism and the Politics of African 
Citizenship and Identity, ed. Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien (New York: Routledge, 2014), 215-246. Postwar 
attempts to organize the world in these “pan” movements mattered; Nasser caused such consternation among 
European administrators that one joked, “We ought to erect a statue to Nasser. To the federator of Europe.” Louis 
Armand, EURATOM president, quoted in Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica, 238. 
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recognition of their imagined communities. 7  While the chapters that follow will take a 
chronological approach to analyze the decision-making processes related to Algeria, Eurafrica, 
and integrated Europe, this chapter seeks to examine some of the diverse claims on belonging, 
inclusion, and exclusion trumpeted by Europeans and Africans from 1945 until well after the 
wave of independence eradicated most formal European empires.8 In order to make sense of the 
economic-political (for indeed, they cannot be untwined) choices of the 1950s and 1960s, I first 
will therefore emphasize the ideological and, to some degree, intellectual field in which such 
ideas emerged. Taking stock of such ideas is imperative to a history of this era; it allows the 
historian to make sense of the range of possibilities imagined, and to take seriously why such 
ideas might emerge, among whom, and when.9 
 
La Mère Patrie, Citizenship, and the Emergence of Nationalist Conflicts in France’s Empire 
 Frantz Fanon, in A Dying Colonialism, asked, “Is anything more grotesque and 
humiliating and obscene than the appellation, ‘French-Moslems’?” 10  In my introduction, I 
detailed French claims that Algeria was a fundamental part of France, a “fact” cemented by 
French administrative practices in the departments. While future chapters will demonstrate that 
                                                        
7  Here I borrow from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). Larry Wolff’s study of the invention of Galicia is instructive here, as well, 
particularly in conversation with the historians of geography I reference in the introduction. Wolff is interested in 
“further the problem of how an imagined or invented entity, like Galicia in the eighteenth century, became 
geopolitically real, meaningful, and historical in the eighteenth century—before receding again into the domain of 
fantasy in the twentieth century.” The same problem can be puzzled out when the idea of Eurafrica is investigated. 
Larry Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 7. 
8  Lewis’ contextualization of “forum shopping” within the much grander narrative of imperial competition, 
sovereignty claims, and European diplomacy demonstrates how geographic certainties (North Africa; Tunisia; 
France; Italy; Europe) could be undermined by legal regimes and the citizenship rights they might entail. Lewis, 
Divided Rule, 40-53. 
9 Gary Wilder analyzes Senghor’s writing and speeches in the context of this moment. He argues that to make sense 
of Senghor’s versions of the future, “we need to revisit Senghor’s political project from the perspective of the 
postwar opening and think with him about that openness.” Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, 
and the Future of the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 136. 
10 Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, 2nd printing, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 30. 
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l’Algérie française was in fact a qualified moniker, here I will emphasize the most glaring 
example of disparity between the Algerian departments and the metropole: citizenship rights. 
Parsing through who counted as “French,” and how that might limit the reach of regulations and 
benefits emerging from integrated Europe (such as the free circulation of laborers), would prove 
awkward and contentious in the postwar years. I therefore begin by examining French attempts 
to extend (or not) citizenship rights to Algerian and other overseas residents, and how those 
attempts failed to quiet the nationalist movements whose voices grew louder in the years 
following World War II.11 This will allow me to contend, in later chapters, that it is only by 
accounting for empire that historians can understand the gravity and reach of European rights 
regimes related to social assistance and labor mobility. 
*** 
Algeria, after France’s loss in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), became a site for 
affirming power and prestige, securing economic benefits, and harnessing military and naval 
strongholds.12 This was in part achieved by encouraging European settlement there and also by 
extending French citizenship to sections of the populace. The Jewish community of Algeria 
gained French citizenship in 1870 through the Crémieux Decree. The assignment of citizenship 
status to the Jewish community reveals some of the confusion about who could count as French. 
Although some of the Jews of Algeria traced their roots to continental Europe, including 
Sephardic Jews who had fled the Spanish inquisition centuries earlier, others claimed millennia-
old roots in Algeria, as deep as those the French administration would label indigène or 
                                                        
11  Todd Shepard employs quotation marks around terms such as “Muslim” and “European” to challenge the 
assignment of such firm categories to groups of people. While acknowledging the much more complex web of 
identities at play in French Algeria, for the sake of simplicity I will not use quotation marks, but readers should be 
critical of religious or national labels. Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the 
Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2-3. See also Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un français?. 
12 These same uses for the colonies would be invoked implicitly and explicitly as France negotiated for a Eurafrican 
policy in European integration nearly a century later. 
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musulman.13 The limits of the Crémieux Decree’s application also demonstrate the importance of 
borders in practices of administration: only those Jews living in the three northern departments 
gained citizenship. Those in the Sahara (Mozabites) would be excluded until after World War 
II.14 
Most inhabitants of the three departments did not, of course, enjoy French citizenship 
rights. Dwarfing the small Jewish community, Algeria’s population prior to the arrival of the 
French mainly comprised Arab communities and Berber communities like the Kabyle. Despite 
linguistic and religious differences between and within these groups, the French tended to lump 
all of these subjects into the musulman category. 15 “Muslims” faced a narrow and hard-to-
achieve path to French citizenship: renouncing Koranic law and embracing only the Republican 
rule of law. Yet even those who took those steps rarely received citizenship.16 Those who did not 
attain it were governed by the punitive indigénat, an 1881 law separating French subjects from 
French citizens (this followed the 1865 Senatus-Consulate). 17  Meanwhile, in 1889, a law 
extended French citizenship to children born of foreigners in Algeria, applying to the offspring 
of settlers from Italy, Spain, and so on.18 A tangled combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis 
became part of the political life of its residents. The uniqueness of Algeria’s relationship to 
France—and the possibilities for citizenship that entailed—did in fact have a sort of corollary in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where the originaires of the Quatre Communes of Senegal held some 
French citizenship rights and yet maintained their personal status, meaning private affairs were 
                                                        
13 Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001), 9-10. 
14 For more on the Jewish community of Algeria and the Saharan divide, see Sarah Abrevaya Stein, Saharan Jews 
and the Fate of French Algeria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
15 The term “Algerian,” until the revolution of the mid-20th century, was applied mainly to the European population 
of the territory. 
16 Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 19-54. 
17 Michael Brett, “Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865,” Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 51, 3 (1988): 440-461. 
18 Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000, 246. 
Brown • Chapter 1 35 
still governed by local Islamic laws. 19 This hybrid form of citizenship was not available to 
Algerian men. 
The service of colonial subjects in World War I complicated questions of citizenship for 
the French government. Henry Simon, France’s Minister of the Colonies, told the Parliament in 
1918: 
[T]o fight in the first ranks of the French Army is, for our African subjects, to stand 
forever on the side of civilization […]. […] France, in return, must take care to prove to 
them her spirit of justice and her recognition.20 
Simon’s assertion was not universally accepted, as some French senators suggested alternatives 
such as promoting further association, so that, in the words of one senator, “the indigène [will] 
evolve not in our civilization, but in his own.”21 In fact, the end of the Great War saw little 
appreciable change in the rights enjoyed by residents in France’s empire, however. The 1919 
Jonnart Law, meant to ease the naturalization process for Algerians, had the opposite effect. This 
was in part because its wording blocked polygamists—a shrinking population in Algeria—from 
applying for naturalization, further codifying Islam’s “incompatibility” with French 
citizenship.22 Clearly, different rights regimes continued to reign in France during the interwar. 
Matters would only become more complicated during World War II and its aftermath. Algerian 
Jews saw their citizenship rights disappear when the Vichy government revoked the Crémieux 
Decree in 1940. Guadeloupe, a vieille colonie and part of France since 1674, where men had 
                                                        
19 This legal distinction appeared in 1848. Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 6. 
20 Cited in Fogarty, Race & War in France, 235-236. 
21 World War I offered an opportunity to reaffirm and bolster the citizenship of the Quatre Communes originaires; 
Blaise Diagne, first black African elected to the French Chamber of Deputies, asserted that the originaires, like 
other French citizens, should be conscripted into military service under the same regulations as metropolitan, not 
AOF, men. Ibid., 237-241. 
22 Ibid., 258-261. 
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enjoyed universal suffrage since 1871, also experienced the erasure of citizenship in those 
years.23  
 Meanwhile, the French army again called upon colonial troops, raising once more 
questions about military service and the rights it might entail. Even before the war’s end, in a 
March 7, 1944 ordinance, Charles de Gaulle assured the Français musulmans that they would 
enjoy equal rights to non-Muslims residing in Algeria. Thus, in theory, they could engage in free 
circulation to the metropole, although in practice transport to the metropole, let alone securing a 
job there, remained difficult and rare.24 Fourteen months later, on May 8, 1945, the same day 
that celebrations across Europe and Algeria marked Germany’s surrender, violent nationalist 
protests broke out in Sétif and Guelma. Over the course of nearly a week, Algerian protesters 
killed over 100 Europeans and injured one hundred more. The French response was brutal, with 
perhaps 6,000 Algerians killed by the French army.25 This repression had the opposite of the 
intended effect, inspiring in young Algerians a sense of nationalist defiance against the French.26 
What’s more 136,000 demobilized Algerians returned home, finding that, in the words of Martin 
Evans, “[t]he disjunction between the ideal of anti-Nazi liberation and the reality of French 
                                                        
23 Eric T. Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 
1940-1944 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 79-83. 
24  Alexis Spire, “D’une colonie à l’autre. La continuation des structures coloniales dans le traitement de 
l’immigration algérienne en France,” in L’esclavage, la colonisation, et après… France, Etats-Unis, Grande-
Bretagne, ed. Patrick Weil and Stéphane Dufoix, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 390. 
25 Estimates range wildly, from 1,020 at the low end of the French government’s Tubert Report to 45,000, as Cairo 
Radio claimed. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: New York Review Books, 
2006 edition), 27. See also Jean-Charles Jauffret, “The Origins of the Algerian War: The Reaction of France and its 
Army to the Two Emergencies of 8 May 1945 and 1 November 1954,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 21, 3 (1993): 17-29 and Martin Thomas, “Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State 
Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945,” Journal of Military History 75, 1 (2011): 125-157. 
26 Though many historians argue that the years between Sétif and the outbreak of the war in 1954 were quiet, there 
are indications that experts felt otherwise. For example, the political scientist (and at the time, graduate student) 
Manfred Halpern, himself a refugee from Nazi Germany in his youth, emphasized the myriad displays of 
discontentment, large and small, that emerged even after the May 1945 uprisings were quelled. Manfred Halpern, 
“The Algerian Uprising of 1945,” Middle East Journal 2, 2 (April 1948): 191-202. 
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Algeria could not have been more startling.”27 Some of these veterans would become founding 
members of the FLN. 
Repression was not the only French tactic, however. In the years after, French official 
attempted to quell Algerian unrest by offering further reforms to its citizenship regime, 
particularly through the September 20, 1947 loi portant statut organique de l’Algérie (Chapter 
2). But reforms of the late 1940s appeared to be too little too late in the eyes of evolving and 
growing nationalist movements. 28  Promises of full legal equality seemed dubious at best, 
considering the appalling living conditions of Algerian laborers who made it to the metropole 
and the continued dominance of men of European origin within local administration. Exclusions 
from citizenship undermined the by then decades-old French claim that l’Algérie française was a 
“partie intégrante” of France. 
 French administrators’ attempts to assure the Algerian population—“Muslim” and 
“European” alike—that the departments truly composed a fundamental part of France would be 
undermined by these same administrators’ decisions regarding the exclusion of the overseas 
territories from the ECSC (Treaty of Paris, 1951). I will analyze reactions to this exclusion in 
depth in Chapter 2, but here I will introduce one of the loudest indigène critics of that decision. 
At a 1952 Council of the Republic meeting, Senator Abdennour Tamzali reacted in outrage to the 
knowledge that the Algerian departments would be excluded from the Coal and Steel 
Community: 
Certainly, while we understand very well that the marriages of convenience between 
foreign economies, necessitated by political and economic imperatives, can be 
                                                        
27 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 94-95. 
28 On Algerian nationalism’s evolutions and divisions, see for example Rabah Aissaoui, “Fratricidal War: The 
Conflict between the Mouvement national algérien (MNA) and the Front de libération nationale (FLN) in France 
during the Algerian War (1954-1962),” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39, 2 (August 2012): 227-240 and 
Jeremy F. Lane, “Ferhat Abbas, Vichy’s National Revolution, and the Memory of the Royaume arabe,” L’Esprit 
Créateur 47, 1 (Spring 2007): 19-31. 
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contracted, we cannot however, resolve ourselves to be subjected to a discriminatory 
regime giving us the feeling—true or false—of being condemned to an experience of 
concubinage, [the] new form of economic indigénat from which Algeria can suffer.29 
Again, we see the metaphor of marriage introduced, now with Algeria suffering the indignity of 
being shunted to the side as a concubine as France wedded Europe. Tamzali’s critique extends 
beyond a notion of loyalties to Algeria and focuses on the economic risks to Algeria if it is not 
treated as a legal part of France. He would have decades of promises, and de Gaulle’s own 
assurances of Algeria’s equality, to back his denunciation of the decision. For French proponents 
of Eurafrica, the marriage was a vow of economic union, and abandoning, divorcing, or being 
unfaithful to Africa could prove disastrous for the war-weakened economies of France and 
Europe. 
 
Eurafrica I: Wedding Bells and Businessmen 
In the Introduction, I discussed how notions of a Eurafrican sphere, dominated typically 
by French actors, gained popularity in the interwar and indeed even impacted the outlook of 
some Vichy officials. Somewhat remarkably, the term Eurafrica, though popularized by 
proclaimed fascists, remained in use following World War II. Emerging from the brutality and 
shame of the war, French officials saw in Eurafrica a path to preserve France’s overseas 
strongholds while excising the now outmoded terms “colony” and “empire.” Unlike the interwar 
iterations of Eurafrica, this one typically envisioned brotherhood or unity—even wedding 
vows—between European and African populations, generally though not always avoiding the 
paternalistic language of the 1930s. Most critically, the French proponents of postwar Eurafrica 
                                                        
29 Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (CAOM) 81 F 2136: “‘L’Algérie ne doit souffrir—ni économiquement, ni 
socialement—de sa non-intégration dans le pool charbon-acier’ a souligné M. le sénateur Tamzali au Conseil de la 
République” in Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie, 3 April 1952. 
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presented it as a means of rebuilding and then preserving French economic might, devastated by 
the war. 
Some French advocates of Franco-African relations bemoaned the survival of the term. In 
an academic lecture in the early 1950s, to which we will return in Chapter 2, the French Union 
conseiller Georges Le Brun Keris complained:  
One hears a lot [On parle beaucoup] about Eurafrica. This is Mr. Guernier’s word, thus 
of French origin. It was created to endorse problematic concepts [conceptions 
critiquables] but was above all polluted by its usage by the German occupant. I am very 
surprised to see that the same vocabulary [un pareil vocable] has been taken up again, 
without any hesitation. We at least could make an effort of imagination and avoid using 
this word when we speak of any form of close association between Europe and Africa.30 
Despite his critique of the term, Keris still argued for the importance of such aims. French 
emphasis on these ties emerged as the war came to an end, and the ideas, as we have seen, 
predated 1945. That year, the French business leader Robert Lemaignen (whom we will see in a 
government post in Chapter 4) published an essay he wrote in 1943, which reflected the wartime 
mood. He concluded, “[I]f this imperial community can tomorrow be a living reality […] so that 
our sons – the sons of France of five continents – can forget this present nightmare […] they will 
march at the fore once again [ils marcheront, une fois de plus, les premiers].”31 Lemaignen’s 
choice of words reflects the larger shift in tone amongst French administrators following World 
War II.  Even before the guns had cooled, French rhetoric about the colonial connection turned 
from one of explicit hierarchy to one of a sort of equality in filial love of France (if not in 
citizenship rights). Lemaignen presented all French subjects and citizens as equal partners in 
France’s resurrection. Noteworthy, too, are the other essayists in the slim volume: Cambodian 
                                                        
30 CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2318: Georges Le Brun Keris, “L’Union Européenne,” lecture at the Collège Libre 
des Sciences Sociales et Economiques (Paris), Section d’Outre-Mer, 1951-1952 school year. 
31 Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (BDIC) S 27.453: Robert Lemaignen "L’Empire, 
Notre Espoir," in La Communauté Impériale Française (Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1945): 53. He would latter serve on 
the EEC Commission—DG VIII. 
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statesman Sisowath Youtévong and Léopold Senghor. Their participation demonstrates the turn 
toward new conversations about Franco-African or French Union relations, despite the 
unchanged French goals of maintaining economic control and political influence across the 
empire.  
The language of a union of men also emerged in pro-Eurafrican lobbying groups. For 
example, the 1953 manifesto of the Movement for Eurafrica declared that it would “topple the 
barrier that still exists too much between the races, and […] bring together, united freely and in 
brotherhood, men and women […].”  Its goal was nothing short of “Assur[ing] the economic 
prosperity, the valorization, the respect of civilizations, the cooperation demanded by the 
solidarity that unites the destiny of all Europeans and all Africans.”32 In its idealism, declaring 
itself apolitical and calling for a Europe open to Africans and an Africa open to Europeans, this 
organization decried colonialism and demanded, notably, a federalist future.  
 This is not to say that the older vestiges of Eurafrican ideology were eliminated. Robert 
de la Motte Saint Pierre, member of a family of planters with holdings in Madagascar, opined in 
1950 that “Africa is the natural prolongation of Europe.” Further still, he claimed that Europe’s 
need of food and industrial materials “could be entirely filled by African development.”33 Like 
Guernier or Orsini, these Eurafrican endeavors would continue to be defined primarily as a 
means of achieving European goals. In particular, de la Motte emphasized the importance of 
action taken by French Union officials and by private enterprises. These actions would be 
separate from, but complementary to, European-level projects. As we will see in subsequent 
chapters, although French officials increasingly promised the other members of the Six that they 
                                                        
32 CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2314: Pamphlet, Mouvement pour l’Eurafrique, 28 July 1953. 
33 CAOM 100 APOM 975: "Le Plan Schuman et le Continent Africain d’après une Note de M. Robert de la Motte 
Saint Pierre," August 1951.  
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would be equal partners within a Eurafrican union, French goals (and French dominance) would 
take primacy.  
Indeed, to what degree was Eurafrica ever really European in the eyes of French 
officials? Despite the continued focus on French-African relations within Eurafrican rhetoric, 
some French officials were uneasy with their colleague’s willingness to cede economic or 
political sovereignty in French-held African territories. Senator Michel Debré, who would serve 
as the first prime minister of the Fifth Republic, was generally dubious of European integration, 
and his skepticism was manifest in his dislike for Eurafrican ideology. In 1952, he argued that 
European integration would reduce France’s role as the key power in Africa. Rather than 
promoting European unity, the French should consider that they already had a stronger 
connection to their overseas holdings, while East and West Germans, for example, had a stronger 
natural bond than the one envisioned for France and West Germany.34 Debré’s concerns were 
perhaps partly assuaged by the exclusion of overseas territories from the Coal and Steel 
Community. But we will see Debré again in Chapter 4, still concerned about how European unity 
threatened France’s privileged role in African affairs.35   
 
A Third Way? 
While it did not win all French administrators to its side, the postwar guise of Eurafrica, 
like European integration itself, was recast as French and other European administrators realized 
that their nations’ status as world powers had quickly diminished as the chill of a bipolar Cold 
War set in. Bolstering relations with Africa would provide Europe with a “third way,” in which a 
                                                        
34  CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2314: Michel Debré, "Construit-on l’Europe," L’Information Economique & 
Financière, 26 November 1952. 
35 At the same time, public opinion in West Germany and Italy already leaned anti-colonialist by the early 1950s. 
CAOM: FR ANOM 61 COL 2314: Le Brun Keris, “Europe des Six et Union Française,” Monde Nouveau, Paru: 
Revue Mensuelle Internationale 63 (1952).  
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Eurafrican bloc could stand its ground between Soviet and American interests. Such a 
geopolitical reading of Eurafrica willfully ignored the racialized basis of Europe’s presence in 
Africa in the first place. This Eurafrica, one of equals (but as the French understood it, with 
Europeans firmly at the helm), would challenge the new world order. Linked with such federalist 
visions of the future were new ideas of French citizenship. In 1956, in a speech to young people 
from Bougie (likely of European origin) touring the metropole, European federalist Albert 
Gordiani emphasized the new possibilities:  
You see how France is captivating [attachante], diverse in its countryside, kind [douce] 
and welcoming; how much one feels proud and free on one’s soil [sol]. How [France] is 
respectful of diversity: the citizen of Dakar, whether black or white, feels equally at ease 
in Paris, Lille, or Bordeaux as in his native Senegal because everywhere in the 
Metropole, as in the Overseas, reigns the same spirit of liberty and respect.  
 
[…] And once you will have returned home, to your family, in that French province 
which is Algeria, you will see that France remains worthy of our love, regardless of our 
race or our religion […].36 
Gordiani’s certitude, spoken after the loss of Indochina, the launch of the Algerian War, and the 
independence of Morocco and Tunisia, can be read as highly naïve, coming from the perspective 
of a European. Alternatively, it can be understood as part of a tempered version of Eurafrica that 
reflected the new reticence about overtly colonialist assertions. While Gordiani’s speech 
concerned only the French Union, we see in it the same arguments that would emerge to promote 
Eurafrican ties. The continuity of the land, rather than the distinct rights regimes that had long 
divided different peoples, would be emphasized.  
Proponents would thus paint Eurafrica as a single continent, massive in scale and 
population, which would serve as a counterweight to a bipolar Cold War order. In his tellingly 
titled L’Eurafrique: Notre dernière chance (Eurafrica: Our Last Chance), published in 1955, 
                                                        
36  HAEU AMG-254: Albert M. Gordiani of the Mouvement Fédéraliste Français, “Campagne de Solidarité 
Métropole-Algérie,” speech to Bougie youth, 19 July 1956. 
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Pierre Nord (better known for his spy novels) emphasized Eurafrica as the third force in the Cold 
War, as opposed to a lonely Western Europe, “crushed between the USSR and the USA […].”37 
Only with Africa could Europe emerge as an equal (atomic) power. Nord envisioned the 
manufacture of atomic bombs in Africa, thanks to the mineral deposits found there. 38 Nord 
emphasized a Eurafrica that embraced African participation, noting that in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where there was one European for every thirty-seven Africans, Eurafrica would “not be made, or 
[would] not last, without the consent of Africans.”39 Nord’s view of Africans within the French 
Union proved quite rosy, and he asserted that the French colonial mission had created a legion of 
proud French Africans, in comparison with Belgian colonial subjects:  
[…W]hereas no Congolese told me “I am Belgian,” I need only set foot in Madagascar, 
AEF, [or] la Réunion, that the dozens of Noirs with whom I make contact tell me with 
nearly the ease and directness of a Picard or Breton, without my pushing them, by chance 
during a conversation, “I am French.” […] This is the proof of France’s exceptional 
success [réussite] in its colonizing work [œuvre colonisatrice].40  
Nord’s overt celebration of France’s “civilizing mission” would be at odds with the small group 
of African proponents of Eurafrica. We see here that a single term stood for a heterogeneous 
idea.  
The strength of this version of Eurafrica lay not only with its potential to combat 
European weakness in the Cold War, but also in its restructuring of European economic 
relations, now bolstered by African markets. This drew approval and concerns, notably when the 
“marriage” of France and Africa appeared to hang in the balance. For French officials, this could 
carry tremendous risk. Pierre Moussa, a civil servant who later became a major figure in the 
                                                        
37 BDIC S 58320: Pierre Nord, L’Eurafrique: Notre dernière chance (Paris : Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1955): 114. 
38 BDIC S 58320: Ibid., 11. This idea in fact had legs, but differently than Nord envisioned. New Caledonia, a 
French overseas holding, was soon to be a site of major nuclear tests. Natacha Gagné and Marie Salaün, “Les 
chemins de la décolonisation aujourd’hui: perspectives du Pacifique insulaire,” Critique Internationale 60, 3 (2013): 
111-132. 
39 BDIC S 58320: Nord, L’Eurafrique, 11. 
40 BDIC S 58320: Ibid., 103-104. 
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banking sector, published Les chances économiques de la Communauté franco-africaine in 1957 
while serving as director of Economic Affairs and the Plan within the Ministry of Overseas 
France.41 France, Moussa argued, already committed to a marriage with Africa through the zone 
franc, which comprised the whole of the French Union. The risk of “bigamy” loomed if France 
were it to privilege a hypothetical European common market or zone over the zone franc. This 
assertion came as the Mollet government faced a growing budget deficit and the mounting public 
critiques of the Algerian War.42 
Rather than disapprove of European integration, however, Moussa argued that the French 
must take up a policy of Eurafrica. This would safeguard French interests in Africa, allowing the 
zone franc marriage to thrive without introducing an unseemly bigamist tie. Moussa further 
emphasized the importance of French vows to Africa during a 1958 radio interview with 
journalist Jean Balensi. Balensi asked Moussa to comment on the continuing controversy 
regarding overseas France associating with the EEC, with some critics viewing the association as 
a “fool’s bargain” in which France handed over “the magnificent dowry of our overseas 
territories.” In response, Moussa defended the decision by pointing out that future accords would 
lead the other members of the Six to contribute more to Africa, and therefore get more in 
return.43 In an 11-page article by Moussa published a year earlier, Moussa repeatedly invoked 
the specter of bigamy, as well as the other unthinkable choice, “divorce,” if France opted to leave 
the old common market ties in favor of the new union.44 Europe and Africa, he claimed, were 
                                                        
41 Pierre Moussa, Les Chances économiques de la communauté franco-africaine (Paris: Armand Colin, 1957). He 
would also preside over the Commission of Overseas Territories within the OEEC (1959-1962).  
42 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 199-201, 215-216. 
43 Sciences Po Fonds Pierre Moussa (PM) 24: Interview à la Radiodiffusion (M. Jean BALENSI), Radiodiffusion-
Télévision Française, Service Economique et Social, 27 March 1958, 9:30am. 
44 Sciences Po PM 24: "L’Intégration des Territoires d’Outre-Mer et le Marché Commun," in Politique étrangère 22, 
1 (December 1957): 43. 
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“old historical comrades since the dawn of time.”45 This couching of French responsibility (and 
right of access) to Africa paired old Eurafrican paternalism with the postwar fraternal—even 
romantic—view of Franco-African relations. 
Marriage was not always viewed kindly in Eurafrican talks. In 1950, discussing the 
possibility of a Franco-German partnership in the earliest stages of European integration, Robert 
Schuman infamously said, “France can carry as a dowry, not only her equipment, but also the 
African market.”46 Communist representatives in the Assembly of the French Union cited this 
phrase in July of that year as they warned of the consequences for Africa of a pool franco-
allemand and demanded that France immediately cease negotiations for it.47 From the earliest 
postwar murmurs of European integration, advocates within France touted its African 
connections as an appealing “plus” for its European neighbors; within a decade, it was still not 
always clear who would be a partner in the marriage, and who might be abandoned for a newer, 
more promising bride.  
France did eventually take its vows with the Six and for a time it appeared that Africa 
also stood on the altar. During the interwar and in the postwar, French officials insisted upon the 
long history of Franco-African relations. Even after the independence of France’s African 
holdings, this vision of marriage did not simply disappear. In 1963, as EEC delegates prepared to 
sign an accord in Yaoundé with independent African states, French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Maurice Couve de Murville emphasized the importance of the accord, claiming: 
                                                        
45 Sciences Po PM 24: Ibid., 50. 
46 CAOM 4101 COL 695: Assemblée de l’Union Française, "Proposition, Tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à 
dénoncer les clauses des récents accords de Londres ayant trait aux territoires d’Afrique et arrêter tous les 
négociations en cours sur le pool franco-allemand en raison de ses conséquences africaines. Présentée par MM. 
FEIX, LOZERAY, THÉVENIN, BARBÉ et les membres du groupe Communiste, Conseillers de l’Union 
Française," Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 25 juillet 1950, Nº 221.  
47 CAOM 4101 COL 695: Assemblée de l’Union Française, 25 juillet 1950. 
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Purely national interest would lead us more to maintain with these countries our bilateral 
relations, which are excellent and will remain so, but we want to do more, which is to say 
to bring as a dowry to Europe, not these countries themselves, which are independent, but 
our good relations with them […].48 
In a somewhat remarkable appropriation of the dowry metaphor, France now had to offer not the 
African states (which by now had their own independent governments) but the track record of 
Franco-African relations. Such a claim attempted to skirt the more uncomfortable questions of 
France’s loyalties to its partners in Europe and now, in independent Africa. It also serves as a 
reminder of the willingness of some African leaders prior to independence to embrace these 
“good relations” as a means of promoting a federal future within the French Union.  
 
Eurafrica II: The Romance of Grands Ensembles 
Leaders within the French Union did not sit back while their wedding (or divorce) was 
planned on their behalf. For a small cadre of politically involved sub-Saharan Africans, 
including, most famously, the Senegalese statesman and poet Senghor, a federalist solution to the 
inequalities of French imperial dominance appeared a better choice than outright independence.49 
Despite the paternalism still latent in the language employed by the French businessmen and 
administrators discussed above, then, some African leaders imagined that their states, too, could 
walk down the aisle. However, a federalist future within the French Union was but one of many 
visions of unity proposed by political thinkers in the postwar era. In this era of grands ensembles, 
sub-Saharan and Maghrebi peoples heard promises that they belonged in a pan-Africa, with 
                                                        
48 Centre des Archives Economiques et Financières (CAEF) B 0062169 (Formerly B 25.363): Jean-Marc Boegner 
telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, “Yaoundé I, préparation et négociations de la Convention 
d’association de la CEE avec les Etats africains et malgache associés (EAMA) (1961-1965),” 26 February 1963. 
49 Guinea’s economic fate after it refused the join the French Community would prove a cautionary tale. For 
example, upon rejecting entry into the French Community, Guinea’s export of bananas fell from 74,000 metric tons 
sold on the “national market” in 1958 to 28,000 the following year. By 1960, Guinea’s banana export had 
“disappeared.” CAEF B 0017739/1: Le Conseil, Communauté Economique Européenne, "Note d’Information sur la 
2ème session de la Commission Economique pour l’Afrique (Tanger 26.1/6.2.1960)," 12 February 1960. 
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North Africans also being wooed by pan-Arabist movements.50 Like European integration itself, 
then, Eurafrica can be considered as one feature in a larger landscape of postwar integration 
schemes. 
African leaders harnessed the idealism and the pragmatism of Eurafrican policies, but 
recast Africa as an equal partner in the endeavor. In August 1950, one month after Schuman’s 
unsavory comment, Ousmane Socé Diop, a Senegalese senator serving as a French delegate in 
the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, argued that the proposed “dowry” alienated Africans at the 
precise moment that Europeans would need them most. Rather, Europeans should focus on the 
“construction” of “an economic house, habitable for them [Africans].” To do otherwise would 
“justify the wisecrack [boutade] expressed in our extreme left press, which says that in the 
execution of the Schuman Plan, France will bring Africa as a marriage gift to Germany.” Playing 
on Cold War fears, Diop warned that Africa’s “148 million consumers and producers” had 
already drawn the attention of America and “maybe tomorrow, the USSR.” Further still, he 
suggested that if Europe did not understand until it was “too late that its influence in Africa can 
completely disappear,” Africa risked becoming the next Southeast Asia. This was an unsubtle 
reference to the ongoing war in French Indochina. Africa should, however, embrace the “creation 
of this third continent,” furthering the “Western culture” it already embraced in order to 
“gradually bring African populations to the European level.” Africa must not be the “wedding 
gift, but the best man [garçon d’honneur] who will have his place at the head table [table du 
festin].”51 
                                                        
50 Todd Shepard, “A l’heure des ‘grands ensembles’ et de la guerre d’Algérie: L’‘Etat-nation’ en question,” trans. 
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Indeed, if Schuman drew the ire of African leaders, appropriating the image of marriage 
proved useful for their own claims-making. Senghor critiqued the metaphor but not the marriage, 
asserting Africa’s real power within Europe, not as a gift, but as an active participant.52 In 1953, 
Senghor, also a French delegate in the Council of Europe, made an appeal in Strasbourg. The 
participation of overseas territories in an integrated Europe was, he argued, the most important 
moral and political question facing those metropolitan states. Claiming to speak in the name of 
“the vast majority of the African deputies in the French National Assembly,” he declared:  
[W]e are for the European Community and, beyond that, for the Eurafrican Community. 
We are for Franco-German reconciliation [;] we would like, in this marriage of reason, to 
be the [members of the wedding entourage] who carry the veil of the bride; we refuse to 
be the wedding gift or the dishes that pay the price in a domestic spat [la vaisselle qui fait 
les frais de scènes de ménage], or the dolls to amuse the children of tomorrow. We are 
neither things nor dolls. We are living men; the ends, not the means.  
 
Of course, men of revolution are always considered crazy. But you know that wisdom 
often borrows the clothing of madness. We are the fous d’outre-mer.53 Can you be those 
of Europe so that together we can construct a new Europe that will not be made of 
historical memories, but of living realities; a Eurafrique, like genuine Europe, motherland 
of man[?]54 
A few months later, in an article in Le Monde, Senghor dismissed those who would reject 
Eurafrica as a German idea. He scoffed, “What does it matter, if it’s correct!” In his reading of 
Eurafrica, it is “one of those classic ideas that have always animated the vision of great men and 
great people. For the ancients, the Mediterranean was nothing other than an interior sea, a 
                                                        
52 Cooper writes, “Senghor saw social rights—not just political ones—flowing from the French Constitution […].” 
Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 189. 
53 This is a repurposing of the term “fous de la République,” used to describe Jewish politicians who rose through 
the meritocratic ranks of the Third Republic without having to convert or hide their identity and who displayed 
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lake.”55 Senghor’s embrace of a version of Eurafrica (and of federalism) that could place African 
men on equal footing with their European counterparts is a far cry from the Mittelafrikan dreams 
of interwar fascists. At the same time, it speaks to the usefulness of the term to encompass a 
number of different goals and ideals promoted by various politicians and administrators.  These 
goals were pragmatic. Senghor wrote, “Africa and Europe, simultaneously neighbors and 
different, are complementary. I am passing over without comment [sous silence] ethnological 
and cultural arguments. Let’s talk about the economy and leave the figures to stick, naked [nus], 
in our memory.”56  
Eurafrica certainly did not enjoy universal appeal amongst African leaders, however. In 
1957, the Guinean politician Diawadou Barry ironically invoked the language of André 
Demaison (a French novelist who penned the companion guide for the 1931 Paris Colonial 
Exposition). Calling Africa “the cake of European reconciliation,” he suggested that the 
European project marked France’s decline and a new era of European neo-colonialism.57 There 
were, however, alternatives to combat European dominance over “Eurafrica.” These included 
“pan-ism” movements that claimed to embrace all of an African or Arab world. Such ideas were 
not new to the postwar; both Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism predate World War II. However, 
prominent voices promoting grands ensembles emerged after the war, embracing older ideals of 
sweeping communities with new calls for liberation from European colonialism. 
Contemporaries of the postwar iterations of pan-Africanism warned of the importance of 
understanding the “capital letter” Pan-Africanism, which between 1919 and 1945 hosted five 
                                                        
55 This was not a new idea. Mussolini embraced the Mediterranean as Mare Nostrum and emphasized its centrality 
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Congresses attended by W.E.B. DuBois, and “small letter” pan-Africanism, “a group of 
movements, many very ephemeral. […] The complicated history of négritude is a good example 
of this.”58 These movements were in no way confined to the African continent. Marcus Garvey’s 
Back to Africa movement, for example, helped to inspire future pan-Africanists, particularly 
African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah.59 And, as we will see below, the Egyptian leader Gamel 
Nasser also made claims of leading a pan-African world. The question of who could count as 
African invited tensions between leaders of independent African states by the late 1960s. 
The postwar era thus opened the possibility for a variety of links of solidarity—and 
foreclosures—of such unity. Senghor’s legacy is one such example. We have already seen his 
advocacy of a federative future between Africa and France, built on notions of common 
republican ideals and a deeply intertwined past. For Senghor, “Africa” suggested a fluidity of 
borders. At the July 1958 Couton Congress, he noted, “When we say ‘Afrique Noire,’ we omit 
[n’oublions] neither the Antilles nor the Pacific islands, even less so Madagascar, all territories to 
which we are linked by our situation as colonized peoples, if not by links of blood.”60 North 
Africa, however, would not be included. This is most clear in the fight that erupted between 
Senghor and Olusegun Obasanjo at the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and 
Culture (FESTAC 77). In the run-up to the Lagos festival, Senghor argued that Algeria should 
only enjoy an observer status, which anthropologist Andrew Apter interprets as Senghor’s 
attempt at retribution after radical critiques of Negritude were voiced at Africanist conventions in 
                                                        
58 George Shepperson, “Pan-Africanism and ‘Pan-Africanism’: Some Historical Notes,” Phylon 23, 4 (4th Quarter, 
1962): 346. 
59 Ibid., 347-348. Nkrumah’s 1963 speech in Addis Abbaba, “Africa Must Unite Now or Perish,” and the publication 
of a book expanding this declaration evince how different leaders understood the imperative of supranational 
organization in the postwar. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963). 
60 Shepperson, “Pan-Africanism,” 356. My translation of the original French quote. 
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late 1960s Algeria.61 It is also demonstrative of “competing Afrocentric frameworks that clashed 
over the North African or ‘Arab’ question.”62 
I contend that Senghor’s insistence that Algeria not fully participate is also indicative of 
the survival of the French colonial mentality that proclaimed North Africa as amputated from the 
rest of the African continent. As I argued in my introduction, this nominal organization was often 
blurred by French policy decisions that appeared to impact both North and sub-Saharan Africa: 
The inclusion of overseas France in the EEC is a particularly clear example of this overlap. It is 
clear that the Sahara was not always the impenetrable border zone that French colonists insisted 
it was.  Yet the Algerian delegation at FESTAC 77 did not appear particularly concerned over 
whether they could fully participate. By then, Algerian leaders saw open before them other 
transnational connections, particularly the Pan-Arabist movement, to which we will return in 
Chapter 5.  
Algerian leaders were also interested in a Maghrebi organization, albeit unbound from 
the former French colonizer. Todd Shepard traces some of the potential groups that attracted 
Algerian leaders as part of his study on the “era of grands ensembles.” 63 Algerian leaders looked 
toward association with their neighbors, in a Union du Maghreb arabe or a “Tunigérie” linking 
Tunisia and Algeria.64 For the FLN, “the idea of a Maghrebine Federation” contrasted sharply 
with French “pseudo-federalism,” a “retrograde and bastard federalism […].” 65 This critique 
makes clear that the FLN viewed the French restructuring of empire and the trend toward 
pushing for a Eurafrica within European integration as threats to Algerian nationalists’ claims. 
                                                        
61 Andrew Apter, “Beyond Négritude: Black Cultural Citizenship and the Arab question in FESTAC 77,” Journal of 
African Cultural Studies 28, 3 (2016): 313-326. 
62 Apter, “Beyond Négritude,” 313-314. 
63 Shepard, “A l’heure des ‘grands ensembles,’” 133. 
64 Ibid., 114. 
65 Ibid., 129. Quoting “Études juridiques de droit international (reconnaissance du Gouvernement algérien),” March 
1957.  
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After independence, other forms of international and supranational organization, such as those 
discussed above, became more appealing and more useful to Algerians seeking a new political 
organization in the wake of decolonization. 
However, we should question the impassability of the Sahara in the eyes of major Pan-
Arabist leaders. Even the distinctions between Pan-African and Pan-Arab worlds could be 
blurred. The political scholar Rouhollah K. Ramazani argued in 1964 that the Egyptian leader 
Gamel Nasser carried the “well-known ambition to guide the Pan-African movement.” 66 
Nasser’s 1955 Egypt’s Liberation appeared to bear out this desire, as Nasser declared: 
I may say without exaggeration that we cannot, under any circumstances, however much 
we might desire it, remain aloof from the terrible and sanguinary conflict going on there 
today between five million whites and 200 million Africans. We cannot do so for an 
important and obvious reason: we are in Africa. […] We will never in any circumstances 
be able to relinquish our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of 
enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle.67 
Nasser’s African calculus fits within the narrative of American anxiety over containment and the 
tensions of spheres of influence in the so-called Third World. Nasser’s declaration is also notable 
for its similarity to European claims on Africa. Where once Africa “needed” Europe, now Africa 
would turn to Egypt. Egypt, itself an African state, would save the rest of the continent from the 
darkness of European colonial rule.  
To Ramazani, Nasser’s eagerness to exert control—even to expand an Arab Common 
Market—into Africa could help explain why “Arab literature is replete with all sorts of 
denunciations of the [European] Common Market,” including the risk of “eventual Israeli 
association.” The market is “suspect because it seems to rob the Arabs of potential leadership of 
                                                        
66 Médiathèque de la Maison méditerranénne des sciences de l’homme (MMSH) 8-25615: Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 
The Middle East and the European Common Market (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1964), 91. 
67 Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, 1955 edition, quoted in Ramazani, 
The Middle East, 91. 
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Pan-Africanism […].”68 In an era of mounting fears about Cold War bipolarity, it should come 
as no surprise that a scholar in the United States would look at Egyptian motivations with such 
suspicion. Yet the notion of Egypt poised to lead either a pan-Arab or a pan-African world points 
to the range of possible political associations to be made in this era and to elastic notions of 
borders that could expand or contract according to political need.  
 
Conclusion: A March Down the Aisle 
This chapter has demonstrated the variety of voices calling for integration schemes, 
Eurafrican and otherwise, in the postwar era. To a stunning degree, political thinkers claiming to 
promote “Eurafrica” assigned that term to a range of policy goals and ideological claims. Thus, 
French business leaders worried about their stakes in African markets employed the same term 
used by African statesmen like Senghor who asserted a future of federative equality across the 
whole of the French Union. Taking stock of the mutable definition of Eurafrica and the stakes of 
the many actors promoting it will allow us to better understand the motivations and tactics of the 
French officials who, by 1956, embraced “Eurafrica” as a non-negotiable feature of the European 
project. 
When the magazine France Outremer, whose screaming headline opened this chapter, 
organized the 1958 Eurafrican “breakfast debate,” it gathered together French businessmen and 
administrators who emphasized the economic importance of Eurafrica to speak alongside 
African proponents who pushed for brotherhood between the French and Africans. Old fights set 
aside, it appeared that Europe (or at least France) and Africa (or at least French Africa) were 
ready to tie the Eurafrican knot. It was no mistake that Schuman, chastened by his years earlier 
“dowry” comment, presided over the event. Guernier, author of L’Afrique, Champ d’expansion 
                                                        
68 MMSH 8-25615: Ramazani, The Middle East, 99. 
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de l’Europe, would act as “spokesman” for Europe. Senghor and Mali’s future first president 
Modibo Keita, would shoulder that role on behalf of Africa.69 Senghor’s subject? “[W]hat Africa 
has placed into the marriage dowry [corbeille de marriage].”70 
In his introductory remarks, Schuman drew smiles from the audience when he made the 
self-deprecating comment that “for average Frenchmen,” including “parliamentarians and even 
former ministers, […] awareness [connaissances] of this subject [Eurafrica] generally dates from 
1955.”71 Such a statement could serve to exonerate Schuman from his earlier ignorance. It also 
confirms my contention, which I will expand in the chapters to come, that it was only after the 
escalation of colonial crises in the mid-1950s that such an ideology took hold of the wider 
political establishment in France. Thus, Schuman’s presence at the 1958 meeting would serve to 
signal his evolved understanding of Eurafrica as a project of unity between Europe and Africa, 
such that the marriage did not exclude the latter, but rather embraced it.  
Senghor and Keita’s presence would solidify this image, in a way that the “debate” 
unfolded as a series of like-minded, pro-Eurafrican declarations. Jean-Max Lenormand, the 
director of France-Outremer, who took up the microphone after Schuman, put this new version 
of the marriage metaphor to use, now seeing the bride and groom not as the Six, but as the Six 
joining with African states. In an address that sounded at turns like a Eurafrica stump speech and 
like mid-19th-century wedding-night advice to a nervous bride, he declared: 
Marriage of love…, marriage of convenience…, arbitrary concepts [formules], certainly, 
but through them we can pursue indefinitely the debate on the respective merits of unions 
based, [… either on] the immaterial, […] or on practical considerations. 
                                                        
69 Guernier, who earned a law degree in Paris, spent much of his early career in Morocco at the Casablanca Chamber 
of Commerce and would later teach political economy at a university there and, later, at Sciences Po, Paris. He also 
served as a counselor of external commerce for France and was president of the technical committee of patents. It 
was his adoption of the term Eurafrica that Keris had critiqued in the mid-1950s, even as Keris and others embraced 
his assertion that France and Africa be indissolubly bound. CDHA: France Outremer, No. 339 [1958]. 
70 Literally, “marriage basket.” CDHA: Ibid., 19. 
71 CDHA: Ibid., 18. 
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Those who are convinced that one cannot construct anything without love defend their 
thesis with enthusiasm. 
 
Partisans of the marriage of convenience are more discrete and seem to experience some 
effort to assert their point of view, never appearing disinterested. 
 
But the most farsighted, do they not allow that the love will be more durable if it is 
sustained by a “reason” that will be even more so? 
 
After a long engagement, the spouses Europe and Africa consummate [their marriage]. 
 
Those who guided the adolescence of one and the other and who watched with joy and 
emotion at their meeting now think of their future.72 
The road to this marriage night was a difficult one. The possibilities for different forms of 
unions, and the initial reluctance on the part of French administrators to see Eurafrica as a viable 
policy, rather than new method of discussing Franco-African relations, were reflected in the 
exclusion of France’s overseas holdings from the European Coal and Steel Community. In the 
chapters that follow, we will track the progression of French administrators’ attitudes toward 
Eurafrica.  
 The term “Eurafrica” was employed unevenly by advocates of the close integration of 
Algeria or of the whole of the French Union within the EEC. Its intermittent use by French 
negotiators in Brussels, as well as the presence of the thinkers I discussed in this chapter in Paris 
and across Europe, suggests that even when the term was not explicitly used, the ideology 
remained on the minds of those who sought to implement such policies. However, it was not the 
ideology alone, but the pragmatic need to implement such policies for diplomatic and 
(especially) economic reasons that Eurafrican policy appeared to come into fruition. Yet as the 
following chapter will demonstrate, colonial concerns were not the only issues weighing on the 
minds of European administrators after World War II. And Eurafrica was far from the only way 
to approach European integration negotiations. Reactions to Algeria’s exclusion from the ECSC 
                                                        
72 CDHA: Ibid., 18. 
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and publications by French jurists who were unsure of how to understand Algeria’s legal status 
within the two postwar constitutions of the French Republic demonstrate that French officials 
were far from certain of how to make sense of the metropole’s relationship to Algeria in the 
postwar era. It is to these debates, and the practical legal considerations of Eurafrican policy, that 
we will now turn. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Integrating Imperial Europe while Excluding Empire (1951-1958) 
 
After decades of Franco-German conflict and warfare, the symbolism of the European 
Coal and Steel Community was not lost on its original members. When the Six signed the Treaty 
of Paris in 1951, they understood this gesture as the launch of a new, peaceful stage in European 
history, in which mistakes like the punitive nature of the Versailles Treaty would not be 
repeated.1  Coal and steel were, of course, the raw materials of the wars of recent memory and a 
source of industrial competition that exacerbated tense relations. Thus, the ECSC would be a first 
step in European reconciliation and integration.2 The France that signed the treaty was very 
much still an empire. Changes to that status would be uneven and at times extraordinarily 
violent. The Lamine Guèye law, extending French citizenship to overseas residents, was only 
five years old. France’s exit from Indochina, on the heels of the loss at Dien Bien Phu, would not 
come until 1954.3 The reformist loi cadre (framework law) of Gaston Defferre, which reformed 
electoral representation and administrative practices in the overseas territories, would be passed 
in 1956. And in Algeria, while measures like the statut organique (1947) emerged, creating an 
Algerian assembly and theoretically extending equal citizenship rights across the population, the 
                                                        
1 The standard trope of European integration historians emphasizes the institutions’ stabilizing outcome: "The 
primary impulse for supranational government in Europe has always been the pressing need to stop members of the 
European family from slaughtering one [an]other.” Mark Gilbert, European Integration: A Concise History 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 16. Although some historians are now reevaluating the Versailles Treaty 
and its legacy, I am interested in how officials in the postwar would have understood the perceived mistakes of the 
early post-World War I era. For an example of a historian challenging the line draw from Versailles to World War 
II, see Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-33 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005).  
2 The Schuman Plan, named for French foreign minister Robert Schuman and largely crafted by Jean Monnet, was 
recalled by Dean Acheson as “so breath-taking a step towards the unification of Europe that at first I did not grasp 
it.” Quoted in Gilbert, European Integration, 27.  
3 France’s loss of its southeast Asian colony falls outside of the purview of this dissertation. However, it is critical to 
acknowledge that in leaving Indochina, French administrators now took more seriously the imperative of retaining 
trade ties and political control over the remainder of France’s empire. Yet France’s war in Indochina also had 
implications for its European ambitions. Mark Thompson, “Defending the Rhine in Asia: France’s 1951 
Reinforcement Debate and French International Ambitions,” French Historical Studies 38, 3 (August 2015): 473-
499. 
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French government largely conducted business as usual in the departments south of the 
Mediterranean. These developments in France’s empire force us to reframe the postwar era and 
consider how what occurred outside of the continent of Europe could come to influence the 
choices made about how Europe would formulate its integration schemes, particularly related to 
labor, agriculture, and aid.  
Indeed, Algeria in 1951 remained l’Algérie française, part of a France that stretched 
“from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset,” as French officials were fond of saying.4 And yet, the Treaty of 
Paris would outright exclude extra-metropolitan territory, drawing a clear line between 
Continental France (inclusive of island Corsica) and the Algerian departments.5 Such exclusion 
suggests that despite language that insisted upon the French quality of Algeria, officials already 
acknowledged that the territory was not equivalent to departments on the Continent.6 In 1951, 
French officials were willing to distance metropolitan France from its overseas holdings, namely 
Algeria, in order to achieve the most pressing goal of the day: European integration. In the name 
of pragmatism, they approved a version of French borders encompassing decidedly less territory 
than the amount administrators preferred to depict as the extent of France’s reach. 
                                                        
4 This declaration arises often. In one case, an administrator declared, “To consecrate the existence of a single Patrie 
from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset, such is the goal [objet] of the present law.” CAOM 81 F 1169: “Projet remis par 
Monsieur Vinciguerra, Exposé des Motifs,” n.d. (likely 1959). 
5  Corsica’s place in French imperial history is striking, both for its own “outsider” status and for the deep 
involvement of Corsicans in the French colonial project. On the former, scholars have investigated a number of 
different angles, including the identity of the most famous Corsican, Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as how Corsican 
identity was shaped by – and helped shape – the island’s responses during World War II. See, for example Philip G. 
Dwyer, “From Corsican Nationalist to French Revolutionary: Problems of Identity in the Writings of the Young 
Napoleon, 1785-1793,” French History 16, 2 (June 2002): 132-152 and Karine Varley, “Between Vichy France and 
Fascist Italy: Redefining Identity and the Enemy in Corsica during the Second World War,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 47, 3 (July 2012): 505-527. On the latter, see Vanina Profizi, “Les fonctionnaires d’origine 
corse en AOF (1900-1920). Une identité régionale en context colonial,” Outre-mers 98, 370 (2011): 31-42 and 
Pascal Bonacorsi, “Au service de la ‘Plus grande France.’ Histoire et mémoire des Corses en Indochine, XIXe-XXe 
siècle,” Bulletin de l’Institut Pierre Renouvin 39, 1 (Spring 2014): 91-101. 
6 Such understandings about Algeria’s place within the French legal system might be read in conversation with 
analyses of Puerto Rico and the United States. See, for example, César J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabe, Puerto Rico in 
the American Century: A History since 1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 
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This chapter opens by discussing the exclusion of overseas France from the Treaty of 
Paris, including the outrage this sparked in some circles in Algeria. It will then turn to the 
practical considerations of such an exclusion, and the impact officials thought it might have on 
Algerian trade. Finally, it will present attempts at legal and economic reform, notably Gaston 
Defferre’s loi-cadre for sub-Saharan Africa and the Constantine Plan for Algeria. These 
reformist efforts, combined with constitutional debates, demonstrate that French officials were 
far from certain about how exactly Algeria fit within the constellation of juridical demarcations 
such as Overseas Department (Département d’outre-mer, DOM), Overseas Territory (Territoire 
d’outre-mer, TOM), and metropole. 7  However, neither were these officials willing to cede 
France’s legal claim to Algeria. Rather, these reforms and constitutional inquiries are evidence of 
the earnestness with which French officials would make claims to Algeria’s place within the 
Treaty of Rome (Chapter 3). As the ECSC exclusion demonstrates, legal scholars’ concerns 
alone were not enough to persuade French officials that such an integration was necessary. 
However, their assertion that it was legally questionable to excise Algeria from the metropole, 
coupled with the emerging colonial crises, notably the loss of Indochina (1954), the start of the 
Algerian War (1954), and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia (1956), would be enough to 
shift France’s direction by the 1956 Treaty of Rome negotiations. Rather than exclude overseas 
holdings from the Treaty of Rome, French officials would by 1956 understand European 
integration as a tool for maintaining control across the French empire. Finally, this present 
chapter will demonstrate that the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics both cemented a 
legal definition of Algeria as a unique part of the French empire, but also stopped short of 
defining exactly what that uniqueness would entail. Such understandings of Algeria’s place with 
the French Union and, after 1958, the French Community, suggest that while French officials 
                                                        
7 Here, Wilder’s discussion of political rationality is instructive. Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State, 44-47. 
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were far from willing to step away from their interests in Algeria, neither were they wholly 
convinced that it was, truly, France. And yet, these jurists understood that Algeria remained 
dissimilar to traditional colonies, raising complex questions of the limits of France’s borders and 
its responsibilities to Algeria’s residents. These legal sources demonstrate the opaque quality of 
Algeria’s relationship to the metropole prior to the outbreak of the Algerian War but, just as 
critically, demonstrate that contemporary commentators understood the early Eurocentric 
versions of the Europe project as unworkable, given Algeria’s unique status within France. This 
chapter asks: Why were the colonies excluded from the European Coal and Steel Community 
and how did this exclusion help push French administrators to act differently when negotiating 
the Treaty of Rome? How did legal definitions of France and its departments impact the way 
administrators approached the negotiating table?  
In the span of five years, the French government shifted from signing a treaty of 
European integration that explicitly excluded overseas territories to refusing to sign a treaty of 
European integration without the guarantee that it would include an association with overseas 
territories. This change appears both abrupt and gradual. It was abrupt in that France’s Eurafrican 
sine qua non during Treaty of Rome negotiations in 1956 appeared swiftly, seemingly from 
Gaston Defferre’s office (Chapter 3). Yet it was gradual, as business and legal concerns were 
voiced in increasingly loud tones over the course of the mid-1950s.  The interim period reveals 
the ambivalence of French officials as they weighed the pros and cons of joining the French 
Union with a European union. I argue that while Eurafrican ideas gained more traction following 
World War II (Chapter 1), the early years of European integration failed to account for the 
colonies in large part because European statesmen were not yet concerned with the potential loss 
of empire; they did not see the “inevitability” of decolonization or the pragmatic application of 
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Eurafrica. 8  Thus, integration without colonies appeared unproblematic, as the empire was 
relegated to the sphere of domestic interest, in contrast to the supranational gaze of European 
integration.  
 
France’s “Second Rate Relations”: An ECSC without Empire 
The well-trodden version of the ECSC’s birth emphasizes a broken Europe emerging 
from the wreckage of World War II to form a united (capitalist) body that would encourage 
stability and recovery. Not only were Eurafrican proponents a part of the push to form an 
integrated Europe, some of its greatest advocates had the ear of Europe’s architects. The 
omission from the ECSC of overseas holdings cannot be viewed solely as the result of the 
absence of coal and steel in Africa. Much of the continental territory of the Six also lacked such 
natural resources (and indeed, proponents of Eurafrica were eager to tap into the natural 
resources that Africa did contain). Rather, the French Union—Algeria included—was absent 
from Coal and Steel provisions because French officials did not yet realize that they would need 
to wield diplomatic weapons to preserve their colonial holdings in Africa.9 The French began to 
assert the place of empire within the EEC only as colonial crises became more pronounced, when 
administrators began to see the EEC as a way to funnel aid money—appeasement—into their 
colonies. It was the mundane pragmatism of economic and political need that helped steer the 
choices made by French officials. In sharp contrast to the soaring Eurafrican rhetoric of the last 
                                                        
8 This process was gradual. Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 55-81. 
9 Here the importance of international institutions to empire comes to the fore. Recent scholarship on both the 
League of Nations and the United Nations asserts these institutions’ roles in shaping the continuity of the imperial 
system and to “stabilize that order,” at least to a certain degree. I contend that more than just continuity, the treaties 
and agreements reached in the shaping of the supranational institutions of Europe gave French administrators a legal 
basis for continuing to make claims on overseas territory, even as other international institutions, namely the UN, 
were soon to become major platforms for anti-imperial causes. Susan Pedersen argues that the mandates were “a 
strategic part of the geopolitical order of the interwar,” hence contributing to the “order” I refer to. Pedersen, The 
Guardians. Mazower contends that while it was not the ultimate outcome, the UN “started out life […] as a means 
to preserve” colonialism. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 30-31. 
 
Brown • Chapter 2 62 
chapter, the policy would only be taken seriously as a political tool when French officials 
realized just how tenuous Paris’ grasp on Algeria and the rest of the French Union really was. 
Yet between the passages of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, legal limitations of a 
Eurafrican entity were far from clear or fixed. Postwar Eurafrican proponents in Paris and 
Brussels managed to cultivate amongst French officials the conviction that an integrated Europe 
might extend beyond the shores of the metropole. For example, France’s response to a 
questionnaire circulated to the Six, likely in 1950, indicated that French officials were prepared 
to organize their overseas holdings within the framework of the ECSC. The questionnaire 
interrogated the potential application of ECSC accords in overseas territories, while reiterating 
that such concerns were not currently the focus of ECSC discussions. Rather, it asked the Six to 
name its overseas territories assimilated to the metropolitan customs regime and if the planned 
coal and steel regime would apply in these territories; it also inquired about pre-existing and 
potential preferential trade regulations, including for coal and steel.10 The French responded that 
the far reaches of the French Union would enjoy no such preferential regime. But in a telling 
addendum, the French respondents declared: 
Corsica, Algeria, and the French Overseas Departments (Guadeloupe, Guiana, 
Martinique, Réunion) form with the Metropole a single customs territory. 
 
The customs regime that will be instituted in France for coal and steel will thus apply in 
these territories.11 
Read with the knowledge that the Treaty of Paris would apply only to metropolitan territory, 
such a statement demonstrates that French officials did not have a uniform understanding of the 
                                                        
10  Archives Nationales (AN) 81AJ/144: "Questionnaire Relatif à l’application aux territoires d’outre mer des 
dispositions adoptées pour la communauté européenne charbon-acier," 1950? 
11 AN 81AJ/144: French reply and addendum to reply to "Questionnaire Relatif à l’application aux territoires d’outre 
mer des dispositions adoptées pour la communauté européenne charbon-acier," n.d. but likely 1950. It is telling that 
the French response was lengthy and detailed, with notions of a coal and steel regime that could encompass 
extrametropolitan territory, while the Belgian and Dutch replies were perfunctory and implied no such stipulations. 
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limits of France’s borders in relation to supranational organization. Yet the Treaty of Paris’ 
wording cemented a smaller scope for an integrated Europe whose regulations would not extend 
beyond the European continent. Article 79 explicitly excluded all other territory from the Coal 
and Steel Community: 
The present Treaty is applicable to the European territories of the member States. It is 
also applicable to those European territories whose foreign relations are assumed by a 
member State; an exchange of letters between the government of the German Federal 
Republic and the government of the French Republic concerning the Saar is annexed to 
the present Treaty. 
 
Each High Contracting Party binds itself to extend to the other member States the 
preferential measures which it enjoys with respect to coal and steel in the non-European 
territories subject to its jurisdiction.12 
Such exclusion should not surprise readers familiar with claims of Europe’s postwar inward turn, 
during which states such as France and Germany expanded their welfare systems in answer to 
the suffering of their war-weary populations.13 Simultaneously, however, this was the moment 
when Western European officials began to work with, and around, American authorities in the 
administration of Marshall Plan funds.14 European-bound privileges, it appears, could extend to 
France’s colonies when France saw fit. France had begun to attempt internationalizing its 
colonial responsibilities, even if it was yet unclear to administrators exactly how that might be 
accomplished.15 Thus, ahead of the Treaty of Paris’ signing, Robert Schuman (of “dowry” fame) 
                                                        
12 Treaty of Paris, Article 79, accessed from CVCE on 1 June 2016.  
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_coal_and_steel_community_paris_18_april_1951-en-
11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58.html. 
13 For an overview of European welfare history, including a critique of accepting wholesale World War II’s unique 
impact on the extension of welfare (embodied by William Beveridge’s fight against the “Giant Evils of Want, 
Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness”), see Stein Kuhnle and Anne Sander, “The Emergence of the Western 
Welfare State,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 63-82. 
14 William Burr, “Marshall Planners and the Politics of Empire: The United States and French Financial Policy, 
1948,” Diplomatic History 15, 4 (Oct. 1991): 495-522. 
15 The “internationalization” of supposedly domestic colonial crises is a theme in postwar French history. Matthew 
Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War 
Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Explaining the Early Decisions: The 
United States and the French War, 1945-1954,” in Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and 
Transnational Perspectives, ed. Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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declared that the ECSC “will allow Europe to pursue […] the realization of one of its essential 
tasks: the development of the African continent.”16 
Overseas France’s potential for inclusion in or exclusion from the European project 
raised some concerns. Raphaël Saller, a senator from Guinea, cast himself as a proponent of 
Eurafrica, but feared that a Coal and Steel Community could put African markets at risk. In a 
1950 article in the business-focused journal Marchés coloniaux, Saller emphasized the negative 
consequences of drawing the international community, and particularly West Germany, into 
African affairs. To Saller, Schuman’s dowry vision, combined with similar rhetoric on the part of 
both Konrad Adenauer and the German press about “developing Africa together [mise en valeur 
en commun],” was another way of saying “France would cede to Germany the African market to 
gain or maintain other European markets.”17 Saller emphasized the importance of consulting 
“Africa or its representatives.” Not only was it “surprising” that “men in France […] sincerely 
believe[d] one could make African development an international task,” but it was also “even 
more shocking” that Germans could be part of this task, considering it was “this Germany which 
left in Africa, precisely, such a bad memory […] in a recent past […].”18 Thus, including the 
colonies in a European integration scheme risked for Saller not the friendship of other European 
states, but the unique claim that France could make on Africa. Saller’s version of Eurafrica 
therefore challenged European integration, claiming to place African needs—under France’s 
watchful gaze—ahead of Franco-German reconciliation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2008): 23-44; and Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001). 
16 Cited in Etienne Deschamps, “Robert Schuman, un apôtre oublié de l’Eurafrique ?” in Quelles architectures pour 
quelle Europe? Des projets d’une Europe unie à l’Union européenne (1945-1992): Actes des deuxièmes journées 
d’étude de la Maison de Robert Schuman, Metz, 9, 10 et 11 mai 2010, ed. Sylvain Schirmann (Brussels : P.I.E. Peter 
Lang, 2011): 75. 
17 CAOM 4101 COL 695: R. Saller, “L’avenir économique de l’Afrique et le pool franco-allemand de l’acier et du 
charbon,” Marchés coloniaux (3 June 1950) 1247. 
18 CAOM 4101 COL 695: Ibid., 1247. 
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Political concerns about the ramifications of the French Union’s exclusion did not 
subside with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Indeed, for representatives from France’s 
overseas holdings, this exclusion proved troubling, even alarming. Article 79’s delineation of 
territory led to deep consternation in some Algerian circles, which found the exclusion of the 
Algerian departments especially disquieting. If Algeria could be amputated from France where 
supranational agreements were concerned, could Algerian politicians promise their constituents 
that they really were guaranteed equal rights as Frenchmen, theoretically made possible thanks to 
legislation that went into effect in 1947? And how could Algeria’s special French departmental 
status, dating from 1848, be understood in light of these potential exclusions? The indigene 
Abdennour Tamzali, as his “concubinage” accusation in the previous chapter attests, vehemently 
protested the exclusion of Algerian territory from the Coal and Steel Community. At the 1952 
Council of the Republic meeting, he attacked the apparent contradiction between French 
assertions of l’Algérie française and French omission of this same region in the supranational 
accord. Tamzali and his Rassemblement des gauches républicaines party (Rally of Republican 
Lefts) did not carry major political clout in Algeria, let alone in the metropole. However, 
Tamzali’s dissent speaks to the wide-ranging juridical and social concerns that emerged in the 
early 1950s. Tamzali decried the lack of security for Algeria’s position within Europe, and 
therefore France, asserting that it smacked of racism. While French officials emphasized “the 
juridical and economic credo of the intangibility and indivisibility of our economic union with 
the metropole,” the Treaty of Paris made the departments of Algeria the “subject of an arbitrary 
discrimination.” He warned: “Our constituents will not easily understand why their territory is 
placed outside of the [Coal and Steel] pool, like a poor, second-rate relation!”19 The treaty 
promoted the “concept of Eurafrica that had bad press in the time of the dictators.” It would 
                                                        
19 CAOM 81 F 2136: “Tamzali,” Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie, 3 April 1952. 
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privilege Germany—such a recent foe—over French territories that counted themselves as the 
terrain of the Free French. He went on:  
We talk about territories of colonization that will become available [disponibles] where 
foreign nations – our enemies of yesterday – whose past we are ready to forget – will find 
an outlet for their oversized [trop-plein] population. […] 
 
We do not understand why Italy, which offers neither steel nor coal, but only a workforce 
competing with our own, is thus integrated while Algeria is not[.] 
 
[…] Our constituents will have difficulty understanding that being associated with the 
duties [and] military and strategic tasks implicated by our integration in the Atlantic pact, 
we may be disengaged from the hopes and advantages of the communities that are being 
built [qui s’édifient]. Here is a moral and political aspect of the problem […].20 
Tamzali’s criticism emerged between Sétif 1945 and November 1, 1954. As a representative of 
Algerian constituents in a French national body, his words suggest a deep concern for the impact 
on Algerian morale were the population to feel yet again that French officials did not truly 
commit themselves to an Algérie française inclusive of the Muslim majority. 
Thus, in one fell swoop, Tamzali condemned allowing former fascist states to share in 
France’s colonial regime and attacked the supposed pragmatism of the treaty, rejecting the 
argument that Algeria was necessarily excluded due to its lack of relevant natural resources. 
Tamzali’s interpretation offered a warning of the very real danger of exclusion. Such a decision 
would support arguments that Algeria was indeed not part of la France intégrale. Algeria could 
be denied access to new markets while its existing trade would be threatened by Italian 
competition. And, though Tamzali did not address it, exclusion added fuel to the Algerian 
nationalist fire. 
Indeed, as supranational ideals flourished in the postwar years, the exclusion of Algeria 
from France appeared to offer confirmation for the new generation of nationalists in Algeria: 
they were not a part of a French community and never would be. In his lecture on European 
                                                        
20 CAOM 81 F 2136: Ibid. 
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unity delivered in the 1951-1952 academic year (briefly mentioned in the previous chapter), 
French Union Conseiller Georges Le Brun Keris warned that if France proved unable to 
reconcile these worlds, his “North African friends” (with whom he did “not share, I must say, 
political opinions”), would tell him, “This is perfect; you, France, adhere to the European Union; 
us, we’ll adhere to the Arab League.”21 France’s challenge, therefore, was to uphold its interests 
within Africa while embracing its new position in Europe. Eurafrica, wielded correctly, could 
solve the problem, but if not, it would exacerbate the crisis. In the postwar, adherence to a 
supranational entity could come down to an ethnic or religious identity—something that Keris 
saw as a threat to the French Union. Thus, both Tamzali and Keris saw the ECSC exclusion as a 
direct danger to the French Union, as it risked alienating French voters abroad (indigène and 
European) and pushing les français musulmans toward nascent nationalist organizations. 
Such fears did not quickly subside. When the Overseas Territories Commission of the 
French National Assembly met in November 1953, Jean-Jacques Juglas worried that European 
integration would have “repercussions on the unity of the French Union.”22 Yet inclusion of the 
DOM-TOM within supranational European accords also appeared to carry risks. It was unclear 
to government officials how such accords might undermine France’s legal claims to the French 
Union. For example, a missive on the European Defense Community (EDC) and European 
Political Community warned that “eminent professors of public law” believed that the 
ratification of the EDC treaty would require “a procedure of constitutional revision,” as the 
Constitution “implied” that in a referendum, overseas electors would also participate, “without 
                                                        
21 This is the same speech, highlighted in Chapter 1, in which Le Brun Keris critiqued the unimaginative adoption of 
“Eurafrica” because of its recent history in fascist ideology. CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2318: Keris, “L’Union 
Européenne,” 1951-1952. 
22 AN C//15639: Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Territoires d’Outre-Mer, 12 November 1953. 
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distinction of colleges.”23 In fact, throughout the early discussions of European integration, the 
specter of unfettered African voting (meaning, proportional voting rights for all residents of the 
French Union) within Europe loomed as a terrifying possibility to the French administration, 
well aware of the growing populations in the African territories. 24 Far from being France’s 
dernière chance, Eurafrican policy appeared to threaten the balance of power between European 
citizens and the millions of African subjects of the French Union.  
 
Algerian Business Concerns and the ECSC  
Caution and confusion also reigned within the business community as various economic 
actors with interests in Algeria and the French Union attempted to make sense of how the ECSC 
and integrated Europe might help or hurt trade within the zone franc. In the early postwar, 
French economic attitudes about the colonies inherited the interwar conviction that empire 
offered both prestige and wealth to la mère patrie. Indeed, it was not until notable public figures 
like the Paris-Match journalist Raymond Cartier began to suggest a new cost-benefit analysis of 
the colonies in the late 1950s that French public opinion came to view empire as a drain, rather 
than as a boon, to the metropole’s economic well-being.25 At the time of the ratification of the 
Treaty of Paris, however, cartierisme had not yet emerged as an argument against France’s 
ongoing overseas presence. And indeed, although someone like Cartier could draw such a firm 
distinction between colonial and metropolitan economic interests, it is evident that such a line 
was far from demarcated for the French administrators concerned with European integration.  
                                                        
23 CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2314: Commission pour la Communauté Politique Européenne, “La Communauté 
Européenne de Défense et la Communauté Politique Européenne,” likely May 1954. 
24 CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 219: Note to the Minister [of Overseas France], “La République française et la 
Communauté Européenne,” 31 December 1952. 
25 Shepard, Invention of Decolonization, 68. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 200-201. 
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Reports in the European Algerian press reveal the variety of ways DOM-TOM exclusion 
from the ECSC could be understood. For some, it smacked of the “bigamy” against which 
Moussa would later caution (Chapter 1). For others, it threatened to open colonial marketplaces 
to other European entities that appeared as relative unknowns in the realm of overseas economic 
markets. In February 1951, the Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie strongly critiqued the threat 
facing Algeria. Reporter Jacques Hasse attacked Italy’s position vis-à-vis North Africa. 
Condemning the bilateral agreement as one that sold short Algeria’s ability to earn money from 
its natural resources, Hasse accused the Schuman Plan of making Algeria “pay the cost” of the 
pool’s creation. He asked: 
What will the French Parliament say, when it realizes that Mr. [René] Pleven and Mr. 
[Robert] Schuman have ceded a part of France’s riches and a portion of its public power 
to [Italian statesmen] Mr. [Alcide] de Gasperi and Mr. [Carlo] Sforza? 
 
What will the Minister of Finances say, when he sees that he can no longer freely choose 
exporting states, notably those with strong currencies [devises appréciées]? 
 
What will North Africa say when it finds that its portion of annual benefits is gravely 
amputated because the different mining companies will by force be turned toward 
different customers?26 
Hasse’s reading of the North African exclusion highlights the threat the treaty posed to North 
Africa’s burgeoning industry if it were left out of the envisioned benefits. What was worse, 
Algeria’s legal status made its export industry even more vulnerable, as it was unable (unlike the 
protectorates Morocco or Tunisia) to court outside customers such as Great Britain, yet would 
remain outside of the Treaty of Paris, too. To assuage Algerian concerns, Robert Schuman 
emphasized that although Algeria was not in the coal-steel pool, a bilateral accord with Italy 
                                                        
26 CAOM 81 F 2136: Jacques Hasse, “L’Algérie ne saurait faire les frais du pool charbon-acier (Plan Schuman),” 
Dépêche Quotidienne d’Algérie, 7 February 1951. 
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would facilitate supplying the Italian steel industry with North African iron ore. He further 
emphasized that France would retain exclusive control in the affairs of overseas mining.27  
Schuman’s reassurances did not quell the anxieties of officials who envisioned a future in 
which France remained the most important player in Africa.28 The Treaty of Paris’ signing on 
April 18 of that year only exacerbated these fears. Detractors included the Gaullist Michel Debré 
(no advocate of European integration), Olivier Wormser of the Direction des Affaires 
Economiques et Financières, and members of employers’ organizations (patronat) with ties to 
DOM-TOM industry. Political administrators like Debré and Wormser feared that European 
integration would force France to cede autonomy, a charge that was amplified by worries about 
maintaining exclusive control overseas. Some business leaders with stakes in Algeria or the 
DOM-TOM expressed wariness at having to share access to France’s overseas resources with the 
other members of the Six and to open new channels for market competition. But for others, 
linking the French Union with integrated European institutions appeared the only recourse for 
the patronat to protect its interests.29  
Thus, the ECSC’s area of applicability divided the French business community. A 1953 
meeting of the Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison du Patronat de l’Union Française (CELPUF) 
illustrates the tensions and aspirations of colonial business interests following the ECSC’s firm 
exclusion of overseas holdings. CELPUF deputy president Paul Bernard critiqued the French 
Union’s absence from integration, pressed for improvements to the policy, and signaled his 
skepticism about the European project. If the exclusion of the overseas holdings in the ECSC, 
                                                        
27 CAOM 81 F 2136: Daniel Cazel, “M. Robert Schuman commente son plan; 1 Sarre: la France défendra les 
intérêts de ce pays; 2 Afrique du Nord: accord avec l’Italie pour les livraisons de minerai,” L’Echo d’Oran, 21 April 
1951: 2. 
28 Such a view is revealing in light of French feelings toward Britain and its Commonwealth. 
29 Catherine Hodeir locates the role of business leaders in the colonies before and after 1945, arguing that regardless 
of political developments, including the eventual decolonization of Africa, they attempted to ensure that policies 
“were also good for them.” Catherine Hodeir, “Le grand patronat colonial français face à la décolonisation, 1945-
1962: problématiques, sources, conclusions,” Outre-mers 88, 330-331 (2001): 142. 
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which was slated to remain the norm in the CED and the pool vert, were maintained in the 
“future political structure” of Europe, “the break between France and the rest of the French 
Union will be complete [sera consommée].” For a businessman like Bernard, this could prove 
fatal, as “[p]roduction and consumption in the metropole will be oriented to prioritize the 
satisfaction of the common European market and not that of the French Union.” To mitigate the 
crisis, Bernard called for overseas representation within the supranational Parliament and 
Executive Council and for assurances that exchange preference and “monetary cohesion” be 
maintained within the French Union. Anything less would risk the “disaffection” of the “exterior 
populations” of the French Union.30 
Bernard was fairly explicit in his explanation of why previous integration schemes had 
not included the French Union. The Convention of European Economic Cooperation, signed in 
Paris in April 1948, focused only on “restoring and maintaining the prosperity of Europe and 
[…] lift[ing] it out of the ruins of the war,” an unsurprising goal for the immediate postwar years. 
Yet such a rationale could no longer pass muster, as excluding Algeria threatened the 
indivisibility of the French Union. What was worse, when officials did invoke the French Union, 
their declarations were “fragmented, equivocal, or contradictory.” Bernard harnessed Debré’s 
mistrust of integration leaders like Schuman and Overseas Minister Pierre Pflimlin and 
approvingly echoed Debré:  
[I]t is a question of security[;] France must be calm [tranquille] on the Mediterranean. It 
is a question of prosperity[;] France needs the outlets and output [fournitures] of North 
Africa. It is a question of existence[;] France will be less than Spain if it is reduced to the 
                                                        
30 He also wryly noted that the issue of integrating overseas holdings was an obstacle for Great Britain’s admission 
into the “European Union” and that “these difficulties are no less great regarding the French Union.” CAOM 100 
APOM 975: Paul Bernard, "L’Union Française et l’Europe, Exposé général," Comité d’Etudes et de Liaison du 
Patronat de l’Union Française, Conférence plénière des 13 et 14 janvier 1953. 
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territory of the metropole. It is a question of legitimacy[;] France created North Africa. 
Without France, there would be no Algeria, no Tunisia, no Morocco.31 
For Bernard, then, North Africa should be France’s first priority, with the “creation of Europe” a 
distant fifth after France attended to its relations with the French Union, Great Britain, and West 
Germany. Yet these goals were intertwined, and Bernard argued that West German interest in 
North Africa could increase trade revenue for Algeria and elsewhere. Above all, Bernard 
emphasized the “République Française une et indivisible,” insisting that all measures toward 
integration be made with Africans in mind and that DOM-TOM actors participate in the 
decision-making process. 32  Thus Bernard offered not a wholesale rejection of European 
integration, but rather called for a policy that would incorporate overseas France—and especially 
Algeria—in order to preserve French business interests and advance the local economy. 
 For some, Eurafrica itself was the risk, as it would cede French control of crucial trade 
outlets. The CELPUF secretary, A. Garand, called for the protection of France’s overseas 
holdings. Anticipating the “bigamy” warnings that would emerge in the coming years, Garand 
reminded the audience that “the French Union is a reality while Europe is but a potentiality [...].” 
Joining in the European project risked leading overseas populations to believe that “metropolitan 
France renounced its role as leader at the heart [sein] of the French Union. All notion of the 
French Republic that flows essentially from the principle of assimilation risks demolition in a 
single blow.” If France did not assert itself as the sole leader in the French Union, these 
territories would soon become a “common European good […].” Garand’s harsh warning against 
                                                        
31 This is a familiar colonial claim. For a critique, see Fanon, A Dying Colonialism. 
32 CAOM 100 APOM 975: Bernard, "L’Union Française et l’Europe." 
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European integration in its current guise demonstrates that Eurafrica was not the only way in 
which French leaders believed future relations with Africa could go forward.33  
Jean Blanchard, the Secretary General of the General Confederation of the Patronat of 
Algeria, warned that the Algerian departments were akin to metropolitan France and Corsica, 
and that excluding them from further European integration projects risked troublesome 
ramifications. Algeria’s “young and modest” steel industry would be harmed, as it would neither 
benefit from the Treaty of Paris’ advantages, nor be protected when the Algeria market was 
“open equally for all the steel industries of the Community […].” Similar regulations, Blanchard 
noted, were in the works for the pool vert and the EDC. This potential triple exclusion worried 
Blanchard, who saw no “formal willpower [volonté] from government officials [responsables] to 
integrate the three Algerian departments into a European agricultural community.” Rather, in the 
three projects of integration, “the Parliament and the French Government thought ‘continental 
European’ and not ‘Europe with its natural African prolongation.’” Were the European Political 
Community, currently under discussion, to exclude the overseas territories, “the divide [coupure] 
would be consummated between the metropole and the overseas territories of the French 
Union.”34 Yet Blanchard was skeptical of the Six’s collective ability to address Algeria’s twin 
crises of population growth and unemployment. Indeed, Blanchard warned that West Germany 
and Italy would be “tempted to encourage their own population to come to Africa” seeking 
agricultural jobs. Prior to World War II, Hitler had exploited concerns about Germany’s 
population size as part of his justification for Lebensraum. 35 This fear extended to much of 
                                                        
33 BDIC Q pièce 10408 (1): M. A. Garand, "Le Problème Institutionnel," Comité d’études et de liaison du Patronat 
de l’Union Française. The CAOM and the BDIC both contain a record of this meeting. 
34 Note the use of the word consummation, here less sexually charged than in Lenormand’s usage (Chapter 1), but 
nonetheless a particular choice. BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): [Jean?] Blanchard, Secrétaire général de la Confédération 
générale du Patronat de l’Algérie, "L’Algérie," Comité d’études et de liaison du patronat de l’Union Française. 
35 France’s empire figured into Hitler’s vision of an expansive Reich. Chantal Metzger, L’Empire colonial français 
dans la stratégie du Troisième Reich (1936-1945) (New York: Peter Lang, 2002). 
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Europe, as Mark Mazower shows, such that “fascist demographers argued that colonization in 
North and East Africa would help solve the problem, at least in Italy.”36 Here, Blanchard’s 
concerns reveal that population worries lingered in the postwar years; the notion that this tension 
would extend to the colonies only caused further alarm. As for industrial jobs, Blanchard put 
little stock in convincing European industrial outfits to set up shop in Algeria, as French 
companies already were hesitant to do so.37 
Blanchard’s ambivalent discussion of Algeria and a possible European future offered 
both promise and danger. He concluded with a cautious tone, encouraging “steps” to “avoid the 
dislocation of the French Union and permit its progressive integration […].” These steps would 
include forming a confederation prior to a European federation. Yet Blanchard firmly declared, 
“The future of Algeria, like all the rest of North Africa, is North-South and not East-West.”38 
European integration appeared at turns to be a solution and a threat to coherence of the French 
Union.  
Indeed, the Treaty of Paris’ wording left open the possibility that trade agreements 
between the Six might comprise overseas holdings, at the discretion of the metropolitan authority 
that oversaw the region in question. Thus, although excluded from the ECSC, Algeria (and its 
export market) could indeed be attached to Europe. Ministry of the Interior officials regarded 
such a move with skepticism, however, and revealed their protectionist attitudes toward colonial 
markets. In a 1955 letter to the Secrétaire Général du Comité Interministériel pour les Questions 
de Coopération Economique Européenne (Interministerial Committee for Questions of European 
Economic Cooperation, SGCI), a Monsieur Thomas in the Interior Ministry cautioned against the 
economic repercussions for France and Algeria should Article 79 be invoked for Algeria. In 
                                                        
36 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 109-110.  
37 BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): Blanchard, "L’Algérie." 
38 BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): Ibid. 
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Algeria, the coal and steel provisions could include the production, import, and export of iron 
ore, solid fuels, scrap metal [ferrailles de récupération], and steel products. Thomas warned that 
if the SGCI adopted recently discussed proposals that would apply the Article 79 regulations in a 
“pure and simple” manner in Algeria, France would lose “the just compensation for public and 
private investments in which it has engaged in Algeria for a long time and which were 
considerably developed in the course of the past ten years for the modernization of the territory 
and the betterment of the standard of living of its inhabitants.” Worse, because Algeria was not 
integrated into the “framework” of the Treaty, it would not receive any benefits in return for the 
opening of its markets, “aggravat[ing] further the economic disequilibrium of Algeria […].” The 
SGCI should therefore take caution to “assure our three Algerian departments a palliative 
[palliatif] that must be defined with care.”39 
Thomas’ fears, and those of the ministry on whose behalf he wrote, crystallize a number 
of the problems at hand as French officials attempted to parse the benefits and drawbacks of 
applying a Eurafrican policy. As Thomas warned, opening overseas territories to the other 
member states risked reducing France’s ability to benefit from its long-held economic privileges 
in Africa. An imbalanced application of Eurafrican ideals, in which the Algerian market opened 
but did not see a return, could further upend the already tenuous financial situation in the restive 
departments. Yet other officials would come to see Eurafrica as a means of securing funding for 
just such projects of industrialization and infrastructural improvement. Such development 
                                                        
39 According to Thomas, these privileges resulted from a variety of laws: the customs union (law of 29 December 
1884); the national pavilion maritime monopoly between the metropole and Algeria [monopole du pavillon] (2 April 
1889); the nationalization of banks and the organization of credit (laws of 2 December 1945 and 17 May 1946, made 
applicable in Algeria on 16 January 1947); and “the extension to Algeria of the provisions of the 18 November 1882 
decree, modified by the decree of 6 April 1962, laying down the procedure for the awarding of contracts by the state 
and public authorities and authorizing civil administrations to exclude foreign competitors whether in the form of 
supplies, services, or work.” CAOM 81 F 2136: Le Ministre de l’Intérieur, Directeur Adjoint du Cabinet Thomas à 
Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique 
européenne, "Application du deuxième alinéa de l’article 79 du traité instituant la Communauté Européenne du 
Charbon et de l’Acier," 17 June 1955. 
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schemes were integral to France’s push for territorial association within the EEC, and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The patronat looked to more than just France’s European partners when addressing 
Eurafrica, however. The early 1950s saw French politicians and business leaders attempting to 
make sense of their place within an increasingly bipolar world and an economic environment 
largely driven by American decision-making. Luc Durand-Réville, a senator for Gabon, warned 
that Europe had to remember that it would need America’s “economic—if not financial—aid” 
for a long while and that it would be a mistake to give the United States government the 
impression “that we wish to encircle the new system’s economy in a ‘bamboo curtain,’ which 
will prevent all exterior exchange.”40 The significance of American aid for postwar rebuilding 
efforts, but also for the advancement of development projects in the French Union, cannot be 
overstated. Beyond Marshall Aid, the French looked toward their American allies for support in 
diplomatic and military efforts. At the same time, this focus on America helps to explain the 
relative lack of attention to the French Union. Jacques Ferrandi, a French civil servant who spent 
much of his public career within overseas administration, recalled his early engagement on the 
Committee of Overseas Territories within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OECE), which attests to the relative lack of interest in Africa at this time: 
 [The Committee] met rarely and discussed absolutely theoretical questions without 
regard for reality. The only reality that mattered at the time was the application of the 
Marshall Plan. […] The portion of the Marshall Plan in Africa was itself rather modest, 
and by consequence, so was my activity.41 
                                                        
40 BDIC Q pièce 10408 (2): M. L. Durand-Réville, "L’Afrique Equatoriale Française et le Cameroun," Comité 
d’études et de liaison du patronat de l’Union Française. 
41 Jean-Marie Palayret and Anaïs Legendre, “Histoire interne de la Commission européenne 1958-1973,” interview 
with Jacques Ferrandi, Ajaccio, 28-29 May 2004, HAEU, accessed on 25 February 2015. 
archives.eui.eu/en/files/transcript/15190.pdf. 
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This French focus on its American partners would shift within the decade, as nationalist 
movements made progress across the French Union.  
We can locate by the mid-1950s a larger interest amongst French administrators for 
tackling head-on the question of Algeria and Africa within European institutions. In March 1955, 
the SGCI attempted to map their approach to the International Bureau of Labor’s [Bureau 
International du Travail] European convention on migrant workers, scheduled for the following 
month. Despite bilateral accords on social security that France secured with Italy and Belgium, 
French administrators worried that enforcing the convention’s applicability to Algeria would 
appear counter to the regulations of the ECSC, according to which “Algeria is expressly 
excluded from the territorial field of application.” 42  This issue mattered, as nearly 5,000 
Algerians were employed in Belgian mines. Thus, understanding how such a convention (and by 
proxy, the ECSC itself) could apply in Algeria would dictate how a European social security 
regime might benefit indigène families whose breadwinners migrated to Europe as laborers. 
However, the French concluded that it was better to avert any direct conflict, arguing that the 
European Convention on Social Security was “not a direct prolongation of the Treaty of the 
ECSC. […T]he notion of ‘territories’ that was adopted for the application of the Social Security 
Convention does not necessarily have the same meaning [signification] as the notion of 
‘territory’ taken for the functioning of the ECSC.” Without challenging the territorial limitations 
of the ECSC, French administrators could make the highly pragmatic claim that Algerian 
workers in Europe should be covered by this convention and, indeed, the French delegation 
                                                        
42 CAOM FR ANOM 81 F 1133: Ferrandi, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction des Affaires Algériennes, "Projet de 
Convention Européenne Concernant la Sécurité Sociale des Travailleurs Migrants," summary of 26 March 1955 
meeting at the Présidence du Conseil, Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique 
européenne. 
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would not ratify the convention without such a guarantee.43 Pierre Alby of the SGCI worried that 
as the issue was being discussed in Brussels, Algerians were not “distinguished” from 
metropolitans, but “only the metropolitan part of the French Republic” was under discussion, 
with Algeria treated as a “territoire tiers.”44  
Labor migration would continue to pose particularly challenging questions in the postwar 
era. This included uncertainty about what rights Algerians would be afforded, and even what 
protections France’s overseas nationals (resortissants) might need, if workers from the British 
Commonwealth were granted access to the same labor market. In 1954, French officials met to 
discuss how Algeria and the DOM might fit within Council of Europe labor circulation 
regulations. The Council of Europe, whose seat is in Strasbourg, was founded by the 1949 Treaty 
of London and initially comprised ten states.45 Although the Council of Europe largely falls 
outside of the scope of this dissertation, its discussions on labor circulation questions are 
instructive, as the same concerns would emerge again during debates on how to apply the Treaty 
of Rome in overseas territories (Chapter 4). French officials attempted to make sense of how the 
proposed Convention of the Reciprocal Treatment of Nationals [Convention sur le Traitement 
Réciproque des Nationaux] could be applied in Algeria and the DOM. Eugène Simoneau, of the 
Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements d’Outre-Mer, suggested that the 
regulation exclude “les citoyens français musulmans d’Algérie,” as they “are not subject to the 
laws of our Civil Code but enjoy [jouissent] the personal civil status of the Muslim law [droit 
musulman].” The extension of the Council circulation law should thus be restricted to “a 
                                                        
43 CAOM FR ANOM 81 F 1133: Ibid. 
44 CAOM FR ANOM 81 F 1133: Procès-Verbal of Secrétariat général Comité Interministériel pour les questions de 
coopération économique européenne meeting, "Examen des problèmes posés par l’élaboration de l’avant projet de 
Convention européenne sur la Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants," 18 November 1955. Alby, trained as an 
engineer, would go on to become the director of Gaz de France. “Pierre André Alec ALBY (1921-1998),” accessed 
27 December 2016. http://annales.org/archives/x/alby.html. 
45 They were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. By 1954, Greece, Turkey, Iceland, and Germany also signed accords to join the Council.  
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definition invoking only French citizenship” in the case of people in Algeria. However, he noted, 
the convention would apply to all French citizens in the metropole, “regardless of their origin or 
their status.” 46  These juridical distinctions, by which an Algerian-born “Muslim” would be 
extended more privileges if he found himself in the metropole, reflect the complex web (or 
inchoate nature) of Fourth Republic rights. However, administrators wary of the potential labor 
circulation critiqued not the risk of selective, race- or religion-based application, but rather how 
an open movement could be “disastrous for the interests of Algerian workers,” who would suffer 
from the movement of foreigners in the metropole.47 At the same time, the membership of the 
Council included the United Kingdom, leading to the risk of Commonwealth workers moving 
not only to metropolitan France, but also to the overseas territories. In particular, the specter of 
Mauritian laborers “of Pakistani origin but with British nationality” inundating the workforce of 
la Réunion disconcerted French administrators. 48  Notable, then, were the voices of French 
administrators for overseas departments decrying the extension of the Council regulations to the 
DOM, for fear that the results would be more harmful than beneficial. While this caution was 
reminiscent of some CELPUF speeches, overall the French Overseas Ministry and other 
interested officials increasingly viewed Algeria and the DOM-TOM as non-negotiable pieces of 
the integration puzzle.49 By the time French officials would approach the negotiating table for 
the Treaty of Rome, Eurafrican arguments for incorporating overseas holdings into the EEC 
would have a familiar ring. 
                                                        
46 CAOM 81 F 1134: Simoneau, Préfet chargé de la Direction des Services de l’Algérie et des Départements 
d’Outre-Mer to Directeur Général de la Sureté Nationale. Direction de la Réglementation, Bureau des Etrangers, 
“Projet de convention sur le traitement réciproque des nationaux dans le cadre de Conseil de l’Europe,” 16 March 
1954. 
47 Emphasis original. CAOM 81 F 1134: Ministère de l’Intérieur, "Avis du 4eme Bureau," 4 June 1954. 
48 CAOM 81 F 1134: Ministre de l’Intérieur à Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des 
Affaires Administratives et Sociales, Conventions “Projet de Convention sur le traitement réciproque des nationaux 
dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Europe,” n.d. (November 1954). 
49 CAOM 81 F 1134: Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur le Traitement Réciproque des Nationaux, Compte-
Rendu de la réunion interministérielle tenue au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 16 November 1954. 
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Legal Reform, French Jurists and the Puzzle of Borders  
Mounting concerns about the threat to French business and political interests overseas, 
exacerbated by the evolution of nationalist movements, independences, and wars in Indochina, 
Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa, caused these administrators to 
reorient their policies. Thus, policy makers in France may not have been committed to the ideals 
behind Senghor’s visions of a federalist future. But they pursued policies that might lead to the 
realization of such a goal because it fit within their own pragmatic approach to dealing with 
nationalist crises in the colonies and the question of dominance within emerging European 
institutions. 
Here, I will describe briefly some of the reforms that French officials implemented in the 
mid-late 1950s. These reforms had the effect of shifting overseas residents’ relation to the 
metropole, notably by broadening local representation (statut organique portant sur l’Algérie, 
loi-cadre Defferre), extending citizenship overseas (statut organique, loi Guèye), and 
implementing new forms of economic assistance (Constantine Plan). These changes all suggest 
attempts at appeasing overseas populations and their local leaders. However, they are also 
domestic attempts by French administrators to maintain control of—rather than introduce 
independence in—overseas holdings.  
In Algeria, the presence of nearly one million French citizens and of entrenched French 
business interests help to explain why French officials rebuffed Algerian claims to independence, 
even as the war intensified and grew unpopular in the metropole. French officials continued to 
resist ceding control, particularly because the empire increasingly came to appear as one of the 
only tools through which France would remain economically dominant and politically relevant in 
Europe and the world. But just as critically, French legal scholars observed that Algeria held a 
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unique juridical status in the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics.50 Although these 
jurists could not reach firm conclusions about exactly how Algeria might be understood within 
the constellation of French overseas designations such as DOM and TOM, it is clear that they 
viewed Algeria as a part of France, just as officials since the mid-19th century had insisted 
through rhetoric and administrative practice. Publications by these jurists demonstrate that by the 
time of the Treaty of Rome’s negotiations, the French legal community saw pragmatic, even 
constitutionally mandated, reasons why Algeria could and should continue to be included within 
the legally defined space of metropolitan France. 
Constitutional changes served as a backdrop for wider legal reforms. The May 7, 1946 loi 
Guèye, named for Senegalese statesman Lamine Guèye, sounded the death knell of the legal 
category “indigène” even before the passage of the Fourth Republic’s constitution.51 The law 
read: 
[A]ll ressortissants of overseas territories (including Algeria) have the quality of citizen 
in the same respect as French nationals of the metropole or the overseas territories. 
Specific laws will establish the conditions under which they will exercise their rights as 
citizens.52 
While the law was applauded in African and metropolitan circles alike, the second sentence 
introduced disputes within the French National Assembly and beyond.53 In particular, it was not 
clear how election reforms would be implemented across the French Union.  
I contend that the incertitude and ambivalence witnessed in response to the law’s 
implementation is very much in step with the French decision to exclude overseas territories 
from the ECSC. The empire remained a domestic concern, and one that appeared manageable 
                                                        
50 Florence Renucci’s work on French legal history details the backgrounds of the jurists I will discuss. See, for 
example, Renucci, “La ‘décolonisation doctrinale’ ou la naissance du droit d’Outre-mer (1945-années 1950),” Revue 
d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines 24 (2011): 61-76.  
51 Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 125. 
52 Cooper, Ibid., 88. 
53 Cooper, Ibid., 90-105. 
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through sporadic reform efforts. Early in the postwar, despite expressions of nationalism and 
acknowledgments that reform must come, major decisions cementing the fate of France and 
Africa appeared unnecessary, or secondary, to other goals of the Fourth Republic. In the first 
months of the Fourth Republic, French officials also attempted to implement reform in Algeria. 
Here, too, seemingly well-meaning (or highly cynical) changes did not stand up to scrutiny from 
the very people Paris administrators hoped to woo, and yet those administrators did not 
immediately grasp the gravity of the situation. The September 20, 1947 loi portant statut 
organique de l’Algérie was, in the words of a French civil services administrator in Algeria, 
evidence that France was “doing nothing but following the path [conformer à la ligne suivie] of 
the evolution of our public institutions since our arrival on this African land.”54  
The new statut organique could be interpreted as a step towards a federal French Union. 
Roland Drago, a jurist at the Faculté de Droit de Paris, wrote in 1949: 
As Professor Scelle 55  declared: “In our judgment, between decentralization and 
federalism there are just differences of degree, and no essential opposition. 
Decentralization, like federalism, implies a decision-making authority or discretionary 
jurisdiction on the part of the decentralized authorities, meaning a guaranteed legal 
autonomy. This implies a discrimination between local and communal affairs.” The 
coordinated administrative autonomy Algeria possesses due to the existence and powers 
of its assembly is a step toward a federalist solution. […] Algeria thus possesses the 
necessary competences to integrate into a federal regime.56 
Drago’s ruminations on a federalist future for Algeria and, by extension, France, were very much 
on the minds of French administrators in Paris and the overseas territories (particularly West 
Africa) alike. However, the reform did little to appease Algerian nationalists, although the 
coordinated attacks of All Saints Day 1954 were as-yet unplanned. 
                                                        
54 Roger Parant, “La suppression des communes-mixtes et l’implantation des communes rurales en Algérie,” La 
Revue administrative 8, 43 (January-February 1955): 20. 
55  Georges Scelle, a jurist, French delegate to the League of Nations, and member of the International Law 
Commission; Roger Drago was citing Scelle’s “Le Fédéralisme et l’Union française,” Revue Politique et 
Parlementaire (1948). 
56 Roland Drago, “L’Assemblé Algérienne: Création et fonctionnement d’une institution originale de la République 
Française Outre-Mer,” La Revue administrative 2, 8 (March-April 1949): 128. 
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As French officials grappled with how the French Union could fit within France’s newly 
forged European bonds, Gaston Defferre’s loi-cadre shifted the ground upon which colonial 
policy stood. Signed on June 23, 1956, the loi-cadre (“framework law”) extended a significant 
amount of autonomy to local leaders throughout France’s overseas territories. Defferre’s law 
instituted universal suffrage and introduced a single electoral college in France’s African 
holdings. It also granted local assemblies stronger legislative power and allowed them to form 
government councils, although such rights in many cases came après-la-lettre, as a system of 
“double power” had already been in place for several years across many of the territories.57  
The loi-cadre emerged only two years after the loss of Indochina and the start of the 
Algerian War, and within weeks of the independences of Morocco and Tunisia. While the loi-
cadre did lay the groundwork for more autonomy in the French Union, it is not in itself evidence 
that French administrators in the mid-1950s believed that nearly the entirety of French Africa 
would gain independence within five years.58 Here, I challenge previous interpretations that take 
as a given the eventual decolonization of France’s African holdings and see earlier legal regimes 
as a stepping stone to full—independent—autonomy. 59  Rather, the loi-cadre represented a 
French attempt to maintain interdependence between increasingly autonomous—but not 
independent—African states and the metropole.60 By extending to much of Africa seemingly 
                                                        
57 Jean-Pierre Dozon, Frères et Sujets: La France et l’Afrique en perspective (Paris: Flammarion, 2003), 231. 
58 Bossuat argues that it is evidence of independence being written on the wall. Bossuat, L’Europe des Français, 
322-323.  
59  Migani argues that tying the TOM to the Six would allow France a “pacific decolonization.” Migani, 
“L’Association des TOM au Marché Commun,” 251-252. However, the jurists’ debates and exchanges between 
administrators suggest that at the time, decision makers did not see these reforms as a stepping stone toward actual 
formal independence. 
60 Andrew W. M. Smith argues that the loi cadre was implemented to reform, not to end, empire. Further, he 
emphasizes the importance of the private sector on the reforms. He writes, “By focusing on development, colonials 
administrators could work with private finance […] to create infrastructure and stimulate production whilst 
minimizing the risk to the colonial state. The loi cadre was designed to strengthen the foundations of French control 
of French West Africa not only in terms of political stability, but also by ensuring that the core economic principles 
that had always governed colonial profit margins held true – monopoly of market, product and route to market.” 
Smith’s analysis of the loi cadre as evidence of the interplay of political and economic goals is critical, and I 
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unprecedented autonomy, it offered France a chance to avoid the outbreak of more wars like the 
one currently raging in Algeria. Thus, the loi-cadre should be understood as an evolution in the 
governance of the French Union, but not as a firm signal that French administrators accepted that 
outright independence was “inevitable.”  
The loi-cadre reformed administration in the Overseas Territories, Gaston Defferre’s 
ministry’s purview, but we must consider how it fits within the history of citizenship and 
territorial reforms extending to Algeria (and how the war in Algeria influenced Defferre’s 
actions). Two years later, in 1958, officials introduced the Constantine Plan, a development and 
industrialization package for Algeria. De Gaulle announced that “all of Algeria must have her 
share in what modern civilization can and must bring to men.”61 The Constantine Plan would do 
just that. Its creators, too, had reform, not independence, in mind. Among the modernizing 
practices that Fifth Republic officials claimed the Plan would usher in were new housing 
initiatives, agricultural reform, industrial growth, and job creation. These changes were 
unsuccessful and, at times, destructive. But as Muriam Haleh Davis argues, as late at 1958, 
“[c]olonial development in Algeria […] helped institute a geographic imaginary that would 
merge Algeria and France in a common framework known as EurAfrica.”62 We have seen this 
imaginary at work already; European integration policy would offer yet one more opportunity for 
French administrators, now preoccupied with Algerian pacification, to assert this framework. 
I emphasize the domestic (i.e. French Union or Community-wide) reforms of this era as 
evidence that French officials in the 1950s viewed legal reform and economic aid as tools to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
contend that we can see similar goals reflected onto France’s European policies. Smith, “Of Colonial Futures and an 
Administrative Alamo: Investment, Reform and the Loi Cadre (1956) in French West Africa,” French History 28, 1 
(March 2014): 96. 
61 Cited in Muriam Haleh Davis, “Restaging Mise en Valeur: ‘Postwar Imperialism’ and The Plan de Constantine,” 
Review of Middle East Studies 44, 2 (Winter 2010): 176. 
62 Davis, “Restaging Mise en Valeur,” 178. 
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maintain the French empire, not as first steps in dismantling it. Thus, French officials’ insistence 
that the DOM-TOM be included in the Treaty of Rome, the subject of the next chapter, mirrors 
the domestic legislative and ministerial choices of the era. The attempts at reforming and 
cementing these relations accelerated as French officials sought to cope with mounting anti-
imperial pressure. When French administrators risked angering or alienating the other members 
of the Six, they were operating under the assumption that although the relationship between 
France and its overseas holdings might shift, it certainly was not meant to end.   
The loi-cadre, read as a legislative attempt to preserve the bonds of the French Union, is 
further evidence of French officials’ expansive vision of France’s territorial reach. The very 
language of the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics allowed French administrators to 
assert this shape of France, or at least, a France that extended across the Mediterranean. In fact, 
jurists were unsure of exactly how to make sense of the legal status within the new constitutions. 
Jurists who tackled Algeria’s place within the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
interrogated whether Algerian departments could be considered part of the metropole only in so 
far as trade and administration were concerned. This seemingly obvious omission of 
interrogations of metropolitan citizenship rights within the Algerian departments would leave 
France in an uncomfortable position during Treaty of Rome negotiations. In the French legal 
community, it appeared that Algerian territory could and should be considered as a part of 
France. However, the benefits of membership in an integrated Europe, including labor migration, 
should not be extended below the Mediterranean.  
Thus, not for the first or last time, Algeria would be governed by a different set of rules 
than the “rest” of France. This ill-defined and yet persistent relationship between Algeria and the 
metropole would render the notion of further European integration without Algeria disquieting to 
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French jurists; as such, we see that Eurafrican policy within the EEC was not only thinkable, but 
legally imperative, in the eyes of some figures in the French administration. Just as tracking 
actual attempts at legal reform in the postwar era demonstrates French administrators’ interest in 
maintaining ties with African territories, jurists’ discussions of the legal framework of France 
itself offer proof that France without Africa at this time remained unthinkable for most French 
decision-makers. French law professors in Algeria took a keen interest in the three departments’ 
status within French law. This, they believed, would clarify Algeria’s place within the French 
Union (and, eventually, within integrated Europe).  
Some, like Paul-Emile Viard, a professor at the Faculté de Droit d’Alger, argued at the 
outset of the Fourth Republic that the emergent French Union must be understood as a large yet 
bonded territory: 
And when we say France, here, we no longer dream [songeons] of the Metropole. 
 
We want to speak of France in its entirety, of France purely and simply, which includes 
not only the metropolitan and Algerian departments, but all of the territories of diverse 
classifications that are scattered across the world and that are linked [rattachent] to 
[France].63 
Yet as the issues with implementing the Lamine Guèye law attest, understanding France “purely 
and simply” was not so simple at all. These jurists understood the passage of the Fourth 
Republic’s constitution as a moment when definitions of French territory risked being called into 
question. Indeed, the very language of the constitution added ambiguity to the situation. 
Jacques Lambert, another legal scholar at the law faculty in Algiers, asked how Algeria’s 
status fit within the framework of the Fourth Republic’s constitution. Writing in 1952, Lambert 
attempted to pin down Algeria’s exact status by analyzing the Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic, as well as the 1947 statut organique law. He asked: “What place does Algeria occupy 
                                                        
63 CAOM BIB AOM B283: Paul-Emile Viard, La Communauté Française (Paris: Editions Renaissances, 1946), 19-
20. 
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in the French Republic? Is it [in] metropolitan France itself? That, one could say, is a physical 
absurdity. Algeria is therefore overseas. But is it ‘overseas departments’ or ‘overseas territory?’” 
Lambert quickly dismissed the idea of Algeria as a TOM, and citing Minister of Overseas France 
Marius Moutet, 64 declared it a DOM. “But,” he noted, “doubt remains [reste permis]." 65 In 
particular, Algeria’s differences from the DOM meant it should be understood as a separate 
entity. For example, the Algerian Assembly was separate from the French Union Assembly.66 
Article 73 of the Constitution, which dubbed the “anciennes colonies” DOM, excluded 
Algeria.67 Yet Lambert argued “it was never believed that laws voted by the National Assembly 
would be applied automatically to Algeria.” 68  This unclear legal position had actual 
consequences for Algeria, because juridical status could determine access to rights and specific 
development aid schemes.  
Lambert’s inconclusive attempt to parse out Algeria’s status demonstrates that Algeria 
was already considered as something separate from the French “hexagon,” even before the start 
of the Algerian War. The ambiguous language of the constitution made codifying Algeria’s 
relationship to the metropole imperative and demonstrates that far from a short-lived dream of 
certain elite African leaders, Eurafrican interpretations of France’s relationship with its imperial 
holdings remained a fundamental part of postwar legal debates following World War II. It would 
be impossible to abandon such claims in the face of increased colonial unrest and intensifying 
European integration negotiations. Eurafrica would serve as a tool for France to quell nationalist 
                                                        
64 26 January 1946-19 November 1947; he was also the Popular Front Minister of Colonies, 4 June 1936-8 April 
1938. 
65 Jacques Lambert, Manuel de Législation Algérienne (Algiers: Librairie des Facultés, 1952), 61-62. 
66 Ibid., 106-107. 
67 Ibid., 63. 
68 Ibid., 62. 
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fervor, even if administrators were unsure of exactly how those far-flung territories actually 
related to France and, by extension, Europe. 
The emergence of the Fifth Republic—and the return of Charles de Gaulle to power—in 
1958 had little impact on the Eurafrican approach of French administrators in Brussels, as we 
will see in Chapter 4. Moreover, the rebranding of the empire from the French Union to the 
French Community under the Fifth Republic’s constitution did not answer the questions that 
challenged Algeria’s status under French law. The exact relations of the DOM or TOM to Paris 
remained hazy, particularly as African and French elite alike continued to explore alternatives to 
independence, such as autonomous, federalist forms of governance. P.F. Gonidec, a professor at 
the law faculty in Rennes who had briefly worked at the law faculty of Dakar in the early 1950s, 
argued in 1959 that the DOM were “in the Common Market and not associated with the 
Common Market […].” 69 Further, an interwar decision by the Court of Cassation (Appeals 
Court) had “qualified the Algerian departments ‘transmediterranean’ to make clear that they 
were simply the prolongation of French territory beyond [au-delà] the sea. […].”70 Gonidec’s 
insistence that the DOM were in the Common Market, a refrain that will reappear in the chapters 
to follow, demonstrates the use for French officials of claiming the inherent Frenchness 
(juridically, if not culturally) of a given overseas holding. What’s more, hist work demonstrates a 
longer history of legal debate regarding Algeria’s exact status. Gonidec’s emphasis on 
assimilation and association places him in a long line of French colonial discussions over which 
policy better served metropolitan economic interests.71   
                                                        
69  P.F. Gonidec, “L’Association des pays d’outre-mer au Marché Commun,” Annuaire français de droit 
international 4 (1958): 598-599. Emphasis original. 
70 Ibid., 599, referencing the 27 February 1934 case Castanié v. Vve Hutarto. 
71 Betts, Assimilation and Association. 
 
Brown • Chapter 2 89 
These legal scholars, interested in the minutiae of customs regulation, certainly do not 
pepper their publications with the stirring prose found in pro-Eurafrican journals. Yet in these 
works, we can locate the attempts at cordoning space and flirting with ideas about the fluidity of 
borders that had already arisen in the ideologies of Eurafrica’s proponents and detractors. The 
jurists reveal the pragmatic use of examining the reaches of borders. They also draw attention to 
the variety of ways in which domestic, bilateral, and multilateral regulations might be 
implemented. In 1951, French policymakers did not yet fear the “bigamy” or “divorce” discussed 
in Chapter 1. Yet it is clear from the jurists’ publications that these legal and economic 
obligations would risk challenging—if not outright undermining—the Europe-centric vision of 
European integration once forwarded by France and its partners. 
 
Conclusion 
Proponents of Eurafrica soon looked ahead to the next stages of European integration. 
When the ECSC emerged in 1952, European leaders had no doubt that it was but the first step in 
the supranational organization of the Six. The absence of the French Union from this first pivotal 
step would serve as a lesson for the next stage of negotiations. Indeed, in the negotiations for the 
Treaty of Rome, French administrators read their positions backwards into the ECSC debates 
earlier in the decade. In one 1957 meeting of the Assembly of the French Union, Georges 
Monnet, a conseiller, evoked a May 1950 Agricultural Commission statement on the OECE, 
which emphasized that “such an organization cannot be viable unless the adhering countries 
know to group themselves around [savent grouper autour] those peoples of whom they have 
assumed guardianship.” He also referenced a 1952 debate in the Assembly of the French Union 
about the Strasbourg Plan, in which “the overseas territories were considered like a field of 
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expansion [champ d’expansion] with a brutality, in a spirit so purely economic that it raised the 
protests of the interested populations and of our Assembly.”72  
By the mid-1950s, French officials began to assert the place of empire within European 
institutions, a policy shift that would intensify once the French Régie Autonome des Pétroles 
discovered oil in the Algerian Sahara in 1956. As colonial crises became more pronounced, these 
administrators saw a way to funnel aid money into their colonies and to persuade their European 
partners to agree in writing to the French character of their overseas holdings. Thus, at the same 
moment Algerian nationalists began to gain international support for their cause, the French were 
shaping supranational accords explicitly to name and include the totality of the French Union 
and, most importantly, Algeria.73 This chapter has argued that it was not clear to French jurists or 
officials during early European integration debates exactly where France or Europe ended, nor 
was it evident if extending European regulations to overseas territories would do more harm than 
good. Tradeoffs looked different in the eye of the beholder, as French officials began to weigh 
ceding sovereignty against gaining European aid funding for the overseas holdings. By 1956, 
however, this attitude quickly shifted. That year, Defferre’s loi-cadre emerged and French 
officials began to consider their demands ahead of negotiations for the Treaty of Rome. In these 
negotiations Eurafrican policy would become, in effect, one more tool for attempting to maintain 
control of increasingly uncontrollable circumstances. What’s more, it would offer France an 
avenue to cement itself as the most powerful economy in Europe. As Georges Monnet warned, 
exclusion of the French Union from the EEC would be a dangerous choice: 
                                                        
72 CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2316: Analytic Summary, Assembly of the French Union, 24 January 1957. 
73 AN 20000293/4 (dérogation): Le Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires Etrangères to Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat à 
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If all that we form is a union between metropoles, the center of gravity of this union will 
be on the Rhine. But if we turn towards Africa, the center of gravity will move towards 
the Mediterranean.74    
United in their demands in Brussels, French officials’ internal discussions, and their tardy arrival 
at the decision to even pursue a Eurafrican policy within the EEC, suggest a more ambivalent 
attitude on Eurafrican goals and the potential for citizenship rights to undermine European 
control in Africa. It is to the decision to pursue such policies, inchoate as they were, that we now 
turn. 
 
                                                        
74 CAOM FR ANOM 61 COL 2316: Analytic Summary, Assembly of the French Union, 24 January 1957. 
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Chapter 3 
 
No Europe without Eurafrica: France’s Line in the Sand 
(1956-1957) 
 
Just one month before his eponymous loi-cadre introduced major administrative 
changes to the French Union’s governance and during the preparatory work for the 
Conference of Venice, Minister of Overseas France Gaston Defferre impressed upon his 
colleagues in the foreign affairs office that France’s overseas territories must be included 
in the Common Market.1 As such, “the European Common Market […] will thus become 
the Eurafrican Common Market.” Further, the TOM should enjoy special clauses 
included in the Common Market’s legislation, owing to their “underdeveloped state.” To 
make his case, Defferre invoked the current economic relations between metropolitan 
France and the TOM, which he claimed were “precisely founded on the notion of a 
Common Market […],” comprising the two principal elements envisioned for the future 
European Common Market: a free exchange zone allowing for the movement of 
merchandise, services, capital, and labor, and a customs exemption [franchise douanière] 
allowing for “a system of reciprocal preference.” In a claim that might sound prescient of 
today’s Eurozone, he suggested that the metropole-TOM Common Market might be seen 
as “more comprehensive” than the European project’s, as the former was a single 
currency zone.2   
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, French officials appeared unconcerned 
about linking overseas French holdings to emerging European institutions in the 
                                                        
1 MAEF 20QO/792: Gaston Defferre to Secrétaire d’Etat des Affaires Etrangères, “Problèmes posés pour la 
France d’outre-mer par le projet de Marché Commun Européen,” 17 May 1956. For an analysis of 
Defferree’s role in European integration, see Anne-Laure Ollivier, “Entre Europe et Afrique: Gaston 
Defferre et les débuts de la construction européenne” Terrains et Travaux No. 8 (2005): 14-33. 
2 MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid. 
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immediate postwar era. However, attitudes shifted quickly as the situation in Indochina 
and much of North Africa dramatically changed.3 This chapter interrogates why French 
administrative practice became firmly Eurafrican in scope, as opposed to the waffling and 
disagreement of the mid-1950s. By the time France and its allies came to the negotiating 
table in advance of the Treaty of Rome, French officials, jurists, and journalists had 
already devoted countless pages and engaged in numerous debates, all in an attempt to 
calculate arguments for why France’s overseas holdings must be included in the nascent 
European Economic Community. Notably, after the release of the April 1956 Spaak 
report and during the Conference of Venice the following month, they contended that 
their demand was not only logical but also seemingly non-negotiable.4 Thus, in the year 
prior to the March 25, 1957 signing of the Treaty of Rome, French officials from the 
Overseas and Foreign Ministries brought their Eurafrican stance to meetings with their 
domestic and European colleagues, even as internal conflict continued to simmer. 
As I have indicated in prior chapters, the hagiographical version of European 
integration focuses on the promise of peace it appeared to guarantee, through the binding 
of war industries, and, increasingly, national economies.5 I want to ask why, given this 
peaceful task, French officials risked the ire of their partners, in order to preserve 
                                                        
3 This dissertation focuses on choices made by administrators in the Fourth and Fifth Republics and largely 
emphasizes the continuity in their pursuit of Eurafrican policy in the European arena. However, the 
political changes (and parties) of the Fourth Republic are a key part of the wider history of French imperial 
policy and postwar decolonization. See, for example, Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French 
Decolonization (London: Routledge, 2013 edition), 8-11. 
4 The Spaak Report recommended both the customs union of the Six and the creation of Euratom. The 
French were wary of some of the recommendations, particularly relating to agricultural regulations, as the 
creation of the customs union would impact France’s ties with its empire. Gilbert, European Integration, 
47-48. 
5 Writing in 1963, Jean Monnet himself emphasized these tropes: “The need was political as well as 
economic. The Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The 
governments and peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis 
for peace in the world was to be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one had to go 
beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end in itself.” Jean Monnet, “A Ferment of 
Change,” Journal of Common Market Studies 1, 3 (March 1963): 205. 
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relations that, as economic historians have demonstrated, did not have the outcome of 
prosperity that officials would have liked to imagine. 6 For this, I will consider Dale 
Copeland’s analysis of economic interdependence and war. Copeland contends that in 
order to understand why a state might risk going to war, scholars must account for that 
state’s “expectations about the future economic environment.”7 I contend that we can 
take his analysis of when wars occur and apply it to the peaceful diplomatic sphere of 
postwar European integration. Copeland argues that expectations can lead state actors to 
make decisions that are driven by “selfish realpolitik calculations.”8 Such calculations in 
the long 19th century led to outcomes of war or of negotiated peace. In the realm of 
international institutions in the postwar, we must instead ask how such calculations 
threatened to undermine the stated goals of these new institutions, even if the threat of 
war between members was never floated as the alternative. 
I contend that the push for Eurafrica prior to the Treaty of Rome’s signing gained 
traction within French ministerial circles precisely because by 1956, the situations across 
the French Union—including but not limited to the escalation of the war in Algeria—led 
French administrators to view the Treaty as a tool for securing international support for 
the imperial nation-state. Further, such a tool would also allow France to find partners in 
the funding of projects meant to ease the economic and social conditions seen as the 
cause of some of these colonial conflicts. At the same time, I emphasize the tensions 
                                                        
6 Jacques Marseille’s seminal work on the economic balance sheet of the colonies strongly emphasizes that 
on the whole, decolonization was a net gain for French industry. The loss of colonial markets would make 
France more competitive by pushing industrialists to modernize, such that as early as the Jeanneney report 
(1964), it appeared that decolonization was not “regrettable pour la France.” Marseille, Empire colonial et 
capitalisme français, 86-87. However, France’s continued effort to link its European economic planning 
with even now-former colonial holdings demonstrates that industrial modernization did not fully sway all 
French administrators to the belief that stepping away from the overseas markets would be good for 
France’s economy.  
7 Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, 2. 
8 Ibid., 327. 
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within the French administration itself, as some ministries, notably Foreign Affairs, 
proved suspicious that a strong push for Eurafrica could risk alienating the European 
allies France had labored to secure over the course of the previous decade. 9  Thus, 
Eurafrican policy took precedence over France’s new European endeavors only when the 
colonial situation appeared untenable without supranational involvement. 
This chapter will examine the ten months of pressure France exerted on its 
neighbors in its effort to have the overseas holdings accepted as part of the EEC. It will 
first analyze Gaston Defferre and Christian Pineau’s adoption of a firmly Eurafrican 
approach to the Treaty of Rome. Next it will examine how France attempted to bolster 
support among the other members of the Six, often through the use of economic 
arguments. Finally, it highlights the concerns and cynicism that remained, now being 
voiced by members of the French Union Assembly. A concluding section demonstrates 
the unique risks to France’s Algerian interests as the Treaty of Rome’s signature loomed. 
These arguments often left Algeria unnamed and, thus, scholars today must locate 
meaning in the declarations and silences of French administrators.10  Indeed, when these 
administrators consistently invoked a “French ensemble” joining the EEC, their 
audiences would have to understand Algeria as part of this collective, even as the 
administrators often emphasized the regulations’ applicability to the TOM.  As the 
jurists’ conflicts make clear, Algeria could hardly be entirely excluded from the 
conversation. Defferre’s plea for the inclusion of the TOM should be read in part as 
                                                        
9  On the challenges of forging those friendships, particularly in light of the question of German 
rearmament, see Alistair Cole, Franco-German Relations (London: Routledge, 2014), 4-9. 
10 Indeed, when Pierre Moussa, Director of Affaires Economiques et du Plan in Gérard Jaquet’s Ministry of 
Overseas France, addressed the Association of Large French Ports in 1958, he cautioned his audience that 
his remarks on Africa excluded North Africa and the Sahara. Sciences Po PM 24: “Association des Grands 
Ports Français: Portée Economique et Financière de l’Association France-Afrique, Communication de M. 
Pierre Moussa,” 7 May 1958. 
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implicitly inclusive of the Algerian departments.11 And his brief mention of the situation 
of Algerian laborers will make clear that debates about the inclusion of the TOM or of 
Algeria were not self-contained, as both French administrators and their European 
partners understood the intertwined nature of stipulations that could apply to one zone or 
another.12 
 
Gaston Defferre’s Eurafrica and the Poorest Region in “Europe” 
The socialist politician Gaston Defferre, longtime mayor of Marseille, served as 
Guy Mollet’s Minister of Overseas France from February 1, 1956 until May 21, 1957, the 
length of Mollet’s government. In a May 1956 letter insisting upon Eurafrican policy 
within European integration, Defferre argued that the exclusion of the TOM from the 
European Common Market risked grave outcomes. Such exclusion could therefore not be 
“seriously envisioned by France, which cannot sacrifice its African vocation for its 
European vocation.” The TOM risked being considered as foreign countries in relation to 
the Common Market, and by extension, in relation to the metropole. This would lead to a 
rapid “rupture of economic ties with the Metropole, and then to political secession.” Two 
years after the loss of Indochina and the start of the Algerian War, and mere weeks after 
the declarations of Morocco and Tunisia’s independence, this was no empty threat. 
Neither did Defferre advocate that France maintain two separate common markets. Such 
                                                        
11 Under Defferre’s tenure, the French TOM were: Western French Africa (AOF - Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, 
Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta), Equatorial French Africa (AEF - Moyen-Congo, 
Ubangi-Shari, Chad, and Gabon), Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoros, Madagascar, French 
Somaliland, New Caledonia, French Establishments in Oceania (today’s French Polynesia), the French 
Southern and Antarctic lands, the Republic of Togo, and Cameroon (under French trusteeship). The 
remaining territories to be comprised by the treaty were the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi; Somalia 
under Italian trusteeship; and Dutch New Guinea. 
12 MAEF 20QO/719: “Note d’Information sur les Territoires d’Outre-Mer et le Marché Commun,” n.d. but 
likely August 1956. 
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a scenario could wreak havoc, with France “deprived of protection from competition at 
the heart of the Common Market” while shouldered with the economic responsibilities of 
the TOM on its own.13  
Only one solution remained, according to Defferre: France must insist that it enter 
into the European Common Market only on the condition that the TOM would closely 
integrate, as well. Their inclusion would require special clauses, as the TOM would be 
exposed to benefits but also disadvantages in their association with the Common Market. 
Defferre proposed a European-wide equivalent of the Fonds d’investissement pour le 
développement économique et social (FIDES), a French organism aimed at funding 
development projects in the French Union. He also argued for protection for TOM 
industries, a delay in demanding that African territories contribute equally to social funds, 
and certain protections for agricultural production. 14  Defferre also emphasized the 
importance of special clauses related to labor circulation. The Common Market 
negotiations had stressed the principle of free movement, which Defferre saw as a threat 
to the TOM. Given the overpopulation and underemployment of a European state such as 
Italy, which Defferre explicitly named, he suggested that an opening of free movement 
risked a major influx of European populations into the TOM: 
For reasons which are less economic than human, it is necessary to guard against 
an excessive flux that could bring about unfavorable psychological reactions, that 
impair the evolution of indigenous [autochtones] social structures, and that lead 
to clashes between Africans and Europeans, clashes we have only too many 
examples of in North Africa. It is therefore not possible to implement [laisser 
poser] without precautions the principle of the free circulation of men between 
Europe and Africa. I believe moreover that it is likely that for analogous reasons 
our European partners will themselves raise this question, moved by their desire 
                                                        
13 MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid. 
14 MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid. 
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to guard against an excessive influx of Algerian populations onto their own 
soil.15 
Defferre’s focus here on Algeria is unusual, as most of Defferre’s communications 
focused on the TOM, which were technically the only overseas holdings under his 
purview. However, his comments foreshadow the ambiguity that would appear in the 
months and years ahead; by focusing specifically on the risk of Algerian laborers 
migrating to Europe, Defferre acknowledged that the unique juridical regime of Algeria, 
contentious as it might be, would open the door to more privileges within the EEC than 
would extend to other parts of the French Union.  Defferre’s emphasis on protecting 
African territories from European labor competition at once blamed petits blancs for 
colonial woes and suggested that even a staunch Eurafricanist hoped to maintain French 
supremacy within the overseas holdings.16  
Defferre acknowledged that admitting the TOM into the Common Market would 
call into question France’s sovereignty in the overseas territories because it would invite 
an increase of the economic influence of its European partners. In a theme that would 
recur, he thus suggested that to maintain any control, France also had to cede control. At 
the same moment that France was engaged in a war to maintain its political hold on 
Algeria, it was negotiating documents that would relinquish a considerable amount of 
decision-making to Brussels. However, Defferre insisted upon the importance of 
consulting with local authorities in the TOM before going forward with the project. And 
he posited that through frank discussions with France’s European counterparts, his 
proposal would be accepted.  
                                                        
15 MAEF 20QO/792: Ibid. 
16 Pierre Nora’s indictment of Algeria’s settler population, originally published in 1961 following his stint 
teaching in the colony, is an example of the ire saved for settler colonies in post-mortems of imperial loss. 
Pierre Nora, Les français d’Algérie (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 2012 edition). 
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Defferre’s office was far from the only one to grapple with the question of 
Eurafrica within the EEC. One week after Defferre’s letter, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs drafted a note on France’s participation in the Common Market, “considering its 
overseas responsibilities.” There was disagreement over what changes France would have 
to make to its trade regulations with the overseas territories in order to stave off 
competition from the other members of the Six, with the Commissariat Général of the 
Plan arguing that preferential trade outlets would suffice as a counterbalance. The 
Secretary of State for Industry and the Ministry of Overseas France disagreed. 
Meanwhile, the note’s unnamed author surmised, it would be politically difficult to 
maintain the two economic spaces of the Franc Zone and the European Common Market 
without making France’s partners—TOM and European—suspect that France attempted 
to establish an “overly preferential” regime with the other, to France’s exclusive 
benefit.17 This echoes Moussa’s bigamy warnings (Chapter 1). 
French Foreign Affairs officials recognized that France’s push for European-wide 
aid benefiting the territories demanded a serious trade-off. On the one hand, the 
assistance contributed by the other members of the Six would allow for a more rapid 
economic development that was “politically necessary” overseas. On the other, “a 
substantial contribution by the other European countries to the efforts of the Metropole, 
in particular to investment efforts, will inevitably lead to a sharing of political 
responsibilities with our partners.” In other words, French officials had to contend with 
                                                        
17 MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, “Participation de la France au Marché Commun compte 
tenu de ses responsabilités d’Outre-Mer,” 24 May 1956. 
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the possibility that in joining the Common Market, it was ceding sovereignty not just on 
the Continent, but also in its colonies.18 
Such a concern reveals the variety of goals—sometimes conflicting—pursued by 
different French ministerial offices. Defferre’s strong push for the TOM’s total 
integration into the EEC could be attributed to his ministry’s tendency “to show itself to 
be more attached to the maintenance of existing political and administrative forms than to 
economic positions to which this Department often attributes a lesser interest.” 
Conversely, the Secretary of State for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs expressed 
reservations because of the “consequences for the future of our relations with the former 
protectorates […].” The Foreign Affairs ministry worried that a close link between a 
unified Europe and the French Union would prove unpopular at home, leading to hostility 
toward the whole of the EEC plan, and weakening French Union bonds.19 Rather than 
abandoning such goals, the ministry advised caution: 
This is why, should the government deem it necessary to extend the Common 
Market to the overseas countries and territories, it would be desirable that this 
position be taken publicly only at the end of the first stage. The provisional 
maintenance of the customs barriers between the European states during the first 
four years will technically permit a temporary avoidance of the fusion of these 
two economic spaces.20 
A French policy of mandating lag time, rather than spurring change, thus emerged even 
before the Treaty of Rome’s solemnization. A French preference for delay will be a 
recurring theme in the chapters to follow. 
                                                        
18 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid. Here I again think of Lewis, whose analysis of Tunisia and the Bardo Treaty 
emphasizes the diplomatic pitfalls of “cosovereignty” but also demonstrates how the French believed they 
had “transformed the Tunisian question into a domestic French question.” Lewis, quoting Antoine Colonna, 
Divided Rule, 171. This interplay of the international (cosovereignty) and the domestic (empire as a 
domestic legal sphere) is apparent in France’s approach to EEC negotiations. 
19 MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, “Participation de la France.” 
20 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid. 
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If French officials felt confident that they could persuade their neighbors to accept 
their demands, the question remained of exactly what policy to pursue. During a May 
1956 meeting in Venice, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau declared 
to his European counterparts that France could not participate in a common market in 
which the overseas territories were excluded. The ministers agreed on a French proposal 
launching a study conducted by “interested national bodies [instances nationales 
intéressées].” Such a decision might seem remarkable, given the obvious bias that would 
emerge from a study spearheaded by those states that stood to gain the most. Indeed, the 
functionary writing up the meeting summary noted that “our partners are never the 
claimants [demandeurs] on this subject.” This management of the issue by the most 
interested party should therefore suggest that the other members of the Six recognized the 
potential French intransigence on the subject of the TOM and wished to turn the page 
without committing their own time or effort.21 
While much of this chapter focuses on documents that ostensibly concern the 
TOM, reflecting the official separations of colonial administration across French 
ministries, Algeria was far from forgotten during early Treaty of Rome negotiations. 
Algeria’s unusual status as an impoverished region of Europe, a colony par excellence, or 
some other sort of undeterminable entity figured heavily in conceptions of the EEC’s 
extension to France’s far-flung holdings. One economic affairs administrator within the 
Foreign Affairs ministry speculated that if France requested for Algeria the 
implementation of the measures meant to target underdeveloped states, “it would be hard 
to imagine that the European partners could validly justify a refusal of admission to 
                                                        
21 MAEF 20QO/719: “Note d’Information sur les Territoires d’Outre-Mer et le Marché Commun,” n.d. but 
likely August 1956. 
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Algeria” and would have to “recognize easily that Algeria would be an underdeveloped 
region in the European Community.” Indeed, the Treaty of Rome would have to ensure 
that Algeria not be “hurt” [lésé] by France’s integration in the EEC. The goal for Algeria 
must be “the accession to a standard of living ‘à la Française.’” Thus, “a new notion” 
should be included in the Treaty, “for example of ‘economically delayed [attardée] 
region’ accompanied by measures of aid and exception that push even further than for the 
underdeveloped regions of Europe.” This was a thinly veiled reference to Italy’s 
Mezzogiorno, the impoverished southern region that would draw comparisons to Algeria 
in the months ahead (Chapter 4).22  
The Foreign Affairs administrator declared that the inclusion of Algeria and the 
formulation of policy that would improve its economy were at the heart of Eurafrica. His 
high hopes for Algeria’s economic prospects within the EEC attest to the usefulness of 
European integration in the minds of administrators concerned with colonial crises. The 
EEC’s money and support would allow for France to maintain control in Algeria. This 
vision of Eurafrica proved distinctly economic, attesting to the imbrication of trade goals 
and political ideals. However, the administrator sold the Eurafrican idea as a net gain for 
all members of the Six. Indeed, for those states interested in “the construction of a 
Eurafrica […] Algeria must necessarily compose the most important African element.” 
The participation of all Six EEC states in the investment funds open to Algeria would 
enhance economic and social development, and their assistance would be rewarded by 
the improved commercial prospects they would find in Algeria. The administrator 
                                                        
22 MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, Marché commun, “Note sur les observations et 
conditions principales à prendre en considération pour l’entrée de l’Algérie dans la Communauté du 
marché européen,” 21 August 1956. 
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envisioned a 6.5 percent improvement in the standard of living in Algeria from 1956 to 
1966 thanks to a 9 percent net revenue increase. Yet these prospects had limits. While 
creating 70,000 new posts in Algeria per year, foreign (read: European) workers would 
have strictly limited access to the Algerian labor market. 23 This letter is yet another 
iteration of the jurists’ debates. Here, an administrator could simultaneously claim 
Algeria’s place within the EEC and make clear that only certain stipulations ought to 
cross the Mediterranean. Algeria would enjoy the exact same privileges as the metropole, 
with major caveats. Thus, Treaty of Rome negotiations did not help clarify exactly what 
juridical status Algeria would enjoy in either France or in Europe as a whole. 
 
New Allies and Old Colonies: Selling Eurafrica to the Six 
If Algeria was France, France needed to prove to the Six why it should remain the 
case, and its strong economic ties appeared its best bargaining chip in both domestic and 
supranational debates. France had major stakes in maintaining, if not improving, 
Algeria’s economic status. Algeria was metropolitan France’s largest buyer, dispensing 
199.7 million francs in 1955 (4.9 million USD, 2015), and its third largest supplier, after 
the United States and West Germany, at 118.8 million francs (4.7 million USD, 2015). 
Eighty-one percent of imports to Algeria originated in the metropole (and in return, 71 
percent of its exports went to the metropole), 89 percent of imports if the entire Franc 
Zone were taken into account (which in turn received 80 percent of Algerian exports).24  
                                                        
23 MAEF 20QO/726: Ibid., Emphasis original. 
24 MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, Marché commun, “Les échanges commerciaux de 
l’Algérie,” 22 August 1956. 
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As French officials attempted to make sense of exactly how they could claim the 
place of Algeria and the TOM in a European common market, they expressed a belief in 
Belgium’s natural allegiance to this same cause. The Belgian Colonial Ministry called a 
meeting with representatives of France’s Overseas Ministry on July 18, 1956. Although 
the meeting was not meant to “prejudice” how either government would proceed during 
upcoming talks between the Six, the two parties signaled their agreement that the 
Common Market must extend to the overseas territories “in conditions that take into 
account not only the interest of the Metropoles, but also the individual conditions in these 
territories and the needs for their development.” They disagreed, however, on the method. 
French administrators expressed hope for special dispensations for the TOM’s benefit 
within the framework of the European Common Market. The Belgians, on the other hand, 
favored “two concurrent customs unions, one European, one African, linked by the 
reciprocal granting of preferential regimes.” In light of this difference of opinion, the 
French administrators recounting the meeting surmised that although the Belgians and 
French were “often close” [souvent voisins] in their arguments for protecting the TOM 
and encouraging Eurafrican exchanges, the “political considerations” that instigated these 
policies were “notably more divergent” and made agreement more difficult to attain.25 
But the French had more to worry about than just the Belgians. France’s partners 
were “distinctly reticent” regarding the Franco-Belgian propositions and they made clear 
that they did not intend to take “any direct or indirect political responsibility in the 
overseas territories.” Such reservations reflected national interests. The West Germans 
observed that tropical products from the overseas territories cost more. Further, the West 
                                                        
25 MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, “Conversations franco-belges sur l’extension du Marché 
Commun aux TOM,”19 July 1956. 
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German government declared itself unable to “force German importers to change 
suppliers.” They argued that an investment fund should focus only on non-profit, social 
investments and declined to name a figure for any possible annual investment. The Italian 
delegation, having secured assurances that they would only contribute a “modest sum” to 
the investment fund, worried about the competition from agricultural products exported 
by both Italy and some overseas territories.26 The Dutch deemed the advantages of such a 
policy disproportionately lower than the sacrifices it would entail and declared they 
would dispute the “soundness” [bien-fondé] of the Franco-Belgian proposition. Instead, 
the Dutch suggested that the member states only decide for the moment whether even to 
open a negotiation about the territories after the establishment of the Treaty.27 As we will 
see in the coming chapters, West German officials came to privilege their relations with 
France and hence follow France’s lead to a degree, while Belgian would gradually turn 
toward the Dutch (embracing a Benelux bloc) and Italy remained fearful of the economic 
stakes of integrating Algeria into Europe. These sides were not always as clear ahead of 
the Treaty of Rome’s signing. 
In the two months that followed the unveiling of the Franco-Belgian proposal and 
the withering criticism it received, the French sought to emphasize the political 
justifications of the project. Their partners proved more receptive to such arguments and 
the French pushed ahead with discussions couching assistance to the territories within a 
larger framework of aid for underdeveloped countries. The French noted that they would 
                                                        
26 Notably, southern Italy’s climate resembled that of North Africa. I will discuss such comparisons and 
their political use in the next chapter. Olive oil was one of Italy’s main concerns, as it also dominated some 
French colonial export markets. See, for example, Léon Laitman, "Le Marché et la production de l’huile 
d’olive en Tunisie," Annales de Géographie 62, 332 (July-August 1953): 271-286. 
27 MAEF 20QO/719: “Note d’Information sur les Territoires d’Outre-Mer et le Marché Commun,” n.d. but 
likely August 1956. 
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be unable to shoulder indefinitely on their own the burden of current aid levels. French 
administrators took a Cold War tack: “If Europe became disinterested in [the territories], 
would it be possible to keep these countries in the Western orbit for much longer?”28 
Such an appeal fed into the larger lore surrounding the very purpose of unifying Europe, 
which would not just stave off Soviet dominance—a particular concern for the West 
Germans—but also maintain European prestige on the international stage. Perhaps 
perceiving the importance of keeping what friends they had, the French were generous in 
their analysis of their partners’ initial hesitance and ready to make concessions. The other 
members’ “ignorance of the African problems and the fear of engaging in an enterprise 
whose scope they struggled to perceive” were to blame for their earlier attitude, rather 
than any “hostility to the principle of the association of the overseas territories.” To 
mitigate the issue, the French would approach the Treaty with a policy that appeared 
quite similar to the Dutch suggestion. The “fundamental principles of the association” 
would be fixed in the treaty, but only carried out progressively thanks to successive 
conventions annexed to the treaty and subject to time limits.29  
How should this French acquiescence be understood? Their eagerness to appease 
their neighbors by delaying the Treaty in the TOM and even Algeria could be seen as a 
diplomatic shift in tone on the part of the French. But did they ever expect to extend EEC 
benefits to the TOM in the same time frame as in the metropole? The answer is unclear. 
However, it becomes evident that the French administrators in these negotiations were 
aware of the balancing act they had to perform, which included earning the support of the 
Six but also maintaining the trust of African leaders who increasingly understood their 
                                                        
28 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid. 
29 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid. 
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territories’ options as either federation or full independence. Treaty application, with 
severe limitations, might prove palatable enough to hold the confidence of these Africans 
for a spell.  
By the summer of 1956, the French were able to sketch out how the TOM would 
relate to the Six in the Treaty. This would include the progressive suppression of customs 
tariffs related to products imported from the territories, and vice versa. A common 
external tariff would be established to protect agricultural products from the territories. 
Over three four-year stages, this tariff would be implemented on such goods as bananas 
(20 percent), coffee (16 percent), cacao (9 percent), citrus (8 to 20 percent), and oilseeds 
(at an as-yet-undetermined percentage). Exact aid amounts were sketched out. The 
common investment fund for the territories would come to 581.25 million US dollars for 
five years. France and Germany would each contribute 200 million, Belgium and the 
Netherlands each 70 million, Italy 40 million, and Luxembourg 1.25 million. The 
investments would be divided between the territories, with 511.25 million going to 
French territories, 30 million to Belgian, 35 million to Dutch, and 5 million to Italian. 
Thus, France would secure for its own territories 311.25 million dollars in investment 
from its partners over five years, an average of 62.25 million per year. The stickier 
subjects of public health, social security, public security and order, and free circulation of 
labor would only be addressed by later conventions that would require the unanimity of 
the Six. Thus, for the time being, France avoided the most trying of debates by deferring 
difficult decisions and emphasizing that Algeria would not fall under these same 
regulations.30 
                                                        
30 MAEF 20QO/719: Ibid. 
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But by then, France’s policy drew suspicion even from its closest ally. “Certain 
Belgian milieux,” according to the press, did not want the Belgian Congo associated with 
the Common Market, as Belgium’s contribution to the whole of the territories would be 
greater than what the Belgian Congo received (the Belgian delegation at the Conference 
of Brussels in February had not voiced such a matter). Yet despite Belgian grumbles, 
German concerns, concessions for the Dutch, and the beginning of what would become 
an unending wave of Italian nervousness, the French viewed the guarantee of aid 
assistance and gradual tariff harmonization to be a victory for their own colonial policy. 
The Treaty “instituting the Common Market sets the basis upon which European-African 
solidarity will develop; the political significance of the principles it implements cannot be 
emphasized [soulignée] enough.” Such an attitude demonstrates the complex layers of 
loyalty between Africa and Europe and the diverse goals of the French as they 
participated in European negotiations.31  
French administrators continued internal conversations about what exactly 
Eurafrican policy might entail and how great a risk France would be taking were it not to 
pursue such a policy. A late September 1956 Foreign Affairs communication cautioned 
that including the TOM in the Common Market would cause the French economy to lose 
important trade channels. Combined with the recent independence of Indochina, the 
restitution of the Saar to Germany, and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, “this 
loss […] could be unbearable for the economy of our country.” To mitigate the risks, 
France would have to consolidate the Franc Zone, which would require improving the 
current tariff regulations in the AOF and Madagascar. France would also have to 
understand that asking its partners to participate in investments and infrastructural 
                                                        
31 MAEF 20QO/719: “ Ibid. 
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improvement would mean accepting a system of co-management [cogestion] in the 
territories.32 
When French and Belgian officials met on September 29, pragmatism somewhat 
marked the discussion, but the French administrators did not touch on the most dire 
concerns expressed within the Foreign Ministry. The conclusions drawn during this 
meeting were intended to solidify a single Franco-Belgian policy ahead of the upcoming 
October meetings and a meeting in which Spaak was expected to submit figures on aid 
investment to the Six. Among those in attendance at the meeting in Brussels were 
Defferre, Savary, Marjolin, and Bousquet for the French, Spaak (the meeting’s host), 
Buisseret (Minister of Colonies), Scheyven (Secretary General for Foreign Affairs), 
Rothschild (Chief of Staff for Spaak), and Baron Snoy (Secretary General for Economic 
Affairs) representing the Belgians. The meeting’s conclusions hardly deviated from early 
Franco-Belgian declarations, as representatives from both sides agreed that the Six 
progressively receive the type of advantages enjoyed by TOM-metropole relations. The 
attendees agreed that the overseas investment fund would be distinct from the European 
investment fund and would be managed under the jurisdiction of authorities of the 
overseas states.33 The meeting led to a call for a common African market, with few 
                                                        
32 MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, “Inclusion des territoires d’outre-mer dans le marché commun,” 27 September 1956. 
33 It was clear to Raymond Bousquet, the French Ambassador to Belgium, that the French and Belgians 
would have to brace themselves for criticism from the Dutch, Italians, Germans, and Luxembourgeois 
regarding their required commitment to the investment fund. Before such a position was fully revealed, he 
encouraged an examination of the current state of TOM-metropole relations, notably regarding exports and 
imports between French and Belgium TOM and the Six. This would make it possible to gauge openness for 
“a more intimate collaboration” in the TOM on the part of the other European economies. MAEF 
20QO/719: Bousquet to Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Le Marché Commun et les 
territoires d’Outre-Mer,” 8 October 1956; Bousquet to Pineau, “Le Marché Commun et Territoires d’Outre-
Mer,” 30 October 1956. 
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specifics given, and speculated that were the “special problem” of Morocco and Tunisia 
resolved, “a great political hope” could emerge.34 
However, skepticism and hostility toward Eurafrica remained strong within 
integration circles, and French administrators still found themselves stuck between their 
“African vocation,” as Defferre and others put it, and their interest in expanding the 
European project. When the delegation heads met in an intergovernmental conference in 
Brussels on November 22, the Netherlands, with Italy and Luxembourg following suit, 
expressed distaste about “launching [themselves] into an adventure.” The Dutch 
representative questioned the call for public investments rather than “the liberty” of 
private ones and suggested that the TOM policy would generate “disequilibrium.” The 
German delegation took a softer tone, calling the problem “complex.” The French and 
Belgian representatives appeared to make their case strongly enough that they left the 
meeting having isolated the Dutch delegation and convinced the rest to accept the 
“political opportunity of an association with the overseas territories […] and the necessity 
of an investment fund of public origin.” 35  Dutch reticence to TOM incorporation 
extended well past the signing of the Treaty of Rome, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
That the Dutch, still embroiled in overseas economic and political affairs in New Guinea, 
the Dutch Antilles, and Surinam, would reject aid for the TOM demonstrates that 
Eurafrica as a solution to colonial questions did not appeal to all Europeans, nor was it 
the only possible path toward the resolution of imperial affairs.  
                                                        
34  MAEF 20QO/719: Bousquet to Pineau, “Le Marché Commun et les territoires d’Outre-Mer,” 30 
September 1956. 
35 MAEF 20QO/719: Laloy, Foreign Affairs telegram to Direction of General Politics – Europe, “Direction 
des organisations européennes,” 24 November 1956. 
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Impressing upon their partners the importance of Eurafrica, the French and 
Belgians attempted to normalize it by relying on recent history. The motivation for the 
policy “could be compared to that which inspired the Marshall Plan […].”36 They also 
studiously avoided including Algeria in the discussions of the TOM, even as we have 
seen that ministerial communications within France acknowledged that the question was 
very much related. Such avoidance can be seen as a method of skirting the hairy issue of 
Algerian independence, about which France could not be sure to count on its neighbors’ 
support, and also as further evidence of the unclear legal status of Algeria not only within 
Europe, but within France itself. Despite the high-minded supranational idealism evident 
in speeches by European statesmen and echoed in some news outlets across the member 
states, it is clear from concerns voiced by France’s ambassadors in other member states 
that domestic opinion held sway over these seemingly internationalist decisions. This is 
particularly evident in the case of Germany, where local hesitations risked hindering 
international statecraft. And yet, West German officials continued to follow French 
overseas policy demands, even if it was clear that there was disagreement in their ranks.37  
West German officials’ willingness to follow France’s lead flew in the face of 
German public opinion opposed to the Algerian War. This suggests that these officials 
believed that European integration was significant enough a goal to risk alienating the 
                                                        
36 MAEF 20QO/719: Ad Hoc Group for the Overseas Territories, “Rapport au Comité des Chefs de 
Délégation,” 20 December 1956, 5. 
37 This matches the assertion by theorists of global political economy who contend that in the drive to 
balance powers, “[p]ublic opinion would also be excluded because it might be necessary to ally with a state 
that had recently been an enemy. The general public might not support sudden shifts in diplomacy so their 
views would have to be ignored.” While this contention is written with regards to 19th-century attempts at 
European diplomacy and peacekeeping, it is evident from the disdain of the German newspapers and the 
ultimate decisions made by Adenauer and others that practical concerns for partnership with France would 
override domestic criticisms. O’Brien and Williams, Global Political Economy, 103.  
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voting public. 38  In early 1957, Maurice Couve de Murville, then serving as French 
ambassador to West Germany, wrote to Christian Pineau to inform him of recent opinions 
emerging from Bonn. His letter detailed two recent articles in German dailies, both 
concerning the question of the Franco-Belgian proposal to incorporate African territories 
into the European Common Market. In “Should We Return to Africa,” Die Welt’s 
correspondent Schröder opined that the Franco-Belgian proposition could slow or prevent 
the finalizing of the treaties for the Common Market and Euratom. To make the matter 
more problematic in Murville’s eyes, Schröder pointed to the reasons why Germany 
should not accept such a project, particularly noting that Germany had not held colonies 
since 1918, a fact which had become beneficial for the state. Schröder contended that the 
economic contribution demanded of Germany would be greater than any benefits it could 
reap. Schröder went further, writing that West Germany’s Minister of Economics, 
Ludwig Erhard, “exploded like a rocket” when he learned of France’s plan. This 
economic argument was similar to that of France’s own economic critic of the colonies, 
Raymond Cartier. It also echoes what Pierre Moussa labeled “le complexe hollandais,” 
alluding to the prevailing sentiment amongst Dutch politicians and citizens that losing 
colonial territories had been an economically favorable development. 39  Further still, 
Schröder also played to his readership’s emotions, casting the German people as “victim 
[…] to Soviet colonialism,” and warning that Africans would view Germany as 
“participat[ing] in dying colonialism.”40 
                                                        
38 This is in some ways an interesting corollary to the French officials who risked alienating their European 
partners in the name of protecting French imperial interests. 
39 Moussa, Les Chances économiques, 17-19. 
40 MAEF 20QO/720: Maurice Couve de Murville to Christian Pineau, “Inclusion de l’Afrique dans le 
marché commun européen,” 7 January 1957. 
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Murville preferred the second article he detailed. Its author, Schwelien, who 
Murville noted had traveled to Africa numerous times, used the pages of the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung to congratulate the Six for having adopted, following “the events in 
the Middle East” (i.e. the Suez crisis), a more realistic and positive attitude regarding the 
problems facing European integration. The Eurafrican goal now appeared less utopian 
and more feasible, thanks in part to the French realization that such an economic 
enterprise would need the “consent and even the free association of the African 
peoples.” 41 Although the Schröder critique forced Murville to acknowledge the 
formidable challenge France faced as it tried to convince Erhard of Eurafrica’s benefits, 
Murville echoed the more idealistic goals of EEC-TOM association and suggested that 
his West German compatriots were ready to be its champions: 
Many among them are sufficiently attached to European ideas and have enough 
taste for major firms and global outlooks to understand that this is but a vast 
development plan in Africa that would provide for their country, for Europe, and 
for the equilibrium of the world. 42 
Murville’s appraisal of the situation demonstrates that economic practicality helped to 
encourage West German acceptance of Eurafrica. Germans, Murville noted, “are not 
indifferent” to “the mining prospects on the African continent.” Thus France might have 
to worry less about heartstrings than purse strings in order to make a convincing case to 
Bonn. French officials could likely count on pro-European Germans, including 
Bundestag president Eugen Gerstenmaier and, critically, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
himself, to balance out – or drown out – Erhard’s concerns.43 Thus, as the Treaty of 
Rome’s signature drew near, French officials felt increasingly sure that they could make 
                                                        
41 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid. 
42 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid. 
43 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid. 
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Eurafrican demands on their European partners, even as those demands were issued in a 
distinctly more pragmatic language than the sweeping rhetoric discussed in Chapter 1. At 
the same time, the pragmatic—if not opportunistic—outlook drew suspicion within 
France itself. It is to these concerns that we now turn. 
 
Internal Reluctance 
In the run-up to the Treaty of Rome, skepticism and caution regarding Eurafrican 
policy continued to reign in some administrative circles in France. An unusually candid 
note by an unnamed administrator within the Foreign Ministry’s Service of Economic 
Cooperation, penned in September 1956, demonstrates the concerns of that ministry as 
Eurafrica threatened to supersede other international policy goals. The note serves as a 
reminder of the unknowns facing the administrators attempting to forge France’s future 
relations with Africa and Europe. For example, the missive would not address the 
integration of the Algerian departments because of the “uncertainties that remain 
regarding the substance [contenu] of the future status of Algeria.” And within those areas 
that could be discussed, the administrator surmised that the United Nations would be 
unlikely to authorize zone franc trusteeship territories to enter into a European 
community. Little would it matter, however, as those territories were unlikely to have any 
such desire: 
[T]he overseas territories for which the Defferre law foresees the accession to 
autonomy cannot [envision], either for political reasons [(]this would be to put 
the brakes on the movement towards self-determination[)] or for economic 
reasons [(]the gap in living standards and productivity between the overseas 
territories and Europe is such that an integration, even coupled with all sorts of 
provisions [réserves], seems difficult to imagine[)] […] anything other than a 
simple association, without practical reach, to the common market. 
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Any integration of the territories into the Common Market would therefore be either 
impossible due to the refusal by the territories themselves or else “destined to remain a 
pure formality [purement formelle].”44 Thus we see skepticism of the Eurafrican project 
coming from one of the ministries charged with furthering its goals. 
The very men who represented the French Union’s constituents also expressed 
feelings of uncertainty about the future of France’s plan for a European-African 
connection. When the Assembly of the French Union met in late January 1957, it was 
with serious awareness of the political climate in Paris and Brussels. The European 
Common Market dominated the opening session of the three-day meeting, stemming 
from Georges Monnet’s proposition to demand that the government not sign the Treaty of 
Rome if the inclusion of the DOM-TOM was not expressly planned. Mr. Reyt and the 
group Republican Center of Peasant and Social Action [Centre Républicain d’Action 
Paysanne et Social] presented an alternative proposal calling for the French government 
to safeguard [sauvegarder] its existing economic and political ties with the zone franc 
countries before joining France to the European Common Market.45 
Members of the assembly attempted to make sense of what European unification 
would mean for France. Georges Monnet, president and reporter for the opinion of the 
Agricultural Commission, recounted a dire comment from “a high functionary” in the 
Ministry of Overseas France who, according to Monnet, said: “I share your concerns 
regarding France’s current responsibilities in the programs of development of the 
territories. But in fifteen years, when Europe will be done [sera faite], France will be no 
                                                        
44 MAEF 20QO/719: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, “Marché commun et pays d’outre-mer,” 18 September 
1956. 
45 MAEF 20QO/627: Assemblée de l’Union Française, “Compte Rendu Analytique de l’Assemblée de 
l’Union Française,” 24 January 1957 session, presided over by [Hector] Burkhardt, 1-2.  
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more.” To this, the assembly member Jean Guiter exclaimed, “This language is 
abominable.” Monnet continued, “It is nonetheless a certitude that, if we have a European 
government, a European parliament, France as a sovereign and independent nation will 
cease to exist.” Guiter again interjected: “France will survive us.”46  
Yet Monnet had a passionate directive for his compatriots. France was not just a 
geographic space, but  
something more, like a spiritual entity, a beam [rayonnement] across the world, a 
sort of torch that marks our country as the incarnation of the ideas of liberté, 
égalité and fraternité universelle.47 
France now had to bring these lessons to Europe. In making this claim, Monnet invoked 
Albert Sarraut’s declaration that France had become a “prisoner of its conquest,” as the 
domination of African territory was more expensive than profitable.48 Monnet’s solution 
to the issue was to ensure that France’s overseas holdings be included in Europe as the 
key to France’s continued relevance and predominance in Europe. Like other French 
administrators of the era, Monnet did not appear to notice the incongruity of his claim. 
Was Africa sucking France dry or was it the last vestige of power that would preserve 
France’s place as a world leader? Monnet and his rapturous audience did not seem 
concerned with parsing out the contradiction. Indeed, Monnet sought to galvanize the 
support of the assembly to secure France’s promise of incorporating the overseas 
holdings, even as he suggested that without the overseas holdings, France would be 
                                                        
46 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 9, 10. This language is striking in light of Brexit and the popular fears about 
what the ceding of sovereignty has done to Britain (and, in the eyes of far-right parties, other nations, as 
well). The wave of academic inquiries into Brexit ideology has begun. See, for example, Michael Freeden, 
“After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies 22, 1 
(2017): 1-11, published online 8 December 2016.  
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813.  
47 MAEF 20QO/627: “Compte Rendu,” 10. 
48 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 10. 
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nothing. In his speech, Monnet offered the dire image of a Europe centered around the 
Rhine, cited at the end of the last chapter. The only solution was France joining with the 
entirety of its overseas possessions: 
[I]t is the final necessity that the overseas territories enter [Europe] with [France], 
showing, by their very presence, that we are there with the willingness to open in 
Europe this perspective to be not only a Union – a close Union, despite 
everything, walking close together in the face of the two blocs – but an ensemble 
entirely open toward a continent that needs it.49 
Monnet’s passionate address reveals a litany of concerns and claims being made just 
prior to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. France had to receive guarantees from its 
partners regarding the association of its overseas holdings. The overseas holdings sought 
sincerity in the Six’s pledge. All of Europe needed the strength of the holdings, an 
unveiled reference to the Cold War blocs. France needed the overseas holdings to 
maintain its own prestige. 
Senator Charles-Cros further considered the place of the French Union, in both a 
European and a Eurafrican union. Charles-Cros declared that “the French Union must 
live; it must not be smothered in the Eurafrican corset.” Yet he did not entirely challenge 
such a future, as “we believe that our destiny will also be the destiny of Africa.” Thus, the 
imperative for France, with the pressure and support of the Assembly of the French 
Union, was to maintain France’s position of power within the emerging systems. As 
always, the question seemed in part: what Eurafrique, and for whom? The Gaullist 
Marcel Léger promised that “Eurafrica will be humane, it will be with Africa and for 
Africa or it will not be.” Otherwise, Africa would be “delivered to interior disorder […]. 
                                                        
49 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 10. 
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What a temptation for the Asian masses!”50 Again, the imperatives were mixed. Africa 
could not survive without Europe; Africa risked falling to Communism, which 
(unspoken) would bring Europe to its knees. 
Not all were sold on the idea of Eurafrica, or the motivations of the Six, let alone 
of France. The Corsican Communist Arthur Giovoni was scathing in his assessment of 
the policy, which he viewed as a method “to check [juguler] the people of black Africa 
before Algeria has won its independence, the example of which risks being contagious. 
This consideration explains the haste taken to conclude the treaty.” Giovoni declared that 
it was not for “the French government to decide for them.” He drew vocal support from 
the extreme left in the assembly when he declared that the question was not whether 
colonialism existed “in this or that country, but to determine if the organization of the 
Common Market is an enterprise of philanthropy or of colonial pillage.”51 He drew ire 
for suggesting that parliamentarians and their compatriots, particularly Armand, the 
former SNCF director, were acting in France’s self-interest. 52  Giovoni’s concluding 
statement was no less incendiary: 
The policy of the Common Market that they propose to us both as a panacea and 
as a lesser evil is in reality a policy of capitulation and abandon. We oppose it 
with a policy of friendship and reciprocal interest, a true policy conforming to the 
greatness of France, in the interests of the people and of peace.53 
Giovoni’s critique, but also the concerns of Monnet and Cros-Charles that Eurafrica be 
approached with care, reveal that the increasingly uniform front France presented to its 
                                                        
50 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid. Léger was part of a group of politicians from Le Havre with strong ties to 
colonial administration. Claude Malon, Le Havre colonial de 1880 à 1960 (Mont-Saint-Aignan: 
Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2006), 403, 577. 
51 MAEF 20QO/627: “Compte Rendu,” 19-20. On the PCF and anti-imperialism, see Goebel, Anti-Imperial 
Metropolis, 176-215. 
52 MAEF 20QO/627: “ Ibid., 21-22. 
53 MAEF 20QO/627: Ibid., 23. 
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partners masked entrenched domestic fears about just what such a policy (bigamy, 
divorce) would do to the French-African relationship. 
 
Conclusion: Algeria and the Treaty of Rome 
The question of Algeria only exacerbated these tensions. As French officials grew 
confident that the Treaty of Rome would entail some version of Eurafrica, they worried 
about what sort of place Algeria would have in such an association. Algeria’s relation to 
the Common Market confounded French and European officials precisely because 
Algeria’s relation to France was so inchoate, ongoing war aside. In negotiations for the 
Treaty of Rome, France expressly renounced the right to ask for Fonds européen de 
développement (FED) benefits for Algeria, and by extension, for the DOM, even as those 
funds would apply to the TOM. Such a policy emphasized Algeria’s status as something 
different from a colony. Further still, no clause in the Treaty would protect Algeria’s 
burgeoning industry through quotas or customs duties, even as the TOM were able to 
raise their tariffs against Common Market states. The disadvantages Algeria risked 
experiencing through its association with the Common Market bear out Defferre’s 
concerns about not making special dispensations for overseas territories. They also hint at 
the status afforded Algeria, which appeared to be treated much more like a part of the 
EEC than like an associated or third-party state, even if such treatment would be highly 
detrimental. This mixed-up status was all the more confused by the regulations relating to 
the Sahara because the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions (OCRS) comprised 
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sections of Algeria, which was integrated into the Common Market, and of Chad, Niger, 
and Sudan, TOM that were associated with the Common Market.54  
On February 20, one month ahead of the Treaty of Rome’s signature, the heads of 
state of the six ECSC members agreed to treaty terms including Algeria and the overseas 
departments. These measures related to the customs union, rules of competition, and the 
free movement of services and institutions. Questions of social harmonization programs, 
agricultural questions, and circulation of workers would be scheduled for clarification 
within two years. In the meantime, Algeria and the DOM could benefit from the overseas 
territories investment fund and, with the unanimous authorization of the Council of 
Governors, loans or guarantees from the European Bank. The question of the origin of aid 
to Algeria would reappear in tense interactions between France and Germany in 1959-60, 
a subject which will be discussed in the next chapter. French officials fretted that in the 
interim, the only agricultural stipulation that seemed to apply to Algeria and the DOM 
related to minimum pricing. The lack of a special regime for Algeria could result in 
“major difficulties.” Indeed, although Algeria’s economic situation meant it had a great 
need for an extension of agricultural commercial outlets, the Treaty currently prevented 
such growth. This was compounded by fears of the impact of a common external tariff on 
Algeria’s citrus trade. Such a tariff would be roughly a third lower than the duty in 
France at the time and represented a major potential blow to Algeria’s agricultural 
sector. 55  Labor migration also garnered considerable worry. Bowing to its European 
partners, France allowed for a “relaxing” of rules that would have allowed for the 
                                                        
54 MAEF 20QO/792: “Le Marché Commun et la zone franc,” n.d., likely early 1957.  
55 MAEF 20QO/720: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction Générale des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, “Agreement of heads of government on Algeria and the 
overseas departments regarding the Common Market,” 22 February 1957.  
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progressive liberalization of the movement of Algerian workers. Thus “deprived of 
necessary outlets,” the Algerians would turn even more to the French labor market – still 
open to them – at a moment when the metropole would become saturated with workers 
from the other members of the Six.56 
Regardless of these concerns, the treaty moved forward with France’s consent. On 
March 25, 1957, representatives of the Six signed the Treaty of Rome: Adenauer (Federal 
Republic of Germany), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Joseph Luns (Netherlands), Pineau 
(France), Antonio Segni (Italy), and Paul Henri Spaak (Belgium). The Six agreed to 
stipulations that would explicitly name the French Union, along with other colonial 
holdings. Article 227 delineated where the Treaty of Rome would be applicable. Section 
1 named the Six, while Section 2 declared that “general and particular provisions,” 
including some agricultural regulations, the liberalization of services, and the movement 
of goods, would apply “to Algeria and the French overseas departments” once “this 
Treaty enters into force.” Section 3 guaranteed “special arrangements for association” 
that would apply to overseas countries and territories. This would include French, 
Belgian, Italian, and Dutch holdings. A fourth section addressed the Saar.57 Despite the 
intensity with which France insisted upon the inclusion of Algeria within the Treaty of 
Rome, the decision makers nevertheless conceded to the other five states a delayed 
application, not entirely planned out, of the conditions linking Algeria to the EEC. If 
these administrators, notably in the Ministry of Overseas France, had insisted that the 
French Union be integrated into the EEC, citing legal and economic links, they also 
                                                        
56 MAEF 20QO/720: Ibid. 
57 Fiona Murray, The European Union and Member State Territories: A New Legal Framework Under the 
EU Treaties (The Hague: Asser Press, 2012), 15-18. AN 20000293/4 (dérogation): “Note sur les 
dispositions du Traité de Rome relatives à l’Algérie,” 10 February 1959. 
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allowed, notably in concessions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain exceptions 
to appease their European partners. 
The question of Algeria reveals internal and external strife as French and 
European officials tried to understand exactly where the limits of the EEC were located, 
and in whose interest those limits were created and maintained. Although the March 25 
signing made official the creation of the European Economic Community, which would 
go into effect on January 1, 1958, this day held little import for France’s Algerian 
territory, juridically a part of the mother country, yet excluded from immediate 
application of the treaty’s provisions. Indeed, although special provisions for Algeria and 
France’s African holdings were a prerequisite for France even agreeing to sign the treaty, 
such provisions were not meant to take effect until a later date, vaguely alluded to as two 
years from the entire treaty taking effect, meaning 1960. In fact, there was enough vagary 
in the language to push off any decision-making until, perhaps fortuitously for those 
European administrators involved, Algeria’s independence resolved the question in a 
markedly different way – by excising the North African territory from France’s notion of 
the reach of its own borders. Thus, in considering March 25, 1957, and its place in the 
history of France, Algeria, and European integration, one must look at the signature 
moment not as a full stop, but as a jumping off point for further tense negotiations. The 
next two chapters will examine the post-Treaty negotiations for how the EEC would 
relate to and exist in Algeria, the DOM, and the TOM. 
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Chapter 4 
 
After the Signatures: Algeria’s “Hybrid” Relation to the EEC, 
and the Challenge from France’s Partners (1958-1962) 
 
The period between the Treaty of Rome’s ratification and the independence of 
Algeria reveals intransigence on the part of French officials, who continued to push for 
EEC regulations to extend to Algeria even as their European partners intensified critiques 
of such policies and French public opinion turned against the war effort. This chapter 
contends that French officials planned for an evolution in trade relations with Algeria that 
they believed would be realized. In so doing, they laid the groundwork for how future 
commercial and development aid treaties would be implemented across the former 
French Community, particularly the DOM. Further, the French used the supranational 
mechanism of the European Economic Community to solidify, if not extend, control over 
much of their former and current colonial holdings, even as formal recognition of 
independence occurred throughout sub-Saharan Africa and as the fall of the Fourth 
Republic laid bare the tumultuous impact of the Algerian War on the larger French 
political landscape.  
This chapter contributes to the field of international history by offering an 
example of how that history changes when empire is taken seriously as a unit of analysis 
in European integration. Policies formulated by French administrators are evidence of the 
impossibility for those officials of separating France’s imperial goals from its European 
aspirations. Discussing the world order following World War I, Adam Tooze argues that 
historians can “locate a dramatic shift in the calculus of power, not external to, but within 
the government machinery itself, in the interaction between military force, economics 
and diplomacy.” Tooze contends that in the interwar, French officials attempted to create 
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new associations with the United States and Great Britain in order to distance itself from 
previous alliances with Tsarist Russia. New alliances could offer France security in a 
markedly different diplomatic environment. Meanwhile, Germany (and Japan) witnessed 
the “nexus between domestic and foreign policy […].” 1  While Tooze is primarily 
interested in how the “old world” formed relations with ascendant America, I am 
interested in his larger themes of the diplomatic and economic turmoil caused by war, 
and how world powers attempted to reassert their place in an upended global hierarchy. 
French officials’ choices after the signing of the Treaty of Rome attest to the messiness of 
the postwar, when once again the French attempted to forge new relationships while 
maintaining a privileged position in world affairs. 
Nineteen sixty would be a momentous year for Algeria and the DOM, or so the 
Treaty of Rome would suggest. A litany of EEC regulations, delayed for two years after 
the official launch of the Treaty, were to be extended to overseas French departments that 
year. Yet 1960 is more noteworthy as the year nearly all of France’s sub-Saharan African 
holdings became independent, and indeed, the Treaty of Rome’s benefits continued to 
elude the far-flung reaches of France. This chapter examines the period between when the 
Treaty of Rome went into effect, on January 1, 1958, and when Charles de Gaulle 
proclaimed Algeria an independent state on July 3, 1962, following an overwhelming 
referendum. In this short interim, the Fourth Republic came to an end and de Gaulle 
returned to power (1958); French administrators launched the Constantine Plan (1958); 
African states, as mentioned above, gained independence (1960); and negotiators mapped 
                                                        
1 Tooze, The Deluge, 23-25. 
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out the Evian Accords (1961, signed 1962).2 Although these historical moments inspire 
long monographs for their significance and their influence, the period is also remarkable 
because it marks the first and last time a European institution’s borders officially 
stretched to encompass Algeria. 3 This stunning understanding of territorial reach and 
economic unity must be taken seriously, and examined not as an unrealizable vision, but 
as a possibility that had concrete ramifications for European relations and the future of 
European-African relations into the decades to follow. 
The first section of this chapter examines the European discussions surrounding 
the Treaty of Rome’s “official start.” As noted already, January 1, 1958 did not mark the 
actual implementation of the Treaty’s policies in any real sense, but rather marked the 
point at which the Six would start to make sense of how to put the Treaty into action. The 
second and third sections of this chapter thus turn to what happened as the mandated two-
year delay on Article 227, Section 2 came to an end. The French delegation in Brussels 
faced two separate yet linked problems by late 1959, early 1960. On the one hand, as the 
second section will discuss, the Commission tackled how the Treaty of Rome would 
apply in Algeria, following the delay period. Italian officials perceived the possibility of a 
broad application policy in Algeria as a major threat to their labor force and export 
potential. On the other hand, the third section examines how as French tactics in Algeria 
shifted, officials in Paris began to reimagine how European aid schemes could be 
                                                        
2  Muriam Haleh Davis’ analysis of the social sciences and the Constantine Plan offers evidence of 
American thought in French social planning and of the interplay between the economy, notions of 
rationalization, and the last days of formal French colonialism in Algeria. Muriam Haleh Davis, “‘The 
Transformation of Man’ in French Algeria: Economic Planning and the Postwar Social Sciences, 1958-62,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 52, 1 (Jan. 2017): 73-94. 
3 Somewhat incredibly, one of the best visual depictions of these expansions and contractions can be found 
on Wikipedia, in an entry on European integration. A map GIF shows Algerian territory in the first slide 
(1957), Greenland but no Algeria in the second (1973), and the absence of Greenland in the fourth (1986). 
“History of the European Union,” Wikipedia, last modified 27 February 2017. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_European_Union.  
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funneled to the embattled territory. Such a change in policy directly contradicted earlier 
plans espoused by the French delegation and embraced by the other members of the EEC, 
particularly West Germany. Thus, by the time of Algerian independence, the subject of 
the next chapter, French officials had once again frustrated and risked alienating their 
European partners in order to pursue policies they deemed desirable for restoring peace in 
Algeria and maintaining economic control elsewhere in the French Community.4  
Read together, the episodes of the years in which Algeria was part of both France 
and the European Economic Community reveal the difficulty of implementing French 
notions of territory and trade zones, but also demonstrate the groundwork laid for 
Europe’s future development aid and labor migration structures. 
 
Creeping Toward Implementation 
The Treaty of Rome’s March signature marked only a first stage of its official 
adoption. In the months that followed, each of the signatories ratified the Treaty. It would 
officially go into effect on January 1, 1958, although the first stage of implementation 
would begin a year after that. As Chapter 3 made clear, France’s push to include its 
overseas holdings within the Treaty proved successful. Yet internally, debates continued 
about exactly what that might mean for the French Union. Major skepticism and even 
outright hostility to the Treaty lingered in Paris, as officials charged with administering 
extrametropolitan French holdings attempted to make sense of how EEC regulations 
                                                        
4 Here I am interested in the dynamics of motivation and power. Discussing Japan and Germany in the 
interwar, Tooze writes, “though the military class and economic groups such as agrarians might have little 
to lose in abandoning internationalism, other influential groups, notably big business, were slower to 
relinquish the promises of the 1920s.” Tooze, The Deluge, 503. Tooze’s analysis hinges on the imbrication 
of international trade in the interwar. By the late 1950s, French business leaders embraced ideals of 
internationalism in trade, but viewed treaty negotiations as a space for carving out regulations that could 
best serve national interests. 
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might help or hurt the constituents and business interests under their jurisdiction. Thus, 
one must see the Treaty’s signature not as a full stop, but as a jumping off point for 
further tense negotiations with—at times—ambiguous goals. This push risked alienating 
some of France’s partners, as French officials attempted to balance their role within a 
supranational European institution with their belief that France must remain the major 
interlocutor between Europe and the African world. 
After the Treaty of Rome’s signing, French officials continued to emphasize that 
Algeria both was and was not entitled to equal treatment under Treaty stipulations. In 
April 1957, a working group devised to examine Algeria’s potential inclusion within a 
European free trade zone emphasized that the departments should be integrated on the 
same basis as Metropolitan France and argued that the Treaty of Rome already applied to 
Algeria. However, it noted, “this group of departments presented all the characteristics of 
an underdeveloped and overpopulated country.” This underdevelopment had already been 
used to justify the delay in solving questions of free labor circulation that would dog 
French administrators in the years to come. Indeed, the group warned that the delay in 
resolving Algeria’s exact status within the EEC had “left hanging a question of capital 
interest that merits being the subject of a thorough examination.” This would be one 
element of the working group’s analysis, which also addressed questions of commercial 
interests, economic growth, and expanded industrialization based on investments. The 
group also elaborated on the extent of Franco-Algerian trade and argued that the risk of 
competition from Italian agricultural goods, and eventually those of Greece, Portugal, 
Turkey, and perhaps even Spain, would have to be mitigated through strong regulation.5 
                                                        
5  The group, headed by Simoneau, comprised: Gutmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Direction of 
Economic and Financial Affairs; de la Genière, Ministry of Economics and Finances, Direction of External 
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French concern about the threat of competition to Algeria is noteworthy because of how 
strongly Italian statesmen would condemn the region’s potential to undermine Italian 
economic stability, as will be discussed in this chapter’s next section. 
In July 1957, in the midst of French ratification discussions and only days after 
the Bundestag had ratified the Treaty, the Council of the Republic’s Commission on 
Overseas France presented a statement voicing concern about the scope of the Treaty’s 
application. The senator who presented the statement, Léon Motais de Narbonne, was a 
representative of les français d’Indochine and would soon serve as senator of les français 
établis hors de France. Invoking the Biblical story of Esau, the Commission argued that 
France should not sell “its birthright for a dish of lentils [droit d’aînesse contre le plat de 
lentilles].” The amount of investment in the Overseas Countries and Territories (PTOM) 
that France now expected from its neighbors was paltry in comparison to the aid already 
given by France and the benefits that the other members would reap, developments that 
alarmed these representatives and their constituents. Citing Article 227, the statement 
declared that Algeria and the four DOM would “follow the fate [le sort] of the Metropole 
through the immediate application of key provisions,” while for “evident economic and 
political reasons,” the associated territories would not. The Commission asserted that the 
reasons that would prevent such an application in the associated territories “are equally 
valid for Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, and la Réunion, but here the fiction of 
juridical assimilation to the Metropole has won.” The Commission expressed dismay 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Finances; Menahem and Sacle of the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Bellon, Undersecretary of 
State for the Merchant Marines, Direction of Economic Affairs and Naval Material; Beaurepaire, Secretary 
of State for Industry and Commerce, Service of External Affairs; Gribelin, Ministry of Overseas France, 
Direction of Economic Affairs and the Plan; Rigard, Ministry of the Interior, Direction of Algerian Affairs; 
and representing the Government General of Algeria: Bouakouir, Direction of Commerce and Industry; 
Barbut, General Inspection of Agriculture; and Mayer, Secretary General. MAEF 20QO/792: Groupe de 
Travail Algérie, SGCI, “Participation Eventuelle de l’Algérie à une Zone de Libre Echange,” 17 April 
1957.  
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regarding the uneven representation of France within the EEC once overseas residents 
were factored in, which meant that France’s representation was equal to that of Germany 
or Italy, despite an overseas population of 50 million. It also worried that the Treaty 
could allow for “abandoning the Africans” after five years.  Despite these seemingly 
urgent concerns, the Commission deemed favorable the ratification of the Treaty.6  
The Commission of Overseas France’s worries highlight an ambivalent 
understanding among French administrators, who perceived the EEC to be a tool for 
maintaining relevance in Africa and in global affairs, but eyed it warily as opening 
France to competition from Europe in Africa and beyond. This is evidenced in what 
appears on the surface to be a petty complaint inserted between the economic concerns 
voiced in the 1957 statement. The Commission was disturbed that “no one talks about, no 
one was scandalized” that the Treaty did not recognize French “as the European language 
and that […] it is placed on equal footing with German Italian, and Dutch.” The 
Commission argued that such a “shortcoming” would allow for “controversies” of 
interpretation. Further, 
It is finally contrary to the well-understood interest of Europe, which, through the 
recognition of the universality of our language, could act as a counterbalance to 
the relentless effort [lutte] which leads the Anglo-American bloc […] to the 
success of their [language], these great realists knowing full well that wealth 
exchanges tend to align with spiritual exchanges and that the conquest of markets 
is facilitated by the conquest of minds.7 
This moment of apparent vanity, concerning the preeminence of French as the language 
of Europe and the language of diplomacy, reveals larger French concerns about 
remaining relevant in the postwar era; this very same concern led French officials to 
                                                        
6 CAOM 81 F 2128: “Avis présenté,” by M. Motais de Narbonne, Sénateur and Commission of Overseas 
France, Conseil de la République Annex to PV of 12 July 1957 session.  
7 CAOM 81 F 2128: Ibid. 
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pursue doggedly Eurafrican policies from the mid-1950s onward. Even the acceptance of 
Eurafrican policy within the Treaty of Rome thus appeared unsatisfactory as a guarantee 
of protections for the French Union and of a promise that France would maintain its 
privileged place at the head of such an organization (and as the most important economy 
of the EEC). Such concerns embody more than the upheaval of colonial practice in the 
postwar era. They also reflect the malaise of the waning months of the Fourth Republic. 
Charles de Gaulle’s return to power, precipitated by a coup attempt in Algeria in May 
1958 and resulting in the emergence of the Fifth Republic, whose constitution was 
ratified on October 4, 1958, drew momentary confidence, yet on the whole, little changed 
in terms of French approaches to the maintenance of Eurafrican policy within the Treaty.8 
The absence of major change in Eurafrican policy from the Fourth Republic 
through the early Fifth Republic speaks to the importance of business interests in 
France’s African holdings. Decisions taken in Brussels over implementing the Treaty of 
Rome in Algeria and elsewhere drew concern and critiques from industrial and 
agricultural interests in Algeria. Indeed, the presence of French business interests—as 
well as citizens—in Algeria can go a long way toward explaining the long life of the 
pressure to maintain Eurafrican regulations and connections between Algeria and 
Brussels. These continuities were pursued even as international and domestic pressure 
increasingly agitated for ceding Algeria. Agricultural interests found a mouthpiece in the 
                                                        
8 Frédéric Turpin argues that “the cascade of independence of black African states in 1960 does not mark a 
profound rupture in the relations between France and these countries. On the contrary, the policy of 
cooperation […] is perfectly inscribed in the logic and past practices, except that these [African] 
governments enjoy[ed] international sovereignty.” Turpin, “L’Association Europe-Afrique: Une ‘Bonne 
Affaire’ pour la France dans ses Relations avec l’Afrique (1957-1975)?,” in L’Europe Unie et l’Afrique, 
346. My findings confirm those of Turpin but I again emphasize that historians must address how such 
practices were implemented in both North and sub-Saharan Africa. The case of Algeria in the Treaty of 
Rome is evidence of just that sort of continuity, between the French republics of the postwar and the newly 
sovereign states emerging across the continent of Africa. 
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Algerian Union of the General Confederation of Agriculture, which voiced opposition to 
risky delays in applying the Treaty of Rome to Algeria and expressed hope that France’s 
representatives within EEC institutions could research a solution “favorable to the 
interests of Algerian agriculture.”9 France’s interest and concern regarding a free trade 
zone extended beyond the halls of government. Private businesses also had a stake in 
how such policies might be implemented in the DOM-TOM.10 For example, the Syndical 
Union of Sugar and Rum Producers of la Réunion wrote to Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs Maurice Faure, in agreement with a position taken by the Algerian Patronat 
(association of managers), encouraging the government to avoid a “rupture of economic 
unity” which could arise from a free trade zone that did not include the DOM. Instead, it 
advocated for “the integration of the overseas departments at the heart of the free trade 
zone” and “insisted in a most pressing fashion” that the French government push this 
point during the upcoming debates on the zone. This, however, was a secondary wish to 
their larger desire: that France continue the Treaty of Rome and renounce the free trade 
zone project, “whose drawbacks are obvious for the overseas [departments].”11  
This concern continued unabated as the Six remained in talks relating to a larger 
free trade zone. In a lengthy report detailing the problematic consequences of such a plan, 
                                                        
9 MAEF 20QO/726: Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires Etrangères to Secrétaire d’Etat à l’Algérie, Bureau 
Economique et Financier, “Application à l’Algérie des dispositions du Traité de Rome relatives à 
l’agriculture,” 19 October 1957. 
10 Copeland argues that European states go to war when “they believe they are facing actors who are not 
committed to open trade and commerce in the future.” Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, 435. 
Here again his argument on economic interdependence and war can be applied to the institutions meant to 
uphold a Kantian perpetual peace. War was no longer on the table, but rather the future of integrated 
European institutions, when French business leaders encouraged regulatory policy that could undermine 
peaceful relations with the other members of the Six. If Jacques Marseille’s analysis of the colonial 
economy suggests that such policies were not actually in France’s best interest, Copeland’s assertion of 
“expectations” can help to explain why the French doggedly pursued such ideas. 
11 MAEF 20QO/792:  Jean Jourdain, Président de l’Union Syndicale des Producteurs de Sucre et de Rhum 
de l’Ile de la Réunion, Conseiller Economique to Maurice Faure, Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires Etrangères, 
9 January 1958. 
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released in December 1958, the Algerian Patronat invoked a declaration made by the 
National Council of the French Patronat in October of that year. Both organizations 
advocated rejecting the free trade zone project in its current form. The Algerian document 
quoted from the parent organization’s statement: 
It is time, too, for those who are attached both to the construction of Europe and 
to the development of harmonious relations between the Six and their partners, to 
denounce the intrinsic flaw [vice interne] of this negotiation of a free trade zone, 
and to demand the urgency of opening the real negotiation: that which, 
conforming to the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, must be engaged with by the 
Community with each of its European and extra-European partners, and firstly, 
of course, with those in Europe who traditionally maintain the most important 
relations with the countries of the Community. 
 
French industry, for its part, never thought that the institution of the Common 
Market should lead to the weakening of commercial relations with Great Britain, 
Sweden, Austria, Scandinavia, and the other states, in or outside of Europe. 
 
That is why it demands, as it has since the start of the debate that, once the 
fantasy of the free trade zone is dismissed, the real problems will be approached 
in a concrete fashion between the Community and each of its partners with the 
firm willingness to adopt, in the mutual interest of the parties, the proper 
measures to guarantee the development of exchanges.12 
Protections would mitigate risks of Algeria being subsumed by unfair trade practices, 
including the risk, for example, of Japanese cotton being exported to an EEC state, where 
it would be “lightly processed” and then sold with the certificate “Provenance CEE.”13 
Such fears of competition were exacerbated as Belgian, Dutch, and Italian representatives 
in Brussels all made clear that they would oppose attempts to extend the EEC social 
security regime to Algerian laborers.14  
                                                        
12 Archives Nationales du Monde du Travail (ANMT) 98 AS N 603: Confédération Générale du Patronat 
de l’Algérie, Rapport de Synthèse: Edition Provisoire, 16 December 1958. Citing a 27 October 1958 
declaration. 
13 ANMT 98 AS N 603: Confédération Générale du Patronat de l’Algérie, Rapport de Synthèse. 
14 MAEF 20QO/712: Mille telegram to Donnedieu de Vabres, Cabinet – Secrétaire d’Etat et Direction 
Economique, 12 April 1958. 
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For some French officials, addressing the specific needs of Algeria within EEC 
regulation could help to clarify what the departments might expect from the creation of 
European institutions. Yet to others, specifically naming Algeria as a separate beneficiary 
of the EEC complicated French claims of Algérie française and risked allowing the 
territory to be excised from the metropole in terms of trade partnerships. 15  One 
administrator offered a particularly novel solution to the chaos. Eric de Carbonnel, 
Permanent Representative of France before the European Communities in Brussels, 
suggested that “[t]he problem of the domain of the application of this regulation as it 
concerns Algeria can be treated by preterition.”16 Preterition is the rhetorical device of 
omission, or of feigning omission. Carbonnel thus implied that by not addressing Algeria 
outright—or by insisting that there was no reason for Algeria to be discussed explicitly—
the French could tacitly create a legal environment in which its partners accepted the by 
now less-than-tenable claim on the territory’s Frenchness. France could continue its 
decades-old colonial practice in Algeria by claiming that metropolitan law still applied in 
the warring region. This appealed to Carbonnel and others, as it side-stepped the looming 
questions of applying the Treaty of Rome to Algeria by suggesting that no additional 
talks would be necessary, as it was merely a part of France. 
Carbonnel’s idea was not heeded and as we shall see shortly, he himself was 
involved in discussions of the implementation in Algeria of Article 227. Yet other 
officials appeared to share his concern about how to understand Algeria in an official 
                                                        
15 Daniel Lefeuvre, himself a student of Jacques Marseille, took up Marseille’s inquiry into the calculus of 
the colonies and applied it specifically to Algeria. He concluded that French authorities clung to Algeria for 
as long as it remained a “strategic interest.” These state interests in Algeria, in some ways separate from 
pure economic interests that might have led France to cede Algerian autonomy earlier, can help to explain 
the attention paid by French officials to how Algeria would be understood within the wording of the Treaty 
of Rome. Lefeuvre, Chère Algérie, 483-484. 
16 MAEF 20QO/721: Carbonnel telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 August 1958. 
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context. In late May 1958, Jacques Pélissier, the Director of Agriculture and Forests in 
Algeria, complained to the Minister of Agriculture in Paris. The working group charged 
with a study of the problems of integrating French agricultural policy within the 
European Common Market had inadvertently stumbled because of the litany of juridical 
definitions. Pélissier lamented:  
In certain already completed reports, Algeria is considered an overseas territory, 
which causes confusion, as the overseas territories are associated with the 
Common Market, while Algeria is integrated into it (Article 227 of the Treaty of 
Rome). Algeria is even sometimes treated [assimilée] as a foreign country, 
meaning a third-party state, in [relation] to the Common Market.17 
Pélissier argued that uniform terminology would “definitively clarif[y] a situation that 
will be susceptible to creating unfortunate confusion.” 18 Even within French ministries, it 
proved increasingly difficult to establish how Algeria’s legal relation to France—and, by 
extension, to Europe—might be understood.  
Indeed, internally and in the halls of Brussels, French administrators avoided 
labelling Algeria as a TOM or DOM, even as it was clear that they did not view it as a 
North African Alpes-Martimes, either. For the French, the stakes were multiple, and 
ambiguity was perhaps as useful as it was perplexing.19 The official French claims that 
Algeria comprised three departments like any other, though undermined by the denial of 
full citizenship rights to the vast majority of the departments’ residents, would offer 
administrators a legal claim in Brussels claiming all European regulations for Algeria. 
                                                        
17 CAOM 81 F 2255: Directeur de l’Agriculture et des Forêts du Ministère de l’Algérie to le Ministre de 
l’Agriculture, “Production Agricole de l’Algérie—Intégration dans le cadre du Marché Commun 
Européen,” 30 May 1958. 
18 CAOM 81 F 2255: Ibid. 
19 Farid Azfar asserts the usefulness of confusion, and its importance as a subject of historical study. He 
argues that “as confusion allowed for creative license in matters of punishment, it could equally prevent or 
facilitate execution.” The openings and possibilities generated by a lack of coherent legal policy in early 
18th-century England would be apparent in the otherwise quite different legal landscape of postwar 
European integration negotiations. “Genealogy of an Execution: The Sodomite, the Bishop, and the 
Anomaly of 1726,” The Journal of British Studies 51, 3 (July 2012): 577.  
 
Brown • Chapter 4 135 
This was not without its pitfalls. Were French officials to acknowledge that Algeria was 
indeed not the same as a metropolitan department, they would promote a reading of its 
juridical status that subverted the very reasoning for France’s deep embroilment in 
Algeria’s war for independence. Were they to insist fully on Algeria’s Frenchness, 
domestic policies would need to shift to incorporate the millions of new citizens.20  
Attention to the Treaty of Rome’s operation within Algeria only increased in the 
months that followed. By early 1959, administrators like Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres, 
Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee, and Salah Bouakouir, Delegate 
General of the Government in Algeria, Adjunct Secretary General for Economic Affairs, 
met to discuss what provisions of the Treaty, including but not limited to Article 227 
Section 2, would be extended to Algeria. Vabres declared it “easy to see, there are many 
questions, some of them quite difficult,” and he urged that the issue be dealt with 
quickly. 21  Gilles Warnier de Wailly of the Secrétariat Général of Algeria, to whom 
Vabres communicated a lengthy memo about the clauses that might apply in Algeria, 
replied with a hint of disdain, or at least frustration, suggesting that he had already 
signaled the issues now being flagged by Vabres. De Wailly wrote, “The implementation 
of the Treaty of Rome in fact still poses, for Algeria, a series of very poorly managed 
problems, in my opinion.” Pointing out that he had told René Brouillet of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry in October that the question must be quickly examined, he wrote that 
little was done, “even in Algeria […] as far as I know.” Further, noting that Bouakouir 
                                                        
20 For evolving notions of citizenship and subjecthood, see Héloïse Finch-Boyer, “‘The Idea of the Nation 
Was Superior to Race’: Transforming Racial Contours and Social Attitudes and Decolonizing the French 
Empire from La Réunion, 1946–1973,” French Historical Studies 36, 1 (Winter 2013): 109-140. 
21 AN 20000293/4 (dérogation): Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres to Gilles Warnier de Wailly, Secrétariat 
Général de l’Algérie, Mission d’Etudes, "Note sur les dispositions du Traité de Rome relatives à l’Algérie," 
10 February 1959. A copy was also sent to Paul Delouvrier. 
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had charged a colleague with studying the issue, he expressed doubt that the 
“fonctionnaire” would be up to the task. That being said, de Wailly did have a plan of 
action. At the behest of Henry Ingrand, Secretary General for Algerian Affairs, de Wailly 
had reorganized the study mission before the Secretary General for Algerian Affairs, and 
“I proposed to him a program of work where the application of the Treaty of Rome in 
Algeria is high on the agenda [figure en bonne place].” This study unit, “naturally in 
close relation with the General Delegation in Algiers, with you, and the various interested 
services in Paris,” would have three major tasks: 
-to predict the conditions of application of certain provisions of the Treaty 
-to negotiate the very application of certain points of the Treaty 
-in all likelihood to renegotiate certain provisions that are not satisfactory. 
He concluded his letter by pointedly noting that “it is difficult to imagine that the 
Algerian market will be open to European products, but that the European labor market is 
not open to Algerian workers.”22  
Bouakouir put the confusion and exclusion in dire terms. He penned a letter to the 
office of Algerian Affairs within the Prime Ministry, writing that he had previously 
highlighted the “very serious dangers [inconvénients très graves]” of the omission of 
Algerian production from the “propositions concerning the development and 
implementation of the common agricultural policy, established to conform with Article 
43 of the treaty instituting the European Economic Community.” Bouakouir warned of 
the problematic effects on “key sectors,” notably cereals, fruits, and vegetables, because 
the resources and needs of France were only assessed using figures of metropolitan 
production. “This could lead to a belief that the French market is a long-term, massive 
                                                        
22 CAOM 81 F 188: De Wailly to Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres, 12 February 1959. 
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importer of durum wheat, as well as of other categories of fruits and vegetables […], not 
at all taking into account Algerian production, notably in regards to citrus fruit.” This 
risked “distort[ing] the common agricultural policy and the external commerce policy of 
the European Economic Community.” What’s more, Bouakouir argued, this exclusionary 
tactic was “against the spirit that reigned during the preparatory work of the Treaty of 
Rome, and especially the principles laid out during the Conference of Stresa, which 
resulted in regrouping in a single and very great French market the supply of the 
Metropole and Algeria.” To remedy this, Bouakouir advocated presenting documentation 
incorporating both Metropolitan and Algerian production and that all documents be sent 
to the services of the General Delegation for Algeria to allow them to give input if 
necessary.23 
At its worst, then, preparing for Brussels regulations to extend to Algeria 
jeopardized French goals for these extrametropolitan departments. Conversely, other 
French officials continued to argue that Algeria’s integration with the EEC served to 
prove the very Frenchness of the region. For these men, the relationship between Algeria, 
France, and the European Economic Community could confirm Algeria’s French quality. 
In 1959, the Director of Domestic and Foreign Commerce for the Adjunct Secretary 
General for Algerian Economic Affairs, a Mr. Marzocchi, wrote an article affirming the 
still-strong link between France and Algeria. Marzocchi summarized some of the 
elements of the EEC that were already applicable in Algeria. He expressed his hope that 
the expected increase in exchanges between Algeria and the Six would help Algeria’s 
economic development. Despite Algeria’s underdevelopment in comparison to the Six, 
                                                        
23 CAOM 81 F 2255: Salah Bouakouir, Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie to Premier Ministre, 
Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires Algériennes (Cabinet), “Place de l’Agriculture Algérienne dans la 
Politique Agricole Commune de la Communauté Economique Européenne,” 18 February 1960. 
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Marzocchi declared, “In any event, it is important not to commit the error of considering 
Algeria as a far-off overseas territory, merely associated with the EEC.” Marzocchi 
launched into a geographic explanation to argue that Algeria must be of interest to the 
EEC: 
By its proximity (the distance is not further between Luxembourg and Algeria 
than between Naples and Amsterdam), by the size of its population and its 
potential riches, by the complementary nature of some of its productions and 
needs in relation to industrial regions, finally, by the size [ampleur] of its 
commercial exchanges […], Algeria must be considered the little sibling of these 
young regions of the Community […] that the member states have engaged in 
helping to develop economically and socially.24  
This discussion of geography is revealing, following in a long French tradition of 
defining the Mediterranean as an internal lake in a Euro-African bloc.25 In such a vision, 
Algeria serves as a portal to Africa, a great expanse that was the natural extension of 
France and of Europe. This insistence, so close to the moment of Algerian independence, 
suggests a willfully blind optimism or a deeply confused atmosphere among those French 
administrators planning for France’s future with both Algeria and Europe.  
What was certain is that even with the independence of nearly the entirety of the 
French Community in 1960, Eurafrican policy would take on a new urgency for France. 
That policy would now extend to France’s former empire as well as to l’Algérie 
française. The use of Eurafrica after the loss of formal empire is evident in declarations 
by Prime Minister Michel Debré that emphasized the importance of maintaining French 
supremacy in the economic and political affairs of Africa, rather than ceding all power to 
Europe. Debré identified new French initiatives as Africa began the process of 
decolonization, noting that the procedure for revising the Treaty of Rome to account for 
                                                        
24 CDHA: Marzocchi, “Le Marché Algérien et l’Europe” in France Outremer 36, nº 354 (May 1959): 60-
61. 
25 See the notion of this bloc in the French and European imaginary, discussed in Chapter 1. 
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this shift would be time-consuming and best delayed until all of the African states 
concerned had acquired their independence. More pressing to Debré was that France 
make clear in this moment of independence that it was still the principal power interested 
in, and working with, these states. Debré told Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve 
de Murville that France should take the initiative to organize a conference regarding the 
preservation of ties between the EEC and Africa (“all overseas states should be 
represented, not only the independent states”), ensuring that this conference take place in 
Paris, and not Brussels. Indeed, it was important that the association between European 
and African states “not depend administratively on the Commission of Brussels.” As 
such, France’s objective should be to establish an independent secretariat, located not in 
Brussels but in Paris.26 
Debré expressed these and other ideas to European Commission President Walter 
Hallstein in July 1960. In a meeting that lasted over an hour, he emphasized that France 
was the leader [chef de file] regarding questions about the African states: 
It is not a question of wanting an exclusive territory [chasse gardée], nor of 
wanting to have our policy considered faultless. We accept the opened door and 
we accept critiques, but confidentially [secrètes]. Regarding Africa, there must 
not be two capitals – Brussels must not compete with Paris. There should not be 
outbidding; there must not even be feeling that Brussels may be a recourse 
against Paris.27  
Debré also told Hallstein that “if there is a European sentiment, Europe must participate 
in the effort that is happening in Algeria.” He indicated that former attitudes of the 
French government (presumably not to involve the rest of the Six) had been justified, but 
were no longer. Considering Debré’s heavy-handed declarations, his recounting of 
                                                        
26 Sciences Po Fonds Couve de Murville (CM) 7: Michel Debré to Maurice Couve de Murville, 10 May 
1960. 
27 Sciences Po CM 7: Michel Debré to Maurice Couve de Murville, 23 July 1960. 
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Hallstein’s responses indicates an agreeable attitude on Hallstein’s part. Hallstein agreed 
with Debré that the question of a Common Agricultural Policy was a “decisive test.” He 
concurred that Germany should have “less ambiguity” regarding Algeria and that the 
Community should “avoid competition,” presumably regarding a question of Brussels 
versus Paris. In all, Debré declared the meeting “very cordial.”28 Hallstein’s conciliatory 
tone in 1960 masks growing dissent from France’s European partners as negotiations for 
implementing Article 227 began. 
The Dutch came to view France’s attachment to Algeria and to its former empire 
as a weak point through which it could attack France, whose blocking of United 
Kingdom entry into the EEC angered Dutch administrators.29 The Dutch government 
contended that independence had rendered moot the association established by the Treaty 
of Rome between African and European states and would only accept that these countries 
could continue to receive aid from the Development Fund until the expiration of the 
application convention. Georges Gorse, Carbonnel’s replacement as France’s Permanent 
Representative in Brussels, worried that a negative message from the Netherlands and the 
EEC as a whole would imbue a sense of ill will toward Europe in newly independent 
African states.30 Ultimately, Dutch obstructionism did little to diminish France’s greater 
power of persuasion within the EEC.31 However, concerns from the Italian and German 
                                                        
28 Sciences Po CM 7: Ibid. 
29 Great Britain’s Commonwealth connection was cited (guilelessly) by French administrators as a reason 
why the British could not join the EEC. British requests to join were formally vetoed in 1963 and 1967, and 
it finally joined the EEC in 1973. The conclusion will touch on this briefly, but for more, see Garret Joseph 
Martin, General de Gaulle’s Cold War: Challenging American Hegemony, 1963-1968 (New York: 
Berghahn, 2013), 17-24. 
30 MAEF 20QO/723: Gorse telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 12 July 1960. 
31 Later, Dutch administrators used France’s increasingly sore spot of colonial management as a way of 
expressing their frustration at de Gaulle’s veto over the entry of Great Britain into the EEC. MAEF 
21QO/1462: Telegram signed Crouy, in The Hague, to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 20 June 1963. 
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delegations in Brussels put pressure on French officials throughout the first stage of 
Treaty of Rome application. It is to those tensions that this chapter now turns. 
 
A Maghrebi Mezzogiorno?  
Although the Treaty of Rome explicitly named Algeria and France’s DOM in 
Article 227, Section 2, those stipulations, as well as the ones impacting the PTOM 
(Section 3), had a built-in delay period of two years prior to implementation. Thus, major 
issues of how the Treaty of Rome might look when applied in Algeria only arose in late 
1959, with tensions rising in the months that followed. An internal memorandum 
circulated in late 1959 prepared French officials for the demands they could make 
regarding the application in Algeria of certain parts of the Treaty of Rome. The French 
asserted that Algeria was “covered by the Treaty of Rome,” yet allowed that “the 
Algerian departments, even more than certain other regions of the European Economic 
Community, are in a state of underdevelopment that necessitates various adaptations 
justified by the concern to facilitate economic and social development.” However, 
Algeria was “totally integrated in the French customs territory [territoire douanier 
français],” and “was part of the European Common Market since the Treaty of Rome 
came into force.” In preparing for negotiations in Brussels, French administrators focused 
on the realms of agriculture, labor migration, and the European Social Fund. The latter 
two would become major sticking points in Franco-Italian relations in the early 1960s, 
which will be discussed shortly. The memorandum speculated that no specific 
discrimination regarding Algerian workers circulating in the member states would be 
implemented, “aside from the reservations based on public order or public security and 
 
Brown • Chapter 4 142 
health.” The French would pursue a policy of quotas by profession to regulate the arrival 
in Algeria of member state workers. The French went further in speculating how the 
Treaty’s social policy might be applied in Algeria. The memorandum declared that “The 
objectives of the social policy defined by the Treaty correspond precisely to those with 
which the Government has tasked itself in Algeria.” It was here that the French made the 
demand that would so concern the Italians in Brussels: 
Concerning the European Social Fund, it would be contrary to the stipulations of 
the Treaty if some kind of discrimination is exercised against workers from the 
Algerian departments, provided that they be employed in a European territory of 
the Common Market or in Algeria itself. 
The memorandum pressed further on the question of the European Investment Bank, 
which it deemed applicable “fully and entirely” in Algeria.32   
Following input from the French and their partners, the Commission submitted a 
proposal to the Council regarding possible application strategies. Rather than offer dates, 
the proposal instead suggested what policy proposals the Council should decide upon 
prior to implementing specific parts of the Treaty of Rome. For example, Article 40, 
Section 4, concerning the establishment of “one or more agricultural guidance and 
guarantee fund[s],” could be addressed once the Commission proposals “for working out 
and implementing the common agricultural policy […]” were settled, as laid out in 
Article 43, Section 2. The Commission suggested similar delays for decisions that should 
be made only once the Council settled other key areas of the Treaty, including the free 
circulation of labor33, the right of establishment34, liberalized movement of capital35, and 
                                                        
32 CAOM 81 F 1133: “Exemplaire Revisé: Mémorandum sur l’application du Traité de Rome à l’Algérie,” 
undated, sent by Michel-Jean Mafart, Directeur du Cabinet du Délégué Général du Gouvernement en 
Algérie, Commerce Intérieur et Extérieur to Premier Ministre, Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires 
Algériennes, 1 December 1959. 
33 Articles 48-50. 
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the implementation of a “common commercial policy”.36 The same recommendations 
also addressed portions of the Treaty of Rome related to “working conditions and an 
improved standard of living for workers,”37 and the establishment of the European Social 
Fund.38 
Administrators in the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Economic and Financial 
Division, Service for Economic Cooperation worried that the proposition used the 
phrasing “once [dès que] [the Council] has decided upon” to explain how these 
stipulations would be implemented. For instance, the application conditions of Articles 
48 to 50 would be decided upon “once [the Council] has decided upon the propositions 
submitted by the Commission in accordance with [en vertu de] Article 49 of the Treaty.” 
Rather than “once,” these administrators hoped the language might be changed to “at the 
moment [the Council] has ruled.”39 This seemingly minor change in language, might, it 
appears, have allowed the French to insist upon simultaneous implementation in 
metropolitan France and in Algeria of any relevant Treaty stipulation, thus speeding up 
the timeline of EEC application in the latter. The urgency officials felt appeared to 
contradict the mood in Paris, as metropolitan France viewed the Algerian War with 
increased skepticism and French authorities attempted to find a solution for the ongoing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
34 Articles 52-58. 
35 Articles 67-73. 
36 Articles 110-116. 
37 Articles 117-122. 
38 Articles 125-128. MAEF 20QO/726: “Projet de Décision du Conseil,” included in letter from Walter 
Hallstein, Président de la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne to Guiseppe Pella 
(Italian statesman), Président du Conseil de la Communauté Economique Européenne, “Proposition de la 
Commission au Conseil relative à la mise en œuvre de l’article 227, paragraphe 2 du Traité de la 
Communauté Economique Européenne,” initially sent 23 December 1959, re-circulated by EEC Council, 
30 December 1959. 
39 MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères DE-CE, Note pour le Secrétaire Général, “Algérie 
et Marché Commun,” 23 February 1960. 
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crisis.40 As mentioned earlier, 1960 also marked the independence of the AOF and AEF, 
leading colonial officials to take stock of how to maintain influence across the African 
continent.  
Thus, pushing for swift implementation in Algeria and the DOM of the economic 
side of EEC (labor movement, excise duties, and more) appeared urgent, as did a 
resolution for the “social” inequalities laid bare by the anti-colonial critique of the French 
Community. It also allowed the French to clarify what EEC membership could entail for 
its extra-metropolitan territory. Applying Treaty of Rome stipulations could address 
concerns across the French Community and, officials hoped, draw the Algerian economy 
into the fold of the EEC as an impoverished region of Europe. In mid-July 1959, experts 
from the Six would for the first time discuss a draft for regulating the Treaty’s Article 49, 
regarding the free movement of laborers. In advance of that discussion, the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry analyzed a draft document, whose final version would need to be 
approved by a simple majority of the EEC Council of Ministers. Of particular note were 
the issues related to Algeria and Algerian workers. “These problems are essentially 
political” and arose because free circulation with regards to Algeria had to be subject to a 
special unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers, pursuant to Article 227. Thus, 
the draft already circulated had to be understood differently if it would or would not 
apply to Algeria. In particular, French officials were wary that the draft wording appeared 
to exclude French nationals born in Algeria from participating in EEC labor migration.41  
                                                        
40 French public opinion (and its evolution) during the Algerian War became a subject of study soon after 
the war’s end, see Charles-Robert Ageron, "L’opinion française devant la guerre d’Algérie," Revue 
française d’histoire d’outre-mer 63, 231 (1976): 256-285 and John Talbott, “French Public Opinion and the 
Algerian War: A Research Note,” French Historical Studies 9, 2 (Autumn 1975): 354-361. 
41 MAEF 20QO/714: Carbonnel (?), Le Représentant Permanent de la France auprès des Communautés 
Européennes à M le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères – Service de Coopération Economiques, “Avant-
projet de règlement sur la libre circulation des travailleurs,” 6 July 1959. 
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Despite internal French concerns, in Brussels, the application of the Treaty of 
Rome drew particular ire from Italy, with labor migration as a major sticking point. 
Chapter 1 addressed the history of thinking through a Mediterranean world in a number 
of fashions, including depicting the Mediterranean as a lake in a Euro-African continent. 
This phenomenon emerged in Treaty of Rome discussions, as well. Italy, for French 
officials, with its impoverished southern regions and prosperous, relatively industrial 
north, was not unlike France, with its prosperous metropole and the undeveloped 
Algerian expanse. Indeed, when French officials pushed for Algeria’s inclusion within 
the EEC, the Mezzogiorno offered a useful line of argumentation: if underdeveloped Italy 
could be a part of the Common Market, why not the poorest region of France?42 Even 
prior to the Treaty of Rome’s signing, officials attempted to cast it in this light, declaring 
that Algeria was not a territory or far-off colonial land, but “the most underdeveloped” 
region of the European community. The Agricultural Study Commission declared it to be 
“not a ‘poor country,’ but an insufficiently developed province”43 Once discussions were 
underway for the Treaty’s implementation, such attempts at normalizing Algeria as 
another underdeveloped part of Europe continued. Jean Pouderoux, the director of the 
Maison de l’Agriculture Algérienne, wrote in 1959 in the journal Communautés et 
Continents: 
                                                        
42 The parallels went beyond the agricultural trade. One striking parallel is the Western European fetishism 
of sexually deviant – and available – populations in the Mezzogiorno and in North Africa. For the former, 
see Chiara Beccalossi, “The ‘Italian Vice’: Male Homosexuality and British Tourism in Southern Italy,” in 
Italian Sexualities Uncovered, 1789-1914, ed. Valeria P. Babini, Chiara Beccalossi, and Luccy Riall (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 185-206. For the latter, see Robert Aldrich, “Homosexuality in the 
French Colonies,” Journal of Homosexuality 41, 3 (2002): 201-218.  
43 CAOM 81 F 2363: Commission d’Etude de l’Agriculture dans le Cadre du Marché Commun, Groupe de 
Travail, Conditions Générales de la Production Agricole, "Note relative aux départements d’Algérie," 9 
June 1958. 
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Why have we planned in the execution of the Common Market a transitional 
period if there was not one for the interior, unequal regions of the continent [des 
pays du continent]? And how can one not be struck by the economic opposition 
between Southern Italy and industrial Northern Italy, all the more with the 
economic situation of France or Germany[?] Will the harmonization between 
legislations and conditions of production, even the harmonization of standards of 
living, social legislations, be more difficult between the Algerian departments 
benefiting from the huge, but economically sound [valable], effort that France is 
ready to pursue, and the European economy, [pursuing] the harmonization of 
living standards between the peasant of Sicily or the Mezzogiorno and the cereal 
grower [céréaliculteur] of Northern France? 
Thus, Pouderoux argued, it was wrong to oppose “this prolongation of France in Africa” 
entering the EEC, considering that underdevelopment existed even on the European 
continent. Rather, he concluded, the EEC would find in Algeria “a territory of economic 
expansion indispensable to the pursuit of its internal expansion.” Further still, France’s 
pursuit of the Constantine Plan was, in Pouderoux’s eyes, an important corollary to 
French expectations for European aid, rather than a competing policy.44  
For the French, the Mezzogiorno’s economic plight offered a method of 
normalizing the presence of an impoverished, seemingly unruly region within the EEC. 
For Italian officials, the very fact that Algeria could be linked to the Mezzogiorno 
threatened Italian trade and labor migration opportunities and access to development 
aid.45 This came to the fore when the Six gathered in Brussels in March 1960 to assess 
the proposition for application described above. All members except Italy agreed to the 
proposals, with the Italian delegation signaling its concern over the “regulations relative 
                                                        
44  CAOM BIB AOM 20773/1959: Jean Pouderoux, “La Communauté Economique Européenne et 
l’Algérie” in Communautés et Continents 51, 3 (July-September 1959): 11-12.  
45 Italians, of course, were an important guest worker population, notably in West Germany. Rita Chin 
argues that policies regarding guest workers cannot be treated as “tangential.” Rather, she claims that 
“these migrants occupied a central place in the most important and enduring question of the postwar period: 
How would West German national identity be reconstituted after the Third Reich?” The furor over the 
rights of movement not just for Italians to Germany but for Algerians to continental Europe forces us to 
expand this question. We can ask not only how the presence of European migrants might help to form 
postwar European identities, but how the possibility of non-European migrant groups claiming European 
rights might further rewrite identity in the postwar. Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7.   
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to the social fund and the free circulation of laborers,” which it did not want set in place 
until “before the end of the 2nd stage [étape]” of the Treaty’s implementation, scheduled 
for December 31, 1965.46 In private meetings between Italian and French officials in 
Brussels, the Italian Permanent Representative to the European Communities, Giovanni 
Falchi, indicated that his government had some room for negotiation, but “remained 
opposed to the application of the social fund in Algeria within two years.” Falchi pointed 
out that “Articles 124 to 127 of the Treaty were conceived to help Italy in its fight against 
unemployment and are thus an important element in the political equilibrium of the 
Common Market.” The “extension of the funds to Algeria” would “reduce the expected 
advantages” for the Italians. Gorse, Falchi’s counterpart, sympathized with the Italian 
position, noting that Falchi’s characterization of the fund’s role in negotiations for the 
Treaty was correct. For the sake of “certain appeasement to the Italians,” Gorse suggested 
that indeed, the French delegation could negotiate a two-year delay, with certain technical 
components of the fund not accessible to Algeria during the first stage of Treaty 
implementation.47 Despite this delay, we should understand France’s insistence on the 
eventual application as part and parcel with the colonial practices that France had used to 
govern Algeria since the previous century. Inclusion in the Treaty, even with stipulations 
or delays, still supported France’s claim to Algerian soil. This, despite a brutal war now 
entering its sixth year. 
                                                        
46  CAOM 81 F 1133: Premier Ministre, Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération 
économique européenne, Secrétariat général, Relations avec la Communauté économique européenne, 
Note, “Application du Traité de Rome en Algérie et dans les DOM,” 2 May 1960. A copy of this letter also 
exists in MAEF 20QO/726, demonstrating the cross-communications of ministries in France. 
47 MAEF 20QO/726: Gorse, Brussels, telegram [attn. Valéry?], Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 16 June 
1960. In CAOM 81 F 1133: Gorse, Le Représentant Permanent de la République Française et de la 
communauté auprès des communautés européennes to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des 
Affaires Economiques, "Extension à l’Algérie et aux DOM des clauses du Traité de Rome (art. 227)," 25 
January 1961, Gorse refers to Falchi as Cattani’s “conseiller social.” 
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The Italians were not alone in challenging a French vision of Article 227’s 
application. François Morin of the SGCI sent a memo and accompanying documentation 
in mid-1960 signaling that West Germany questioned France’s assertion that Algeria be 
considered part of the favored social security zone. Morin found the Germans’ juridical 
basis for this argument “nonexistent,” and he noted that it was “necessary for the French 
delegation to reaffirm clearly its position.”48 In the German line of argumentation, only 
those dispositions named in Article 227 Section 2 were applicable in Algeria. Any other 
application of a disposition would have to be unanimously approved by the Council.49 
Considering that the debate over whether the Treaty might apply within Algeria was in 
full swing, such an assertion would have disturbed French officials in Paris and Brussels. 
The negotiations led to Italy offering France two options. Either they could see 
the “extension to Algeria of the whole of the Treaty’s social dispositions at the end of 
1963,” or they could “accept simultaneous application of these dispositions in the 
metropole and in Algeria, except for the Social Fund which will only apply in Algeria in 
four years [from now].” Cognizant that not accepting one of the Italian offers would 
jeopardize Italian opinion of France in Brussels and cause a delay in the application 
currently in the works of other Treaty stipulations, the SGCI, with the Représentant du 
Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires Algériennes weighing in, deemed neither of the two 
proposals acceptable.50 The SGCI, however, instructed Gorse to tell the Italians that the 
                                                        
48 MAEF 20QO/712: Morin, SGCI, “Problèmes concernant les règlements nºs 3 et 4 de la CEE,” 5 May 
1960. 
49 MAEF 20QO/712: German communication, “Application des règlements nº 3 et nº 4 sur la sécurité 
sociale des travailleurs migrants en Algérie,” attached to Morin 5 May 1960 communication, n.d., likely 
1960. 
50 MAEF 20QO/726: Morin, Secrétaire général adjoint, Premier Ministre, Comité Interministériel pour les 
questions de coopération économique européenne, Secrétariat général, Relations avec la Communauté 
économique européenne, Note, “Application du Traité de Rome en Algérie et dans les départements 
d’outre-mer,” 20 July 1960. 
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second solution would be acceptable were the delay period reduced from four to two 
years and deemed the French “concession” “the most reasonable.”51 But when French 
Permanent Representative Jean Mille and the Italian diplomat Attilio Cattani met, Cattani 
delivered little promise of further Italian negotiation. Cattani reiterated the importance of 
the Social Fund to the Italian decision to ratify the Treaty of Rome in the first place. 
Gorse opined that if Italy maintained its position, French authorities would have to decide 
“if it is preferable to leave tentatively without solution the problems posed by the 
application of Article 227 or if it is appropriate [s’il convient] to accept the most recent 
propositions made by the Italian side.”52 For the French, embracing a stalemate appeared 
to hold as much appeal as making concessions, and this was their tactic in the ensuing 
months. 
In January 1961, Gorse warned that the issue of extending labor circulation 
regulation to Algeria “posed the larger problem of the relations to establish between 
Algeria and Europe.” In a letter to the Direction of Economic Affairs within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, he noted that the Italian side remained as intransigent as when he 
reported on the Mille-Cattani meeting of the previous year. Falchi had reiterated the 
Italian position to Gorse, raising new concerns for the French representative to Brussels. 
“[I]n a personal capacity,” Falchi emphasized  that he had not ruled out the possibility of 
extending the Social Fund to Algeria at the end of 1963. However, he went on, Italy’s 
Minister of Labor was “preoccupied by the extension to Algeria and to Algerians of the 
dispositions concerning the free circulation of laborers. The evolution of events ma[de] 
                                                        
51 MAEF 20QO/726: Morin to Gorse, “Application du Traité de Rome en Algérie et dans les départements 
d’outre-mer,” 1 August 1960. 
52  MAEF 20QO/726: Gorse to Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires 
Economiques [M. Valéry handwritten at top of page], 11 August 1960. 
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him fearful [of] the arrival in Europe of numerous Muslim elements who can compete 
with the Italian workforce in Northern Italy.” Although the Italian Foreign Minister had 
not forgotten the compromise offer from the previous year, which would have 
encompassed extending to Algeria the labor migration stipulations of the Treaty, it 
appeared nonetheless that it was not a given that it would be possible “to soothe [apaiser] 
all of the fears emerging in other administrations.” Falchi suggested that the French “not 
push too much [n’insistons pas trop] in the coming weeks.” As Gorse explained: 
[Italy] fears, in fact, that too much haste on our part will only awaken in the other 
[European] delegations concerns that will harden [raider] the whole of the 
positions and even compromise the slim advantages that the Italian government 
expects from the execution of the Treaty in this area. Mr. Falchi hinted that in an 
exchange for some discretion on our part, his government might consider the 
possibility of supporting us, one or two months after the adoption of the 
regulation, such that that the principal stipulations of this be immediately 
extended to Algeria. Certain detailed clauses must however be reviewed, for 
example those concerning the definition of family. 
Gorse reported that a French colleague had “expressed surprise and worry” over “this 
calling into question of that which until present seemed settled.” Further, he told the 
Italians that French delegations had “never made a mystery of their intention” to push for 
the free circulation of labor regulations to be extended to Algeria. Gorse warned that he 
feared an “impasse” if France maintained its current position, noting that “it is, in fact, 
clear” that no additional concessions would come from the Italians. As a possible 
solution, he suggested that problems be treated “one by one” to “obtain for each the best 
possible solution,” or alternatively, to place the “whole of the problem” of Article 227 
back onto the agenda for the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. Gorse cautiously 
favored the latter idea.53 
                                                        
53 CAOM 81 F 1133: Gorse to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques, 
"Extension à l’Algérie et aux DOM des clauses du Traité de Rome (art. 227)," 25 January 1961. 
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The French continued to view the Italian opposition as “paralyzing” to the 
application of EEC social policy in Algeria. Nevertheless, “considering it is impossible to 
overcome [vaincre] this opposition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked us to accept 
the Italian counterproposals that will slow the application of the Treaty of Rome in this 
area.” There was more than a hint of resignation in this observation: 
The free circulation of laborers “within the limits of available employment” is an 
important theoretical guarantee [garantie théorique importante] for the 
immigration to Europe of Algerian laborers. In practice, in the measure where the 
essential outlet remains metropolitan France, this guarantee will not bring any 
new good to Algeria [n’apportera rien de bien nouveau]. In contrast, it would 
allow, at least in theory, the introduction of unqualified Italian laborers into the 
Algerian labor market. 
Therefore, it would be ideal to not put off making a decision regarding Algeria’s place 
within the Common Market. The extension of social regulations to Algeria should be 
settled “at the same time as that of the Member States for their European territory […].”54 
Christian Delaballe, Secretary of State charged with Algerian Affairs, noted that if France 
took “an intransigent position” it would only “obstruct the problem” and “prevent us 
from obtaining” results. Thus, he backed accepting the first Italian proposition, pushing 
for the extension of the social policy provisions to Algeria by the end of 1963. He 
reasoned that the possible benefits that would arise from swift access to the Social Fund 
would have “an appreciable interest for the betterment of the technical level of the 
Algerian labor force.”55  
 
 
                                                        
54 CAOM 81 F 1133: Signed Y. R-B, Note for the Minister, 22 March 1961.  
55 CAOM 81 F 1133: Christian Delaballe, Ministre d’Etat Chargé des Affaires Algériennes to Secrétaire 
Général du Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de Coopération Economique Européenne, attention 
Morin, “Application à l’Algérie des dispositions du traité de ROME,” 26 June 1961. 
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Sources of Aid as Sources of Dispute 
For over a year beginning in mid-1959, France risked exacerbating tensions with 
West Germany, in many ways its most important ally among the Six, in order to secure 
greater amounts of aid for Algeria. In early June, officials in the Prime Minister’s office 
reached out to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressing hope that Algeria could be 
included among the beneficiaries of the EEC Development Fund. This had alarming 
repercussions, because France had explicitly declared, as recorded in Article 16 of the 
Convention of Application, that “it is the intention of the [French] government not to 
request the intervention of the development fund outlined in Article 1 of the Convention 
except for the overseas countries and territories under the purview of the Minister of 
Overseas France.” Such a demarcation would effectively exclude Algeria and the DOM, 
yet it appeared possible to one French official within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
France might rescind this declaration. The drawbacks, however, could prove 
considerable, and did indeed arise throughout the ensuing debate. These would include 
the risk to funding earmarked for sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar and the possibility 
that Algeria would not obtain funds from the European Investment Bank. However, 
“these considerations can only be appreciated by taking into account the political benefit 
that the French government can expect to draw from the support that the European 
Economic Community will give [France] in the Algerian departments.”56 Nonetheless, 
Orphuls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry predicted to Carbonnel that this change in 
particular risked relations with West Germany, for whom France’s guarantee of only 
                                                        
56  MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, note for Olivier Wormser and Valery, 4 June 1959. 
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seeking these funds for the PTOM was an important component in agreeing to the 
Eurafrican policies of the Treaty of Rome in the first place.57 
Orphuls’ prediction was borne out. François Seydoux of the French embassy in 
Bonn recalled that during the Bundestag ratification debates over the Treaty of Rome, in 
June 1957, the Socialist opposition had approved of France’s prior restrictions to the 
fund’s use. A reversal would bolster SPD critiques that the government was “indirectly 
financ[ing] the Algerian War […].”58 In an interview with Der Spiegel in August, Ferhat 
Abbas launched just such a claim against the Bonn government, leading Western German 
officials, according to a Deutsche Presse-Agentur report, to complain about France’s 
divergence to Algeria of some of the EEC development money destined for the TOM. 
West Germany contributed $200 million to this fund.59 Despite the objections of the 
Germans, by October the Delegate General in Algeria informed the SGCI that roughly a 
fifth of the Development Fund (62 billion francs, a quarter of the credits “returning to 
France”) could be funneled to Algerian projects.60 That month, financial experts met at 
the Ministry of Economics and Finances to discuss the Common Market. Because of the 
discovery of more oil in Algeria (they judiciously alluded to its being found in the “Franc 
Zone”) since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, they agreed that the question of oil 
products would be called into question during tariff negotiations. The restriction of funds 
to Algeria was therefore “no longer justified” and these experts declared their intention to 
                                                        
57 MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, outgoing telegram to Ambassade de France, Bonn 
30 June 1959. 
58 MAEF 20QO/726: François Seydoux, Bonn, telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 3 July 1959. 
This telegram is one of the only instances I found in the archives that overtly acknowledged the existence 
of a war in Algeria. 
59 MAEF 20QO/726: Leduc, Bonn, telegram to Delahaye, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 18 August 
1959.  
60  MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, note for the Minister, "Extension à l’Algérie des 
opérations du Fonds de Développement de la CEE," 3 October 1959. 
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file the first series of projects, amounting to 8 billion francs, aimed at expenditures for 
hospitals, schools, and other projects of a “social character.” They explained this change 
in part by noting that the Social Fund, from which Algeria was initially meant to benefit, 
was not yet in operation in 1959, owing to its rules having never been submitted by the 
Commission to the Council for final approval.61  
West German officials in the Foreign Office, working under future Bundestag 
President Karl Carstens, declared that they would not consider the “unilateral revocation 
of the French declaration of March 24, 1957 […].” They defended the disavowal of any 
revocation by pointing out that the French declaration on not applying the funds to 
Algeria did not mention a delay or the possibility of reversal, and had “become an 
integral part of the application accords.” Further, the guarantee was “a preliminary 
condition for the approval of the Treaty by the federal parliament.”62 Yet the French 
could argue that indeed, in 1957, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Maurice 
Faure had called the French declaration “revocable,” saying that the “problem is not only 
juridical.” Indeed, the policy of the West German foreign affairs office was “to avoid all 
debate or parliamentary question about Algeria.” Thus, the French push for EEC 
development funds to Algeria placed “the federal government in a very delicate 
position.” 63  The French, though cognizant of placing West German officials in this 
situation, did not back down. An administrator in the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s 
Economics and Finances Division, Service of Economic Cooperation (DE-CE), declared 
                                                        
61 CAEF B 0062126 (formerly B 25343): Ministère de l’Economie et Affaires Financières, Direction des 
Finances Extérieures, Compte-rendu de la Réunion des Conseillers Financiers [Conseillers Financiers], 9 
October 1959. 
62  MAEF 20QO/726: François Seydoux, Bonn, telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 20 
November 1959. 
63 MAEF 20QO/726: Ibid. 
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that the “juridical position of the federal government is in reality weak.” Rather, it was 
clear from Article 16 of the Treaty of Rome, regarding the application, that “the unilateral 
declaration […] was of a revocable nature […].” Yet convincing the Germans would not 
just be a juridical endeavor. There were “considerations of a political sort, changes in 
information on the Algerian problem [les données du problème algérien] that must lead 
them to adopt a new attitude.”64  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached West German objections with a 
measure of disdain. In response to an aide-mémoire from the German government, the 
ministry dismantled German declarations that it would not consider the French revocation 
regarding Algeria and the European Development Fund. Not only was Germany wrong to 
claim that the unilateral declaration was not revocable, but it was “inexact to pretend that 
this declaration was ‘adopted’ and had become ‘an integral part of the Treaty.’” If the 
Bundestag worried that during its ratification debates it had assured authorities of the 
French declaration not to extend the funds to Algeria, that was not France’s problem, but 
rather of an “internal order […].” Citing Faure’s speech, as well as vague wording in a 
declaration by the National Assembly member Paul Alduy that same month, the French 
thus rejected out of hand any West German claim to the unacceptable nature of France’s 
about-face regarding the funds’ beneficiaries.65 The French were unafraid to invoke the 
Constantine Plan, and suggest that their reversal on the funding question was integral to 
                                                        
64  MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, note, 28 November 1959. 
65  MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, "Extension à l’Algérie des opérations du Fonds 
Européen de Développement," 28 November 1959. 
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its success.66 An unsigned memo likely penned by Michel Debré proclaimed that “the 
problem of aid to Algeria takes a scandalous appearance [aspect].”67 
Yet West German industrial interests could prove beneficial to France’s goals in 
Algeria. Kattenstroth, the Director of Mines, Energy, and the ECSC within West 
Germany’s Ministry of the Economy, hinted that Economics Minister Erhard might visit 
the Sahara to survey gas and petrol production. This could “have a profound influence on 
the German economy regarding cooperation with France in the domains of research and 
exploitation of Saharan petrol,” but was delicate for West Germany.68 Erhard himself 
planned to visit Cairo in 1960, and “wanted, of course, to maintain and develop 
commercial relations between the Federal Republic and the Arab countries.”69 Indeed, 
West German economic interests in Algeria were in no short supply. Investments and 
manufacturing outfits included petrochemicals (Hoecht) and shoe factories (Salamander, 
Dillman).70  
                                                        
66  MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, "Algérie et Marché Commun," 30 December 1959. 
67 AN 2 DE 69 (Fonds Debré; in the midst of recataloguing at time of consultation, June 2015): “Note sur la 
Politique Européenne,” 30 June 1960. Later in this memo, he wrote “I believe it necessary to recall to what 
degree this policy of supranationality is at once unrealistic and dangerous. […] France drowned in 
European Communities can no longer be at the head of the [French] Community. The union of France and 
Algeria is in itself compromised.” 
68 For a fuller account of West German attitude toward Algeria, see Mathilde Von Bulow, West Germany, 
Cold War Europe and the Algerian War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
69 MAEF 20QO/726: Seydoux, Bonn, to Couve de Murville, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, "Caisse 
d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie: visite à Bonn de M. Coup de Frégeac [sic]," 24 
December 1959. 
70 MAEF 20QO/726: Seydoux, Bonn, to Couve de Murville, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, "Visite de 
M. Coup de Fréjac le 18 Décembre 1959, Entretien avec MM. Leduc, Rivain, Biclet, Schricke, Féquant et 
Morizet," p.j. to 24 December 1959. Hansen and Jonsson argue that all members of the Six stood to gain 
from Eurafrican policy and strongly emphasize the enthusiasm of a variety of non-French leaders, notably 
Spaak and Adenauer. While I contend that French goals took precedence, the presence of West German 
firms highlights the economic possibilities for France’s partners were open trade established between the 
EEC and France’s empire. Hansen and Jonsson, “Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of 
Eurafrica: A Reply to Gary Marks’ ‘Europe and Its Empires,’” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, 6 
(Nov. 2012), 1029.  
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Jacques Coup de Fréjac, then Chef du département des relations publiques de la 
Caisse d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie, proposed to French foreign 
affairs administrators a push for wooing German and Austrian business leaders, all while 
maintaining close contact with the ministry. Unlike French administrators within the 
government, French business leaders were less opaque regarding the upheaval in Algeria. 
Despite his encouraging plan to increase German interests in Algeria, Coup de Fréjac also 
suggested that the French state grant a “political guarantee” for metropolitan enterprises 
that agreed to install themselves in Algeria. This guarantee would cover two risks: 
Of secession, leading to, for example, the nationalization of the enterprise in 
Algeria and the loss of invested capital. 
 
Of an evolution of the situation that compromises the possibilities of trade outlets 
that existed at the moment when the enterprise in Algeria was created. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that “for reasons easy to understand, no 
publicity shall be done on this subject” and that its possible extension to foreign 
investments had not yet been examined.71 
However, perhaps because of the deeply tenuous situation, French officials 
concerned themselves more with aid contributions than with private investment, foreign 
or domestic. As French Foreign Affairs administrators continued to negotiate with West 
Germany, potential solutions arose regarding the European Development Fund question, 
but their ramifications appeared to overshadow their advantages. In January 1960, the 
German foreign affairs official Hilger van Scherpenberg offered to Carbonnel that France 
reduce its contributions to the European Development Fund by the amount it hoped to see 
allotted to Algeria, in a compromise that would “permit the end of an episode [un 
                                                        
71 MAEF 20QO/726: Seydoux to Couve de Murville, "Visite de M. Coup de Fréjac.” Emphasis original. 
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dossier], bothersome for its political implications, and whose existence weighed on 
Franco-German relations.” Despite its freeing French money to move toward Algerian 
development projects, the solution appeared problematic to the French. 72 Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs officials cited no fewer than five issues, leading them to conclude that the 
German proposition “definitively presented more drawbacks than advantages.”73 
First, because the contribution amounts by the Six to the Development Fund were 
fixed within the Convention of Application, any revision might open the door to major 
modifications, and even put at risk the fund itself. Second, France would no longer be 
equal to West Germany in terms of contributions to the fund. With West Germany as the 
stronger contributor, “its prestige among the associated African states, currently lowered 
by its policy regarding coffee imports, would find itself raised to a good level.” Third, 
African states associated with the EEC would view it as “a unilateral decision on our part 
[…].” Fourth, reducing French contributions would effectively contradict French claims 
of the importance of a “community effort” to aid underdeveloped countries, and 
particularly the PTOM. Fifth, the German solution might further alienate France’s 
partners, rather than encourage solidarity “with our action in Algeria.” 74  Jacques 
Donnedieu de Vabres of the SGCI opposed van Scherpenberg’s proposition, suggesting 
instead that the Prime Minister ask the Minister of Finances to set aside the “necessary 
credits” for projects planned for Algeria in 1960.75 
                                                        
72 However, we will see a similar calculation in the conclusion, explicitly made by French officials. 
73  MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, "Extension à l’Algérie des opérations du Fonds 
Européen de Développement," 25 January 1960. 
74 MAEF 20QO/726: Ibid.  
75 MAEF 20QO/726: Olivier Wormser on behalf of Delahaye, "Projets algériens et Fonds Européen," 11 
February 1960. 
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The question of European aid to Algeria dogged French-West German relations, 
and bled into personal disputes between leaders of the two countries. On June 7, 1960, 
Bonn announced that it would recall to the Austwärtiges Amt Helmut Allardt, second-in-
command at the Direction of Overseas Countries and Territories in the EEC (DG VIII).76 
Allardt had reportedly clashed with the French director of the commission, Robert 
Lemaignen, over future relations between the EEC and independent African states.77 
Allardt, a longtime civil servant, had previously served as German ambassador in Jakarta, 
as head of the West Germany’s Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Near, Middle, and Far-East 
Department, and as head of service for commercial policy in the same ministry. The 
French-published Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens applauded his service and his 
ambition, but noted he “kn[ew] more the Asian mentality than the African mentality” and 
that he and his African contacts did not enjoy mutual goodwill.78  
Lemaignen’s chief of staff Jacques Ferrandi’s memories of Allardt confirm the 
magazine’s depiction of an ambitious functionary who was decidedly not a team player. 
Ferrandi described his role within Lemaignen’s office as that of a right-hand man, and 
said that in all instances, Lemaignen passed ideas by him and expected Ferrandi to speak 
for him. In the entire DG VIII, only Allardt did not treat Ferrandi in this way, going so far 
as to reject a note of agreement that Ferrandi had signed on Lemaignen’s behalf. 79 
Ferrandi recollected a haughty German and faulted Allardt’s personality for his dismissal. 
                                                        
76 Véronique Dimier’s analysis of the leadership of the DG VIII highlights the importance of business 
leaders and the movement of colonial administrators to posts in Brussels. Véronique Dimier, “Recycling 
Empire: French Colonial Administrators at the Heart of European Development Policy,” in The French 
Colonial Mind Vol. 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters ed. Martin Thomas (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 251-274. 
77 MAEF 20QO/722: Tofkin (?), Ministère des Affaires Etrangères telegram to Direction Générale des 
Affaires Politiques, Mission de Liaison pour les Affaires Algériennes [destined for Valéry?], 10 June 1960. 
78 CAOM BIB AOM 20285/1960: “La politique européenne en Afrique doit rester solidaire,” Marchés 
Tropicaux et Méditerranéens vol. 16, no. 762: 1383. 
79 Palayret and Legendre, interview with Jacques Ferrandi, HAEU Web site. 
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The last straw came when Lemaignen was away from Brussels, and Ferrandi opened a 
letter from Allardt addressed to Lemaignen, responding to a recent speech the latter had 
given regarding Europe and development aid. According to Ferrandi, the letter read, in 
part: 
I absolutely disagree with this idea. […] Obviously, one can see that given your 
origins, your background, the business world, etc., and given that I myself, I am 
of a corps noble, I am from Foreign Affairs, from diplomacy, that there are 
profound differences between us… 
Ferrandi said he had the letter translated into French and sent to Lemaignen, who was 
“naturally distraught.” This led directly to Lemaignen demanding Allardt’s resignation.80  
However, West German press coverage of the Allardt Affair was withering, as 
they faulted personal and political causes of his dismissal, and portrayed it as an example 
of both French and German managerial missteps in Brussels. Allardt “felt too beholden to 
Lemaignen,” who demanded that Allardt pass all speeches and some correspondence by 
him. Thus, although Allardt “was totally ready to follow the instructions of the 
Commission,” he could not abide its “becoming the executive organ of a single member 
of the Commission.” Allardt clashed with Lemaignen, the former of whom held “a more 
flexible attitude” toward African states. This included Allardt suggesting direct contact 
between the EEC and African states, while Lemaignen emphasized that the former 
colonizer (in these instances, France) would continue to serve as interlocutor. 81 One 
newspaper reported that “Mr. Allardt recently declared in private that we are making 
fools of ourselves regarding the current evolution in Africa, in seeking to apply the letter 
                                                        
80 Ibid. 
81 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translation of dépêche de l’Agence DPA en Provenance de Bruxelles, 
transmis par le bureau de presse et d’information de Bonn pour information au Cabinet du Président 
Hallstein, "Motifs de la Démission d’Allardt de la Commission de la CEE," 8 June 1960. 
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of the EEC Treaty.”82 Die Welt attributed the falling out to a speech Allardt delivered in 
Milan in March 1960, in which he argued that it was “dangerous” to distinguish between 
African states that were or were not associated with the EEC, and that it was important to 
avoid improving EEC relations with associated states to the “detriment of countries that 
are not associated or that do not want to be associated.” This comment “seems to have 
thus triggered a personal controversy with the French commissioner, Mr. Lemaginen.” 
This was, according to Die Welt, the first time that a German in a position of leadership 
had left his post in the EEC, and it warned that the affair “takes on even more 
significance still because of its purely political importance for the Eurafrican question.”83 
Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens deemed this same speech to have “undeniably 
exceeded his jurisdiction.”84 
Business-focused German publications were particularly disgusted. The 
Industriekurier contended that the exclusion of states like Guinea, which “denounced the 
still existing association” with the EEC, should not be excluded from the EEC 
development fund. Any such exclusion “would be a contradiction with the basis of the 
political idea that pushed for the fund’s creation.” Industriekurier deemed it 
“unfortunate” that France continued to hold control of the $581 million in aid, “the large 
part of which still remains in the fund’s coffers.” The newspaper intoned: “From the 
political and moral perspective, it is irrelevant whether these countries and territories now 
have a different status and a new name. Mr. Lemaignen should here walk in step with 
                                                        
82 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translated excerpt of “Brouille à la Commission de la CEE au Sujet 
d’Anciens Territoires Coloniaux ; L’Allemand s’en va – le Français reste/‘Je voudrais voir vos lettres,’” 
Westfaelische Rundschau, 9 June 1960. 
83 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translated excerpt of “L’Affaire Allardt, Différends avec la France au 
sein de la Commission de la CEE, de notre correspondant – Bruxelles, le 8 juin,” Die Welt, 9 June 1960. 
84 CAOM BIB AOM 20285/1960: “La politique européenne en Afrique doit rester solidaire,” Marchés 
Tropicaux et Méditerranéens 16, 762 (1960): 1383.  
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[aller de pair avec] the times, even if he does not wish to walk in step with Ambassador 
Allardt.” 85  The Volkswirt alluded to German contributions to the Fonds de 
développement pour les PTOM (FEDOM). According to Volkswirt, Germany and the 
other members of the Six agreed to supporting the FEDOM “on the condition that all 
members of the European Economic Community would be treated on equal footing in the 
associated African territories, regarding the execution of development projects authorized 
by the Fund.” This had been negotiated, as the French insisted on reserving for French 
firms the “technical control” of these projects. To extend an olive branch, the French then 
suggested that the projects could go to foreign firms, “on the condition that they partner 
with French firms.” This proposal also being rejected, the French government refused, 
“for an entire year, to sign the financial conventions already passed between the 
Commission and the overseas countries. This is the reason why, of the $581 million 
dollars the Fund may dispose of by the end of 1962, only a few million have been used so 
far.” The Volkswirt critique of the FEDOM carried with it a Cold War threat: in its 
current form, the FEDOM “more resembles a welfare fund [caisse de bienfaisance] than 
an investment fund; the requests for aid cover a multitude of small projects without 
connections between them and without a plan for the whole. If it wants to combat 
effectively Soviet competition, the European Economic Community cannot restrict itself 
in the long run to the role of health agency [organisme sanitaire].” Volkswirt and other 
                                                        
85  AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translated excerpt of “La toile de fond de l’affaire Allardt,” 
Industriekurier, 11 June 1960. 
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newspapers also brought up the variety of associations pursued by the governments of 
Togo, Cameroon, and Guinea, all recently independent, and the EEC.86  
For Germans, this affair not only inspired frustration with France, it led to 
introspection regarding West German involvement in Europe. The Neue Rhein Zeitung 
ran an analysis under the headline, “At the EEC in Brussels, We Remain Amongst 
Ourselves.”87 It heartily critiqued Hallstein for “very simply refusing to back [suivre] 
Allardt […].” The article asserted that meetings between government officials in Bonn 
had concluded that: 
The Federal Republic cannot complain about its involvement [in Brussels], 
because the president of the EEC, Hallstein, is German. But he is, in reality, 
European.88 This attitude is entirely comprehensible, but leads to a certain short-
sightedness [étroitesse de vues]: because the French members of the EEC remain 
French above all. 
 
In addition, in Brussels, the French most often outrank the Germans—Hallstein 
aside. Bonn sends to Europe functionaries or even politicians who have become 
superfluous […]. In contrast, France often sends to Brussels, as in the case of 
Lemaignen, the opposite of Allardt [le vis-à-vis d’Allardt]—influential 
industrialists. These men are ready to put up with a shortfall for the length of 
their activity. 
Such critiques are striking, as they demonstrate early strategy in the EEC regarding 
whose interests might be upheld in Brussels. It echoes a question that can be located in 
                                                        
86  MAEF 20QO/722: Leduc, L’Ambassadeur de France près la République Fédérale d’Allemagne to 
Maurice Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, “Le ‘cas Allardt’ et l’association des pays d’outre-mer au Marché commun,” 15 June 1960. 
87 For more on this newspaper and other West German journalistic accounts of the Algerian War, see Von 
Bulow, West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War, 122-123. 
88 The current discord in Brussels over Donald Tusk’s reelection bears a somewhat striking resemblance to 
this critique, albeit with key differences. In this 1960 commentary, West Germany was at a disadvantage 
for sending “Europeans” to Brussels, rather than statesmen with avowedly national (and hopefully 
economic) interests. In March 2017, 27 of the EU’s 28 governments voted for Donald Tusk to serve 
another term as European council president. Tusk himself is Polish and the only country to vote against his 
second term was Poland. The highly unusual instance of every state other than his own supporting him is 
evidence of recent anti-European trends, particularly in the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS). But there is 
a vestige of the West German critique of the apparent short-sightedness of entrusting “Europe” to “the 
Europeans.” Jennifer Rankin, “Poland Reacts with Fury to Re-Election of Donald Tusk,” The Guardian, 9 
March 2017, accessed 15 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/donald-tusk-re-
elected-as-european-council-president-despite-polish-opposition?CMP=share_btn_link.  
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negotiations for the Treaty of Rome: was the EEC meant to offer a supranational system 
for cooperation and shared influence, or was it a new forum in which individual states 
could attempt to bolster domestic initiatives?89 
Allardt’s replacement, Heinrich Hendus, transferred from his post as West 
German Consul General in Algiers, was reported to have “excellent relations” with 
French authorities in Algiers and news of his appointment was met with overt pleasure by 
French foreign affairs officials. 90  Indeed, days before the announcement, Hallstein 
himself had informed Mille, through Emile Noël, that Bonn was considering Hendus for 
the post.91 In Ferrandi’s recollection, “They say that a thin pope is always replaced by a 
fat pope, a difficult man by a charming man.” According to Ferrandi, Hendus, was just 
such a man, charming, and “francophile, francophone, literally seduced by France.”92 
Thus, French officials in Brussels, whether responding to an extreme clash of 
personalities or worried about imperiled relations with Africa, managed to encourage the 
ousting of a senior German official in favor of one more inclined to agree with their 
political and economic goals in Algeria. 
Despite domestic pressure in Germany to take a firmer line against France, 
particularly in light of the Algerian War, we see in the summer of 1960 a concerted effort 
by French and German officials in Brussels to maintain strong links and avoid tense 
disagreement. Indeed, by August, the FEDOM debates appeared to quiet down. The 
German government informed Paris that it would lift its opposition to financing Algerian 
                                                        
89 AN AG/5(F)/2558 Fonds Foccart: Translated excerpt of Hilde Purwin, “A la CEE à Bruxelles, On Reste 
Entre Soi,” Neue Rhein Zeitung, 26 June 1960.  
90 MAEF 20QO/722: Tofkin (?) Ministère des Affaires Etrangères telegram to Direction Générale des 
Affaires Politiques, Mission de Liaison pour les Affaires Algériennes [destined for Valéry?], 10 June 1960. 
91 MAEF 20QO/726: Gorse telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1960. 
92 Palayret and Legendre, interview with Jacques Ferrandi, HAEU Web site. 
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projects using the European Development Fund. 93  In advance of the official 
announcement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a letter to send to Brussels, 
detailing for the European Commission what sorts of projects would benefit. These 
would include “soil restoration,” the improvement of 55,000 hectares in “sheep country,” 
the purchase of 186 tractors for agricultural insurance companies, and the construction of 
some 60,000 rural dwellings across Algeria. The letter also noted that “accounting for the 
urgency […] of some of these operations,” the French government had already taken up 
the costs of other projects, including building two of six proposed agricultural schools. In 
contrast, it was no longer going to request funding for the construction of nine hospitals, 
although it did still intend on pursuing financing for a 400-bed hospital in Guelma.94 
Yet the French feared that this openness to funding Algeria could negatively 
impact relations with sub-Saharan Africa, revealing that Eurafrica had the possibility to 
divide, even as the French hoped it would unite, the francophone world. In Brussels, 
Mille suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepare at the very least an unofficial 
position in order to react to issues that could arise. For example, Development Fund 
money funneled toward Algeria would necessarily reduce the amount that other French 
Community states could claim. Lemaignen suggested that France should “show these 
states the reasons we have revisited our declaration of intention of 1957 in order to 
mitigate their reactions.” The question also might arise of the timing of aid to Algeria and 
the DOM, and whether these departments could claim funds for the entirety of the five 
                                                        
93 MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaire Economiques et Financières, 
Service de Coopération Economique, Note, “Algérie et Fonds Européen de Développement,” 3 August 
1960. 
94 MAEF 20QO/726: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaire Economiques et Financières, 
Service de Coopération Economique, p.j. to “Algérie et Fonds Européen de Développement,” “Projet de 
Lettre de Présentation au Président de la Commission Economique Européenne,” 3 August 1960. 
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years of the application of the convention.95 Thus, accord with Germany did not alleviate 




By pushing against their Italian and German allies, French officials shunted aside 
diplomatic niceties in favor of bolstering their relations with Algeria. In pursuit of a 
policy that accommodated Algeria’s position within the EEC—dubbed “a bit hybrid” by 
the agricultural official Pouderoux—French officials made clear their goal to maintain 
French predominance in Algerian affairs.96 To an almost shocking degree, thanks in no 
small part to the lack of foresight regarding the eventual exodus of the vast majority of 
French citizens from Algeria to France in 1962, these administrators continued to insist 
that Algeria enjoy a privileged status with the Treaty of Rome, even as the Evian Accord 
negotiations were underway. In the end, it was not Dutch pressure, Italian complaints, or 
German worries that would halt the implementation of the Treaty in the Algerian 
territories. Rather, when Algeria was declared independent on July 3, 1962, the future of 
France’s Algerian-focused Eurafrican policy was radically changed. The next chapter 
will ask how statesmen in independent Algeria came to view claims of Eurafrica as useful 
to bolstering their young economy. It will also examine reasons why France and, to a 
lesser degree, its partners appeared open to maintaining strong ties with independent 
Algeria into the mid-1960s. 
                                                        
95 MAEF 20QO/726: Mille, telegram to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 23 August 1960. 
96  CAOM BIB AOM 20773/1959: Jean Pouderoux, “La Communauté Economique Européenne et 
l’Algérie” in Communautés et Continents 51, 3 (July-September 1959): 6. 
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Chapter 5 
 
A Seventh European State? Non. (1962-1964) 
 
The Algerian situation – France’s bloody and expensive domestic crisis – entered 
its eighth year before the guns began to quiet. Following the Evian Accords, France faced 
questions domestically and internationally about its future relations with Algeria. The 
results of the July 1, 1962 vote for Algerian independence, with pro-independence ballots 
cast by 91.23 percent of registered voters, were made known on July 3.1 Once Algeria 
gained its independence, defining Algeria’s status vis-à-vis France and Europe became an 
imperative. The outcome of the independence referendum did not surprise most French 
administrators nor much of the metropolitan public, but it did contribute to the already 
surging numbers of Algerian residents of European descent, known colloquially as the 
pieds noirs, arriving in major French cities like Marseille and Paris. All told, nearly 1 
million pieds noirs fled to France during and immediately after the Algerian War, with 
over half of that population arriving in the summer months between May and August 
1962 alone.2 The presence of European settlers in Algeria—along with wider French 
business interests in the departments—helps to explain the stubborn diplomatic measures 
French administrators took in order to integrate Algeria within the EEC. This chapter thus 
asks: when and how did administrators begin to rethink Algeria’s status within the 
emerging European project following independence and the flight of Algeria’s European 
citizenry? And once it became clear that the relationship would be redefined, how did 
European and Algerian leaders understand how future interactions might look? 
                                                        
1 Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000, 104. 
2 R. Averell Manes, The Pieds-Noirs: A Case Study in the Persistence of Subcultural Distinctiveness 
(Bethesda: Academic Press, LLC, 2005), 20, 61. See also Jean-Jacques Jordi, 1962: L’arrivée des Pieds-
Noirs (Paris: Editions Autrement, 1995); Joëlle Hureau, La Mémoire des Pieds-Noirs de 1830 à Nos Jours 
(Paris: Olivier Orban, 1987); and Eric Savarese, L’invention des Pieds-noirs (Paris: Séguier, 2002). 
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African-led calls for Eurafrica, such as Senghor’s discourse (Chapter 1), suggest 
the multiple uses that French Union leaders – both European and African – saw in such a 
policy, however different their interpretation of that policy might be. During the first 
decade of such discussions, non-European Algerian voices were largely absent, with 
notable exceptions like Tamzali (Chapter 2). That would change in 1962.3 While the FLN 
and other Algerian independence groups did not advocate for Eurafrica or Algeria’s 
inclusion in the EEC during the war, in its immediate aftermath, Algeria’s leaders saw 
potential benefits to maintaining or even expanding relations with Europe. The bulk of 
this chapter interrogates this new moment in European integration diplomacy, when it 
appeared clear to French and European leaders that something had changed with 
Algeria’s independence, but not clear exactly how that change would manifest itself in 
Brussels and beyond. Before analyzing the negotiations with and surrounding Algeria, 
this chapter first examines how the EEC struggled to understand how an independent 
Algeria fit into its constellation of international relationships (ranging from member 
states to third-party states) and how French administrators attempted to make sense of 
what future Franco-Algerian relations might even look like. I contend that the fraught 
debates and declarations about independent Algeria threatened to upend notions of the 
very Europeanness of the EEC, as the specter of Algeria loomed as a hypothetical 
seventh member state of the Community. 
 
                                                        
3  Jeffrey James Byrne analyzes this era from the Algerian perspective. Notably, he emphasizes the 
importance of the period between the signing of the Evian accords (March 1962) and the formation of the 
first Algerian government (September 1962). He argues that this moment “constituted a consequential 
historical point in its own right.” The ambiguity that interests Byrne in this months-long period also 
dominated the comparatively lengthy, but still quite brief period in which it appeared that Algeria might in 
some capacity indeed remain part of the EEC. Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and 
the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 129-139. 
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Detaching Algeria Swiftly? Challenges from Brussels   
If French officials had been slow to admit publically that France would not win 
the Algerian War, it appears its European partners leapt upon the new reality as soon as 
Algeria gained independence. Only a month afterwards, in early August, Belgian officials 
began to inquire about how to treat the import of Algerian produce (namely, “extra 
quality” grapes), while the Dutch asked similar questions about exporting eggs to the 
newly independent state. Jean-Marc Boegner, Permanent Representative of France before 
the European Communities in Brussels, surmised that the “accession to independence of 
this country must not, it seems to me, have the effect of depriving it of the benefits of 
intercommunity preference.”4 In Boegner’s line of thinking, which received agreement 
from Christian Delaballe and the DE-CE within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algerian 
grapes should continue to enjoy preferential entry rights into the EEC member states.5 
If concerns about eggs and grapes appear narrow in scope, the elicited responses 
foreshadowed the much longer discussions that would soon take place in Paris and 
Brussels over Algeria’s position within the European Economic Community. Boegner 
received instructions that he could, “if need be, […] underline that it would be premature 
and hardly opportune to change anything in the current situation.” Because the Foreign 
Ministry had not yet settled upon its position on “the current and future system of 
relations between the new state and the EEC, […] it would be wise [il conviendrait] to 
avoid engaging this subject in one manner or another.” 6  Avoidance of a definitive 
                                                        
4 MAEF 21QO/1462 : Boegner telegram to Ministère des Affaire Etrangères, “Politique agricole commune 
et Algérie,” 9 August 1962. 
5 MAEF 21QO/1462: Le Ministre d’Etat Chargé des Affaires Algériennes à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, “Politique Agricole Commune et 
Algérie,” 14 August 1962; Valery, Direction des affaires économiques et financières du Ministère des 
affaires étrangères, Service de coopération économique, telegram to Boegner, 17 August 1962. 
6 MAEF 21QO/1462: Valery to Boegner, 17 August 1962. 
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answer, it appeared, would quickly become the party line in France. Thus, when Boegner 
addressed the question of egg exports with Dutch officials, he emphasized maintaining 
the status quo. Saying that “it seemed to me wise” to continue treating Algeria under 
Article 227, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty, he noted that the Commission itself, “in an 
informal manner, had let the member states who were asking about the subject know that 
in its opinion it was juridically possible not to consider Algeria a third party state.”7 
Boegner’s instruction to the Dutch went, in effect, to the heart of the debates that 
would intensify in the weeks, months, and even years to come. When France and its 
partners signed the Treaty of Rome, Algeria, they agreed, was indeed a part of France, 
however inchoate its exact status within the Republic might be. Now that an independent 
Algeria emerged, the future of its relations with the Six appeared far from clear. Indeed, 
Algeria’s name, thanks to the pressure from France discussed in Chapter 3, appeared in 
the Treaty of Rome. The question thus became: How would an independent state located 
on the continent of Africa be connected to the European Economic Community, and what 
legal and economic rights might this entail? 
Such a question came not only from France’s partners, concerned with how 
France’s drawn-out decolonization of Algeria might impact their trade regimes, but also 
from within French ranks. Francis Vals, a Socialist deputy from the Aude, proved an 
especially inquisitive politician. In late August 1962, he submitted a written question to 
the Council of the EEC, asking whether the Treaty of Rome would continue to apply to 
independent Algeria and how the Treaty might allow for future relations to be established 
between Algeria and the EEC. Vals explicitly laid out his line of thinking, wondering if 
                                                        
7 MAEF 21QO/1462: Boegner telegram to Ministère des Affaire Etrangères, “L’Algérie et la CEE,” 22 
August 1962. 
 
Brown • Chapter 5 171 
Algeria’s status as a French territory until July 1 of that year  “impl[ied] for Algeria the 
maintenance of certain rights and advantages resulting from the Treaty.” Although Vals 
phrased these ideas as queries, one can see the insistence in his words. Going further still, 
he asked the Commission if it believed it desirable to secure relations with Algerian 
leaders through an accord, and brought up the idea of broadening the “economic 
association convention” already existing between the EEC and the independent Franc 
Zone states.8 The SGCI deemed it impossible to provide a comprehensive reply to these 
queries.9 
Nineteen sixty-two proved in some respects a watershed year for inter-North 
African and North African-European relations. Moroccan and Tunisian authorities, 
claiming solidarity with Algerian freedom fighters, refrained from entering into trade 
negotiations with the European Economic Community during the war; they now could 
approach the institution, which offered a potentially lucrative outlet for their products. At 
the same time, France and Europe began to group francophone North African states—
under the heading of the Maghreb—as a unit, even as it became clear that wartime 
solidarity did not necessarily mean peacetime unity between Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. 
The DE-CE put out a lengthy missive on the topic in October 1962, a copy of 
which received heavy edits by two hands, likely Olivier Wormser and Yves Delahaye. 
Before circulating it, Wormser sought to speak with Delahaye and asked him to refrain 
from sharing its contents. Like Boegner’s communications from Brussels, this note made 
                                                        
8 AN 20000293/4 (Sous dérogation): Conseils de la Communauté Européenne, Secrétaire Général, Note 
d’Information, “Question écrite nº 82,” 31 August 1962. 
9 AN 20000293/4 (Sous dérogation): Morin to Boegner, “Projet de réponse à la question écrite nº 82 posée 
au Conseil de la Communauté Economique Européenne par M. VALS (socialiste – français),” 9 October 
1962. 
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clear that Algeria’s accession to independence changed the landscape of Algerian-
French-EEC relations. However, it took a more pragmatic, if unsure, view of the future. 
In considering this future relation, “the French government will have an important and 
delicate role to play, because it must at the same time participate in the development of 
the European position and coordinate its attitude with that of the Algerian government.”10 
France, it seemed, could direct and determine the path of future bilateral and multilateral 
relations. 
In this reading of potential future relations, some older ideas remained at the 
center. The case of Algeria differed from that of the “three other North African states” 
(Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya – not Egypt) because of the claims it could make to the 
EEC that the other states could not. This dovetailed with the pre-Treaty of Rome claims 
by France that Algeria’s quality as a territory differed significantly from that of its closest 
neighbors. However, there were limits to these claims, as it was “obviously absurd” to 
suggest that Algeria might become the “seventh member of the European Community.” 
Beyond this, there were few certainties. 11 
Understanding these accords carried practical applications for the French and their 
partners. In asking its neighbors to continue to treat Algerian products like French 
products, the French had secured a “provisional solution,” evidenced in the handling of 
Belgium’s grape import query. 12  But major questions remained, including over the 
presence of Algerian laborers in Europe.13 As Common Market regulations entered into 
                                                        
10  MAEF 21QO/1462: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Service de Coopération Economique. “Note a/s Le Maghreb et la Communauté Economique 
Européenne,” 11 October 1962: 1. 
11 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid., 2, 4, 8. 
12 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid., 11. 
13 Their presence had only grown during the war, and would continue to surge after 1962. MacMaster, 
Colonial Migrants and Racism, 189-190. 
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the second phase of their larger rollout, French officials sought to understand if the 
regulations would maintain the rights of Algerians in France, as defined by the Evian 
Accords. A glaring question mark (presumably scrawled by Wormser) in the margins of 
the edited note likely led the second reader, Delahaye, to cross out part of the text: 
This [draft of the new Common Market rollout], if adopted, will maintain the 
privileged regime of Algerian workers in France. However, it will not assure 
Algeria the possibility of benefiting from the free movement of its workers in the 
territories of our partners, as the Treaty of Rome could have led it to hope.14 
This edit speaks to the larger question that loomed since 1956, if not 1951: did French 
officials actually ever think this had been a possibility? Should Algerian officials – and 
citizens – have believed that the Treaty of Rome would offer this right of movement? 
Why did French officials assert Algeria’s Frenchness, if it would always be qualified by a 
denial of certain rights that would extend to the rest of French territory?  
In attempting to resolve the various issues of trade and migration covered in the 
draft, the author offered by way of solution two possibilities. In the first case, the status 
quo of relations between France and the Maghreb, and the carrying out of policy planned 
for in the Evian Accords, would continue. One potential drawback of this would be 
explaining how France could call for exceptions to the Common Market rules on behalf 
of North African states while refusing Great Britain’s Commonwealth similar treatment 
during negotiations with the British.15 Another solution involved the “multilateralization” 
of trade regimes, in which France helped to “spread progressively” the same status that it 
enjoyed with the North African states. This could allow for the movement of Algerian 
workers to the rest of Europe. However, competitive third party states risked labeling 
                                                        
14 MAEF 21QO/1462: “Note a/s Le Maghreb et la Communauté Economique Européenne,” 11 October 
1962, 14. 
15 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid., 18. 
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such a policy neo-colonialist. And members of the Six, particularly Italy, might object 
over fears about trade protections. Yet the author hopefully concluded that cooperation 
between Algeria and France was a first step in cooperation between the Maghreb and 
Europe, which would lead to “a mutual willingness to resolve common problems […].”16 
This lack of resolution, like the time delays discussed in the previous chapter, 
demonstrates the utility for French officials of avoiding firm, but potentially alienating, 
stances before their options were well-examined, if not exhausted. 
Ever inquisitive, by late November Francis Vals had more concerns for the EEC 
about how independent Algeria’s trade could go forward. Focusing on Algeria’s wine 
exportation, Vals wondered if the Treaty of Rome would continue to apply to Algeria on 
the condition that Algeria not renounce its place within it.17 Would “the advantage of the 
customs union granted by the Evian Accords benefit the whole of the member states of 
the Community?” Reversing the query, Vals speculated that if Algeria had (in the eyes of 
the EEC) become a third-party state [pays tiers], the duty-free entry of its agricultural 
products into France would have to be “reconciled with the adoption of a common 
foreign tariff [...].” In yet a third possibility, Vals wondered if the Algerian state could 
negotiate a “bilateral agreement” with the EEC. 18 EEC officials declared themselves 
unable to offer a “substantive” reply.19 
These questions of economic cooperation and coordination loomed increasingly 
large for France as Algeria settled into its independence. After nearly a decade of 
                                                        
16 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid., 18, 21. 
17 The Algerian wine industry has a long history, including as a site of diplomatic dispute. John Strachan, 
“The Colonial Identity of Wine: The Leakey Affair and the Franco-Algerian Order of Things,” Social 
History of Alcohol and Drugs 21, 2 (Spring 2007): 118-137. 
18  HAEU BAC-007/1971_0005: Secretary General, Councils of the European Communities, “Question 
écrite nº 124,” 1 December 1962.  
19  HAEU BAC-007/1971_0005: EEC Council, “Réponse que la Commission compte donner à 
l’Assemblée,” 20 December 1962.  
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attempting to convince its European partners that France did indeed extend across the 
Mediterranean and into the northern reaches of the Sahara, French officials now weighed 
the chances for a variety of forms of cooperation, from bilateral ties between France and 
Algeria to supranational ties between Europe and North Africa. French diplomats now 
confronted new combinations of loyalties, as they attempted to factor in the fledgling 
Algerian government’s affinity toward pan-Arab or at least North African solidarity. 
They were also burdened with an unenviable task: beginning to uncouple the Algerian 
and French economies.  
The French in Paris and Brussels found themselves in a delicate position, as they 
attempted to negotiate with Algerian administrators and to manage the needs of the newly 
arrived pied noir population. French authorities in the Foreign Affairs ministry judged 
that Algerian authorities, though well aware of new protocols meant to formally separate 
the French and Algerian treasuries,  
would consider the implementation of this measure under the current 
circumstances as a disparaging act and would not miss passing the unfortunate 
consequences to the continuation of the French presence in Algeria (end of 
transfers toward France).  
Conversely, clarifying the economic situation could harm the position of French 
administrators “in this electoral period,” as it might prove “inopportune,” 
to get out of this ambiguity and make known the considerable amount of the 
advances that will undoubtedly never be reimbursed, but it will be time to make 
known to the public the affair during the vote by the next Parliament on the law 
of the regulation of the 1962 budget exercise.20  
                                                        
20 MAEF 21QO/1462: “Relations Financières Franco-Algériennes,” 31 October 1962. 
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This left French administrators stuck between a newly independent state with which their 
own economy was deeply imbricated, and a small but vocal electorate already outraged 
by their loss of home. 
In bilateral talks held in late December 1962, the French participants came to 
believe that “the Algerians’ position was not stalled, but likely leaned more to an 
association, despite the advice certainly given them by Egyptian experts who recently 
arrived in Algiers.” The Algerians were, however, probably waiting for the meeting of 
Maghrebi foreign ministers before taking a stronger stance. The French struggled to 
balance economic and political exigency with their loyalties to Franco-Algerian trade and 
to the pieds noirs. The Algerian administration – only a few months after the end of a war 
predicated on nationalist propaganda that drew sharp divisions between Algeria and 
France – now faced the uncomfortable task of choosing between practical accords with 
France and ostensibly ideologically harmonious ones with the North African world. 
French negotiators viewed their own choices as fraught and identified an attempt to 
“prolong the current status quo for a while” as their best solution.21 
Yet the Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs and the DE-CE warned that the 
problems could not be avoided for long, signaling that tariff reduction between the Six 
planned for July 1 “could present Algeria [with] a choice.” The ministers in the French 
delegation were thus tasked to consider, as they prepared to continue bilateral 
negotiations with Algeria, if the French “must accept” (a handwritten cross out of the text 
changed this from “try to avoid”) Algeria fixing higher tariffs for the other members of 
the Six. If Algeria did raise its tariffs, France stood to benefit from a stronger preferential 
                                                        
21 MAEF 21QO/1462: DE-CE, “L’Algérie et la Communauté Economique Européenne,” 7 February 1963. 
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regime than the other members of the Six; this risked “a bias for a free trade regime” 
between France and Algeria, to the exclusion of France’s European partners.22 
Thus, we see within the first months of Algeria’s independence, French and 
European officials attempting to clarify how the new political and trade landscape might 
look. At the same time, French officials continued to embrace the useful tactic of “delay” 
in this arena as they attempted to forge new relations with Algiers without alienating the 
newly arrived pied noir community. France’s partners did not appear entirely sure of how 
to proceed, and, as we will see shortly, encouraged France to settle its bilateral 
agreements with Algeria before bringing those relations back to the Brussels negotiating 
table. As French officials re-examined the Franco-EEC-Algerian relationship, they found 
they were not alone in their investigation; from late 1962, independent Algerian leaders 
entered the fray, to the consternation of France and the other members of the Six. It is to 
these sometimes uncomfortable exchanges that we now turn. 
 
Letters from Algiers: Ben Bella Writes to Brussels 
The situation only became murkier when Ahmed Ben Bella wrote to Brussels, in a 
letter that appears completely expected in terms of the discourse already occurring in 
Europe and entirely startling, judging from the incoherent half-replies the note would 
garner. On December 24, 1962, Ben Bella wrote to the president of the EEC Council, in a 
letter that would quickly be sent to the Brussels offices of each of the Six, as well as to 
their capitals and to dozens of officials in a variety of French ministries.23 It read: 
                                                        
22 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
23 AN 20000293/4 (Sous dérogation): F. de Schacht telex to SGCI (copy), 4 January 1963. Sent to: Ortoli 
and Labussièr the Prime Minister’s office, Rolland-Billecart in the Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, 
Pierre-Brossolette in the DAEF, as well as Pierre Esteva in External Finances and Clappier of the DREE in 
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 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community stated in its 
Article 227 the conditions of the Treaty’s application concerning Algeria. 
 In addition, the convention of application relative to the association to 
the Community of Overseas Countries and Territories [Pays et Territoires 
d’Outre-mer] stated, in Article 16, that the regulations foreseen in Articles 1 
through 8 inclusive are applicable in Algeria. 
 I have the honor of bringing to your attention that my government has 
the intention to inquire through negotiations with the organisms of the 
Community what will be the possible future relations between Algeria and the 
Community. 
 While awaiting the conclusion of these negotiations, my government 
wishes to see the maintenance for Algeria of the benefit of the regulations that 
are currently established. 
 Please accept, Mister President, the expression of my very high regards. 
 The President of the Council, 
 Ben Bella24 
Did Ben Bella and his compatriots know the turmoil into which they were sending the 
whole of Brussels? In addition to the letter, Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed 
Khemisti, sent Ali Lakhdari to represent Algeria in Brussels, telling Brussels that the 
diplomat hoped “to discuss problems [of] common interest with you.” 25  Lakhdari’s 
presence seemed to elicit considerably less consternation than the letter, a response to 
which became the subject of elaborate and inconclusive discussions in the halls of the 
EEC. 
The debate on how to respond to independent Algeria brought up wider concerns 
among the EEC members, just as the debate on whether to incorporate French Algeria 
revealed fissures only a few years earlier. The subject of the Algerian government’s 
“communication” arose when delegations from the Six met in January 1963. The Belgian 
delegation “hope[d] that the examination of the problem will not be broached until the 
Committee is able to prepare, in a deeper manner, its decisions on this point.” The Dutch 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the same ministry, Gardellini in the Ministry of Industry, Beaurepaire in the Services of External Affairs, 
Woimant in the Ministry of Agriculture, Wallon in the Direction of Studies and General Affairs, Chazelle 
in the Ministry of Labor, and Moureau in Coopération. 
24 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Herbst, EEC Commission, to Calmes, Council of EEC, 3 January 1963. 
25 HAEU CM2/1963-885: F. de Schacht, EEC Councils, to Permanent Representatives, 4 January 1963. 
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delegation “believe[d] it important as of now, notably with the existence of the letter 
from Mr. Ben Bella, that the Community define as soon as possible its position vis-à-vis 
Algeria, keeping in mind that until now the Community has applied the regime that was 
established before the country became independent.” Further, the Dutch argued the 
importance of “better understand[ing] the exact position of the Algerian government, at 
the moment when the Council will be called on to discuss the definitive system to apply 
in Algeria.” This, they believed, should be elucidated ahead of the January 24 Council 
session. The West German delegation proved less pugnacious, declaring that Article 227 
and the similar Article 16 of the Convention of Application Relative to the Association of 
the PTOM to the Community should remain in place until the future relationship between 
Algeria and the EEC was defined. The application of these regulations, however, would 
not go on for an unlimited amount of time. The Italian tone was also fairly conciliatory, 
arguing that the Algerian query should be considered after a reasoned debate in the 
Council.26 
As they were presenting their first reactions to Ben Bella’s query, the Germans 
had also raised what turned out to be a very sticky subject: how to reply.  
Moreover, the German government believes that it is important to carefully 
examine – notably within the heart of this Committee – the question of knowing 
how to best inform the Algerian government of the willingness of the 
Community to provisionally look over pursuing the application of these 
regulations in Algeria.27 
                                                        
26 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Councils of the EEC and CEEA, “Addendum au Projet de Compte Rendu 
Sommaire de la réunion restreinte tenue à l’occasion de la 243ème réunion du Comité des Représentants 
Permanents (Bruxelles, les mardi 15, jeudi 17, vendredi 18, mardi 22 et mercredi 23 janvier 1963),” 28 
January 1963. 
27 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
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The Commission representative picked up on this concern when he spoke. “[D]ue to the 
political and psychological importance of [Ben Bella’s] question,” it was imperative that 
Brussels not delay a reply. He suggested that a response written  
in rather warm terms [en termes assez chaleureux], but not prejudicing the 
content, inspired by the type of letters addressed to African states after their 
accession to independence, can be submitted to the Council as of its January 24, 
1963 session, on the understanding that the fundamental problems will be 
brought up during the session of February 11-12, 1963.28 
The Dutch proposed that the reply be limited to “a confirmation of delivery [accusé de 
réception] like those addressed to states that have submitted requests for association, each 
minister remaining free, moreover, to make, if necessary, some general declaration on the 
subject.” This attitude was indicative of the Netherlands’ post-independence attitude 
toward France’s continued ties to former colonies. Increasingly, the Dutch delegation 
would see EEC-Algerian relations as a venue through which to critique Gaullist policy, 
evidence of which will be elaborated on later in this chapter.29 
The French delegation declared itself in agreement with the Commission, but 
emphasized the uniqueness of Algeria – hardly different from its pre-1962 claims – 
noting that its relationship with the EEC was distinct from those of third-party states. 
Thus, the French expressed hope that the Council’s reply to Ben Bella would accede to 
the Algerian request to enter talks and would allow for overtures of a study “in 
accordance with the Algerian government, on which basis and which modalities must be 
established the future relations between Algeria and the Community.”30 The discussion 
concluded with the delegations agreeing to create alternative proposals of how to word 
                                                        
28 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
29 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
30 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
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the confirmation of delivery.31 Schaus, the acting president of the EEC Council, sent an 
acknowledgment of receipt to Algiers on January 24.32 The reply, he said, “uses the terms 
of acknowledgments of receipt usually addressed in response to requests for an opening 
of negotiations.”33 Ben Bella would have learned little from such a reply, other than the 
reliability of diplomatic telegram services. The issue was not laid to rest. If the Council 
had managed to send a single reply to Ben Bella, it was only because it had not yet 
tackled the actual substance of the Algerian question.  
This was compounded by the fact that the question of Algerian-EEC relations was 
discussed a few days before the suspension of negotiations with Great Britain, which the 
French felt limited their ability to insist upon a more “attractive” [engageante] reply from 
their partners. Yet the French were simultaneously engaged in bilateral talks with 
Algeria, meant to implement the Evian Accords. In these talks, the Algerians brought up 
imposing quotas on imports—including from France—as a method of protecting its 
industry, but also of establishing a preferential tariff that could apply to France and 
potentially to other states that would guarantee Algeria the same commercial advantages 
as France. 34 
Despite the French officials’ pessimism, in early February EEC Secretary General 
Emile Noël wrote to Secretary General of the Council of Ministers Christian Calmes, 
summarizing the late January Commission talks as positive, because  
                                                        
31 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
32 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note, “Démarches algériennes auprès de la CEE,” 
3 January 1964. 
33 HAEU CM2/1963-885: “Extrait du procès verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l’occasion de la 92ème 
session du Conseil de la CEE à Bruxelles,” 24 January 1963. 
34 MAEF 21QO/1462: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Direction of Economic and Financial Affairs, Service of 
Economic Communication, “L’Algérie et la Communauté Economique Européenne,” 7 February 1963. 
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the initiative of the Algerian government, even if its future significance cannot be 
exactly understood [appréciée] nonetheless constitutes the first significant 
opening of the part of a geographic zone with which the Community seems to 
have a real political as well as economic interest, in forming or in reinforcing 
through organized relations.35 
A few days later, Calmes wrote to the delegation heads of the Six in Brussels with a copy 
of a working paper by the Commission and a letter from Noël. The working paper 
examined aid commitments made by the EEC to the PTOM associated with the Franc 
Zone. Were the EEC to satisfy some of Algeria’s requests, it suggested, it might be 
required to reallocate some financing from other FED projects (as FEDOM was by then 
known).36 
The Commission deemed it possible to continue using FED credits to fund 
investment in Algeria, as long as Algeria did not “in law or action” [en droit ou en fait] 
adopt an attitude that the “EEC would consider incompatible with the spirit or letter of 
the Treaty […].” The paper called Algeria’s independence a “juridical novation [sic],”37 
which allowed for the end of the applicability of Article 227 and the Convention of 
Application to the territory. However, because Algeria had taken the necessary practical 
measures to permit the execution of the financing conventions finalized before its 
accession to independence,” this excision need not occur.  The Commission, it seemed, 
was willing to consider the development funding unchanged in light of Algeria’s major 
shift in legal status.38 
The question of aid seemed to rely on the general agreement of the Six. However, 
much of the discussion of customs duties was predicated on Franco-Algerian relations. 
                                                        
35 HAEU CM2/1963-885: E. Noel to Calmes, 7 February 1963. 
36 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Calmes to Permanent Representatives, 11 February 1963. 
37 Novation: “The substitution of a new legal obligation for an old one.” Merriam-Webster, accessed 27 
December 2016. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/novation. 
38 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Calmes to Permanent Representatives, 11 February 1963. 
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Prior to its independence, Algeria was part of the French customs zone [territoire 
douanier français] and, as such, did not impose customs duties on French imports. In 
addition, French Algeria had begun to reduce tariffs with relation to the other members of 
the Six after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. This was meant to continue after its 
independence, although France reserved the right to introduce customs duties if Algeria 
began to enforce “a less favorable regime” than the one France enjoyed prior to Algerian 
independence. The Commission noted that Algeria had thus far maintained the 
increasingly favorable regime of customs duties applied to the other members of the Six. 
Because the question of the right of establishment had not yet been settled in Algeria, it 
remained a question to take up “ab initio.”39 
The working paper quoted from Ben Bella’s December 24 letter. It noted that the 
two tasks at hand were, first, using talks to learn of the possible future relations between 
Algeria and the EEC, and second, seeing about maintaining the current status Algeria was 
enjoying related to Article 227 of the Treaty. Indeed, the former could not be done if the 
latter were not “tacitly or explicitly” secured. A “negative or insufficiantly positive 
attitude” toward Algeria might tip the hand toward “certain political tendencies,” putting 
at risk future relations with Europe. Thus, the Community could find it “politically 
favorable” for its own interests, and for the interests of its future relations with Algeria, to 
ask Algeria to demonstrate its goodwill more explicitly. Algeria could do this by 
guaranteeing the status quo of exchanges and the right to establishment, and through a 
formal recognition of the Treaty of Rome, Convention of Application, and FED 
regulations. Finally, they called for a declaration of intention for the two parties, which 
                                                        
39 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
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would foresee the negotiations within 12 or 18 months that would lead to a global, 
definitive agreement.40 
In the annex to the working paper, the Commission acknowleged the uneven 
application of export regime charges between Algeria and the Six. The German 
delegation noted that Algerian agricultural imports were subject to the same withholding 
tax [prélèvement] as imports from the other members of the Six. In contrast, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands applied to it the same withholding tax as imports from 
third-party states. The Italian delegation reported the same policy as Benelux, but said its 
administration could reimburse Algerian exporters the difference between this tax and 
those of member states. The same individual policies were reflected in exports from the 
member states to Algeria. The question thus lingered: should Algeria be treated like a 
member of the EEC or like a third-party state?41 
While much of the discussion centered on imports and exports, the right to 
establish and continue business within Algeria also concerned the Six. These discussions 
revealed private, commercial interests, but also highlight the unique relationship already 
existing between France and Algeria, which both appeared in some ways to hope to 
maintain. In early March 1963, the Algerian authorities signaled to the French that they 
would protect local Renault factories (the only car manufacturer in Algeria), and 
suggested they were favorable to talks that could lead to Peugeot assembly in Algeria, as 
well.42 These overtures were twinned with a text signed by the Algerian Minister of 
Commerce that would allow for a fixing of quotas on the import of automobiles. A 
                                                        
40 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
41 HAEU CM2/1963-885: Ibid. 
42 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction of External Economic 
Relations; copy also sent to Minister of Industry, signed Gorse, from Algiers, 2 March 1963. 
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Renault-Peugeot accord would “consolidate the position of the CARAL [Construction 
des Automobiles Renault en Algérie], permitting it to offer a range of vehicles sufficient 
for covering nearly all the needs of the country.” 43  It would also dissuade foreign 
competition, three brands of which were “trying to establish themselves in Algeria: 
Volvo, Volkswagen, and especially Mercedes.”44 Thus, clarifying EEC-Algeria relations 
appeared in the interests of the other members of the Six, who saw the risk in extending 
to now independent Algeria the same modes of assistance they once promised French 
Algeria, with potentially even fewer returns.  
The French were not entirely sure of how their European partners would define 
independent Algeria’s status, nor were their partners in agreement. If they had held back 
previously, France’s European partners now voiced their concerns. For example, in April, 
the Italian delegation wondered if Algeria would modify its tariffs by labeling the Six 
(except for France) third-party states.45 In a late May 1963 meeting of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, the delegates discussed the regime that would apply to 
commercial exchanges between Algeria and the EEC after July 1 of that year. The West 
German delegation announced it had decided to continue treating Algeria like the EEC 
member states regarding commercial exchanges and to extend to Algeria the next 
intercommunity tariff reduction. The French noted hopefully that this pronouncement 
could carry “a certain weight as the discussion continues.” This contrasted to the Dutch, 
who made known that the government had hesitations “about the indefinite prolongation 
                                                        
43 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
44 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
45 AN 20000293/4 (Sous derogation): Morin copy of Boegner telex to SGCI, “Régime Commercial de 
l’Algérie,” 26 April 1963. 
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of a favorable regime benefitting Algeria.”46 In mid-June, only two weeks before the 
delegations were meant to establish a set of regulations with Algeria, the Dutch Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs Hans van Houten declared that Algeria’s independence had 
transformed it “ipso facto” into a third-party state, although the Dutch understood the 
arguments for maintaining “a particular regime in favor” of Algeria.47  
Voices for the status quo did ring out, as well. The Belgian Jean Rey, speaking in 
the name of the Commission, observed that the current relation was “transitory,” but that 
the Algerian government should not be “rushed” [presser] to take a position on the 
subject. Rey suggested that the July 1 intercommunity tariff reduction apply to Algeria 
and that the Community “reflect at its leisure on the other problems that do not require 
immediate implementation.” 48  Henri Rochereau, a French member of the European 
Commission tasked with development policy, added that he hoped the committee of 
permanent representatives would consider, in its examination of the Algerian problem, 
the use of the balance of the first FED for financing new projects.  
This June 1963 discussion revealed the continuity of some fault lines in the 
Algeria-EEC debate, but also suggested new allies for France. The Italians chimed in 
with their support of Van Houten. Although the Belgian and Luxembourger delegations 
did not speak, observers took this to mean their solidarity with Van Houten, part of wider 
Benelux accord. The Germans did not comment further.49 Yet the German openness to 
Algeria’s inclusion in these trade regimes suggests that West Germans saw value in 
                                                        
46 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, signed Boegner, from the 
French delegation, Brussels, 29 May 1963. 
47 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, signed Boegner, from the 
French delegation, Brussels, 18 June 1963. 
48 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
49 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
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maintaining close ties with the territory. German motivations could be viewed as  
economically interested, as the EEC-Algerian ties would allow for German goods to flow 
into Algeria with a reduced customs duty. They also could appear politically motivated. 
For example, West Germany had an interest in ensuring that Algeria remain in the sphere 
of the capitalist world, which rejection from the EEC might threaten. In addition, 
Adenauer and de Gaulle recently demonstrated their strengthened alliance as the former 
stood with the latter opposing British entry in the EEC.50 This closer Franco-German 
alliance could sway German positions within these EEC talks, just as France’s rejection 
of Great Britain appeared to have alienated other members of the Six.  
As France’s partners hardened their stances, France appeared to soften its own. 
Recapping the June meeting, Boegner found Rey’s suggestion “reasonable” and 
wondered if it was wise “to break spears [rompre des lances] to get all of our partners to 
continue to accord Algeria the intra-community regime.” With West Germany favorable 
to Algeria, despite Dutch pressure, it did “not seem that there is danger in the delay […].” 
Indeed, even if Italy and all of Benelux did not extend the regime to Algeria, the result 
for Algerian exports would be “practically negligible.” What was more, Boegner said he 
was unaware of the Algerian government having ever asked the French to intervene with 
the other members of the Six on its behalf. This might be a startling argument coming 
from a state that had spent a significant portion of the past decade arguing supposedly on 
Algeria’s behalf before these very same countries, but Boegner appeared earnest in 
suggesting that France should not take up any policy position that the independent 
Algerian state had not explicitly requested. Boegner surmised that considering the varied 
opinions of France’s partners, and the low likelihood of the decision’s actual impact on 
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Algeria, it would be wise for France not to play the role of “demandeur,” leaving its 
partners to work out the problem on July 1. 51  Wormser agreed with Boegner’s 
assessment, only asking that Boegner be “less reserved” regarding Rochereau’s FED 
query. The French would thus appear to have “an attitude of abstention,” although it was 
important to avoid having the other members interpret this “as a mark of indifference.”52 
This approach to Algerian policy was a far cry from France’s earlier 
interventions, discussed in Chapter 3. If Defferre’s forceful 1956 advocacy of Eurafrica 
took precedence over the Foreign Affairs office’s fears of steamrolling its Western 
European allies, and in 1961, the French snippily defended the theoretical right of 
Algerian men to enter European states as freely circulating laborers, by mid-1963, French 
policy had shifted, and fast. Boegner presented the contentious issue of Algerian-EEC 
relations as something that was divisive, yet could and should be solved without France’s 
vocal input. The question demanded a resolution, but Boegner and his superiors deemed 
it less critical than the risk of alienating the other members of the Six. 
The question of EEC-Algerian relations became a tool for France’s partners to 
attack broader French policy. An article in the Dutch daily de Volkskrant suggested that 
Dutch intransigence on the Algerian question during the June meeting derived from 
frustrations about France’s attitude toward Great Britain during EEC accession 
negotiations. De Houten’s pronouncement was not “a menacing gesture but rather 
sending a clear and precise warning addressed to France.” Such a warning would serve to 
remind the French that “they needed [the Benelux ministers’] cooperation in order for 
                                                        
51 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram received at Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, signed Boegner, from the 
French delegation, Brussels, 18 June 1963. 
52 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram from Olivier Wormser, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des 
Affaires Economiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Economique, 19 June 1963.  
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independent Algeria to continue to profit from the advantages accorded it by the 
Common Market.” The article’s author drew attention to how Van Houten “prudently and 
diplomatically” raised the contentious Algerian question. “Certain observers” believed he 
broached the subject to exert pressure on France, whose “tenacious opposition” to 
relations between Great Britain and the EEC sparked “the crisis that currently spans the 
EEC.” Van Houten’s timing—just before a meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer 
scheduled for early July and also the next ministerial meeting of the EEC—was 
purposeful, meant to inspire de Gaulle to take up “a more amenable [souple] attitude 
toward Great Britain […].” The contention over Algeria was thus meant to serve “as a 
wake-up call [avertissement salutaire].”53 
French officials upholding their uncomfortable, if vague, stance regarding EEC-
Algerian relations did not receive help from the Algerian delegation in Brussels, who 
were not forthcoming with their government’s position. On July 1, the same day that the 
EEC decided to apply a 10 percent tariff reduction to Algeria, as foreseen in the Treaty of 
Rome, an Algerian delegation gave the European Commission a letter from Algerian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika announcing changes to Algeria’s 
customs tariff.54 The delegation, led by Kemal Abdallah-Khodja, the Adjunct Director 
General of the Plan, suggested an autumn meeting to discuss necessary modifications.55 
The functionaries emphasized that their government was in the midst of investigating “a 
solution to the entirety of the problem of relations with the Common Market.” In the 
meantime, the Algerian government hoped “to continue to benefit from the Treaty of 
                                                        
53 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram signed Crouy, in The Hague, to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 20 June 
1963.  
54 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note, “Démarches algériennes auprès de la CEE,” 
3 January 1964. 
55 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
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Rome regime.”  They also defended restrictions to their new customs tariff, which 
appeared to label the Six, with the exception of France, as third-party states. Such 
restrictions should not be viewed as discriminatory, but rather as “simply resulting from 
necessities of an administrative nature.”56  
Jacques Degas, a colonel within the National Defense’s Intelligence Operation 
Center, believed Ben Bella’s communication with Brussels and Lakhdari’s presence there 
had done little to clarify Algeria’s position or to help France hone its own stance. Yet it 
gave some hope that a solution could be achieved. Europeans might interpret Lakhdari’s 
arrival as a signal of Algeria’s ongoing connection to the EEC. The process of 
considering Ben Bella’s query “was interpreted as a recognition of a Common Market-
Algerian tariff union,” according to Degas. What is more, the designation of an Algerian 
permanent representative “accentuated this impression,” as until that point, such a title 
was “reserved for representatives of the member states.” The military intelligence service 
understood the import Algeria placed on the negotiations, which stood to benefit the 
fledgling state: 57 
Almost at the same time [in late Winter/early Spring], the Algerian permanent 
representative implied in private that the current situation perfectly suited his 
country, which did not intend [n’entendait pas] to accelerate negotiations with 
the Six. Furthermore, it was out of the question that his country would open itself 
to a global Maghreb-EEC negotiation that would have the effect of making it lose 
its privileged position relative to its Maghrebi neighbors.58 
Algeria, while signaling its desire to solidify relations with the EEC, did not want to risk 
these relations by pushing too hard. This was made manifest in Ben Bella’s July 1 letter 
                                                        
56 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram from Boegner in Brussels to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 3 July 
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Colonel Degas to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, 
“Position de l’Algérie Face au Marché Commun,” 2 September 1963. 
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to the EEC, in which he made clear that Algeria would continue a preferential tariff with 
France and, to a lesser degree, the other members of the Six, all while proposing talks 
regarding the future relations between the Six and Algeria. These Algerian decisions led 
Degas to conclude “it [was] therefore apparent that Algeria has not yet chosen its path [sa 
voie].” But faced with opposition, particularly from Italy, it appeared that by the end of 
1963, Algeria might prefer a “more versatile [souple] solution” – a free exchange zone –
which the Commission of the EEC proposed to advise.59 
Although Degas gathered that the Algerians hoped to protect their privileged 
place within the EEC, information from Rabat suggested otherwise. Less than two weeks 
after Degas’ note, France’s ambassador to Morocco, Pierre de Leusse, sent a telegram to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He reported that the envoy Algeria would send to 
Brussels in the fall would be decided by Algiers, with the agreement of the Tunisian 
government, “which itself would be disposed to taking part in the contacts envisioned 
with the organism in Brussels.” 60  Algerian officials, it seemed, were preparing to 
abandon their privileges as France’s favored territory in the past. But they had not yet 
admitted it to the French or the EEC. Such a move by Algeria suggests that the new 
government hoped to draw out the benefits of French-Algerian relations for as long as it 
could, even while forging new South-South relations. 61  At the same time, it could 
indicate reluctance on the part of Algerian officials, who might have been concerned 
                                                        
59 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
60 MAEF 21QO/1462: Pierre de Leusse telegram to the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 14 September 
1963. 
61 Byrne demonstrates that independent Algeria presented itself as a “third way,” in some ways reminiscent 
of the Eurafrican bloc ideology popular amongst French leaders during earlier European integration 
negotiations. His analysis, taking a “Maghribi vantage to examine decolonization and the phenomenon of 
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engaging with South-South relations (with Algeria often at the heart of actual events, or at least of idealized 
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about the pragmatism of diving head-first into a Maghrebi agreement when the lucrative 
potential of trade relations with Europe was still a possibility.  
By early September, Brussels attempted to glean from Algeria how its 
government envisioned a new tariff implementation, but the Algerian ambassador in 
Brussels, Boualem Bessaïh, only suggested that it would be desirable to discuss this 
“before the end of the year.”62 By early October, whatever patience or goodwill France’s 
partners once displayed was running dry. A Dutch statement backed by the Italian 
delegation declared that relations between the EEC and the Algerian embassy had still 
not allowed any precise understanding of the intentions of the latter’s government. Thus, 
as the EEC prepared for the upcoming talks with Algeria, it was imperative to emphasize 
that “the current state of things cannot be indefinitely prolonged.”63 But the ordinance 
passed by the Algerian government on October 28 cemented this prolongation, with its 
fifth article only stipulating that while waiting for “the definition” of tariff relations 
between the EEC and Algeria, merchandise from the Community, except for France, 
would be subject to a unique tariff (different from that of France and non-EEC states, and 
closely following the “column” [colonne] organization of tariffs within the Treaty of 
Rome Article 227 regulation).64 Hence, nearly a year after the Ben Bella telegram, the 
relations between Algeria and the EEC remained murky. 
A letter sent by Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika nearly 
one year after Ben Bella’s initial communication with the EEC bore a strong resemblance 
                                                        
62 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note, “Démarches algériennes auprès de la CEE,” 
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to the 1962 missive. In his December 18, 1963 letter to the Permanent Representatives, 
he made known that the Algerian government hoped to enter into talks with the EEC, on 
a date chosen by Brussels.65 Like Ben Bella’s letter, it garnered an uninformative, tardy 
reply, this one penned on January 28 by the Belgian Henri (Hendrik) Fayat, acting 
president of the Council of the EEC. Fayat noted the “great interest” with which the 
Council had received the letter, telling Bouteflika that the Council had invited the 
Commission to “engage with your government in the proposed conversations.” 66 
However, the atmosphere in Brussels was not identical to what it had been one year prior. 
Notably, Algerian functionaries were present in larger numbers. Thus, in late December, 
a Mr. Hamdani, an advisor in Algeria’s Brussels embassy, had opened “very general” 
conversations asserting that “all of the hypotheses” should be examined, including those 
in which all of Algeria’s particular links with the Common Market be renounced. By the 
start of 1964, another delegation prepared to go to Brussels, signaling the Algerian 
government’s readiness to open conversations with the Community.67 
Algerian officials met with functionaries from the EEC Commission in late 
February. The former’s delegation was led by Bessaih and included Khodja, by then 
director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of the Economy. The Algerians emphasized the 
“preliminary character” of the talks and would not commit to any decision, as they did 
not have instructions that would allow them to take a position on the different problems 
that arose. Rather, the talks were “in some way a ‘pre-exploratory’ stage.” The Algerians 
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did, however, ask the Commission about a plan of financial assistance related to 
commercial exchanges, and wanted to know the precise intentions of Europe before 
taking up an exact position. “They also gave the impression of hoping to buy time and 
continue for as long as possible the current transitional regime,” a French foreign affairs 
administrator remarked. The Algerians did not seem hostile to the free exchange zone 
solution that the Commission suggested, as long as the word “‘association’ was not 
expressly mentioned.” They also claimed to be favorable to coordinating the position of 
the three Maghrebi states in relation to the EEC. The talks concluded with the Algerian 
delegation planning to return in a month with its instructions, which, the EEC 
Commission surmised, would allow Europe to complete reports on exploratory talks with 
all three Maghrebi states by late April.68 Despite internal inaction or frustration, the EEC 
put forth a rosy vision of EEC-Algerian talks in February 1964. The author of a press 
release wrote that the conversations took place “in an excellent climate of mutual 
understanding.”69  
Stalling, foot-dragging, delays, rain checks. For two entities consistently asserting 
their desire to communicate, coordinate, and conclude accords, Algeria and the EEC 
spent an inordinate amount of time (and telegrams) avoiding concrete decisions. Why? 
All negotiating bodies (Algeria, France, the EEC, and its member states) had motivations 
for prolonging the confused relationship. For Algeria, close relations with the whole of 
the EEC meant the continued promise of favorable customs and tariff regimes and 
avoided jeopardizing the unique trade benefits derived from Algeria’s favored status in 
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French legislation and, now, in Treaty of Rome regulations. For France, maintaining 
Algeria’s ties to the EEC delayed the difficult choice between Algeria (and perhaps, by 
proxy, the DOM-PTOM) and the EEC, all while ensuring that it would not shoulder 
economic assistance for Algeria on its own. For the EEC, there were more mixed 
motivations. Some members, like the Netherlands, were frustrated that Algeria – an 
independent state – would continue to enjoy the benefits of and hold sway over the EEC. 
But West Germany, perhaps reflecting its own Cold War concerns, stood with France, in 
a move that would seem to guarantee to safeguard Algeria’s loyalty to the capitalist West. 
Brussels increasingly put pressure on France to clarify its own relations with 
Algeria, before the EEC could take a decisive step. By March 1964, the Commission had 
repeatedly asked Boegner for information about the most recent state of affairs in Franco-
Algerian exchange accords. Boegner asked his colleagues in Paris to provide him with 
information that he could pass to the Commission, noting that “it seems to me preferable” 
that the Commission learn of the situation from France, rather than from the Algerian 
delegation. If the French allowed the Algerians to provide the information, they would 
give their partners “a pretext to be suspicious.” Boegner cautioned that if the French 
spoke to the Commission, it would be for the Ministry to first decide if they needed to 
secure the Algerian authorities’ agreement.70  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed this duty to the Secretary of State Charged 
with Algerian Affairs, who in turn tasked the French embassy in Algiers to inform the 
Algerians that they were preparing to send to the EEC Commission the text of the last 
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decisions on Franco-Algerian economic relations.71 But it appears that the information 
was not passed immediately, or that the Algerians asked for clarification. A month later, 
Delahaye asked the French embassy in Algiers to inform the Algerian authorities that it 
would share with Brussels the meeting minutes signed in Paris on November 30, 1963, 
and the protocol on wine signed in Paris on January 18, 1964.72 Gorse communicated that 
the Algerians, who themselves had not yet replied to Brussels, approved of the 
transmission of the documents.73 
The situation’s complicated nature only became more confused as Algerian 
officials continued to explore their country’s place in the global economic and political 
landscape, and as France forged ahead with its own post-colonial diplomacy. Questions 
about potential bilateral and multilateral accords with Israel on the part of France or the 
European Economic Community exemplify the exacerbation of this confusion and the 
conflicting loyalties with which Algerian officials contended. Boegner expressed 
increased frustration with the Algerians, whose inaction and vagueness on the subject of 
EEC-Algerian relations were beginning to appear obstructionist. Indeed, in May 1964, as 
“new exploratory conversations” took place in Brussels (a full 17 months after Ben 
Bella’s overtures for such talks), the Algerians expressed their desire to conclude an 
accord with the EEC, but declared themselves unable to do so until Franco-Algerian 
relations were firmly defined.74  
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The Algerians packaged this delay as a sign of their respect for France, “insisting 
on the importance [le prix] its government attached to accords with France and its 
concern not to do anything in Brussels that could upset our country.”75 Algeria’s plan 
was thus first to turn to France to make sense of how Franco-Algerian relations could be 
included and maintained within a system of cooperation established between Algeria and 
the EEC. Boegner did not appear swept away by this apparent show of goodwill. He 
speculated on the Algerian delegation’s plans:  
Everything happens as if the Algerians used the vague perspectives of an accord 
with the Community to obtain, in fact, a maintaining of the status quo of 
commercial exchanges. They even go so far as to demand the benefit of certain 
elements of the Treaty of Rome that are no longer applicable to Algeria. This is 
how their delegation focused on the revival [reprise] of the Community’s 
financial aid and on the necessity of finding an arrangement allowing the use 
[utilisation] of Algerian labor in the countries of the Community. 76 
The Community, for its part, also declared its need to discuss the matter as an ensemble 
with France and the member states. Ben Bella’s seemingly straightforward question from 
late December 1962 had by now taken on much more meaning, it seems, even as the 
issue remained far from settled.77  
Algerian officials impressed upon Gorse’s colleagues in Algiers the “difficult 
situation” [embarrass] in which Algeria found itself as it attempted to determine its 
position vis-à-vis the European Economic Community. Gorse noted protests regarding an 
April 28 accord between the EEC and Israel, which could be troubling to Algerian 
authorities, after a conference of heads of state in Cairo made clear the problems that 
could arise for “Arab states” that maintained relations with countries developing ties with 
Israel. He suggested that this conflict arose not because of the content of the accords but 
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simply because they existed. 78 For Algeria, “which intends to be at the forefront [à 
l’avant-garde] of the fights led by the Arab world,” it was challenging to find “a 
compromise between its economic interests and its anti-Israeli outbursts 
[démonstrations].”  
This ambivalence bred inaction. Thus, when Layachi Yaker, Algeria’s Director of 
Economic Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was sent to Brussels in early 
spring 1964, it was without precise instructions, his mission limited to a “simple contact” 
with the European authorities.79 Perhaps in part because of this, although the preexisting 
ambiguities in the spectrum of EEC-Maghreb-French-Algerian relations should not be 
forgotten, attempts for a common action of the three Maghrebi states regarding the EEC 
“seemed to pass to the second level,” which would be “an individual approach” that 
maintained contacts.80 Gorse surmised that the question of Arab-Israeli relations most 
likely arose when the heads of state, including the Soviet Khrushchev, met on May 14 for 
ceremonies in Aswan during which the Nile was diverted as part of the massive dam 
project. Gorse went further, claiming, “the advice of Mr. Khrushchev will undoubtedly 
determine the attitude of Colonel Nasser and of President Ben Bella.”81 Such an assertion 
gives little agency to Nasser and Ben Bella, both of whom would come to personify the 
non-aligned movement. Thus, the Algerian representatives would approach EEC 
negotiations hoping to present any outcome as a victory for “the Arab world over 
                                                        
78 MAEF 21QO/1462: Gorse telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 1964. 
79 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
80 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
81 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
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Zionism,” part of an increasingly anti-Zionist tone Gorse noticed in official 
documentation and newspapers that had been, “until now, indifferent.”82 
Axel Herbst, Director General of External Relations for the Commission, met 
with an Algerian delegation led by Ambassador Bessaïh and including the Algerian 
Director of Economic Services of Foreign Affairs, on May 13-15. In the meeting, the 
Algerian delegation denied responsibility for the precarious state of relations between 
Algeria and the EEC, although it did not name a culprit. It also asserted that its “desire to 
maintain the status quo must not be interpreted as looking for an opportune moment to 
break with the EEC.” Rather, it intended to conclude a global, preferential accord with 
the Community. This accord would not be resolved in common with Morocco and 
Tunisia, a contention that fit the Algerian delegation’s claim of the “particular problems 
that called for particular solutions” between the EEC and Algeria. Only later, they said, 
would they examine to what degree there could be coordination with the other Maghrebi 
states with regard to European cooperation.83 This claim of Algeria’s special status is 
noteworthy in contrast to the new tones of Maghrebi neighborly cooperation emerging at 
this moment. Also noteworthy was the French reluctance to take the lead in pressuring its 
European partners. An EEC administrator reported to Hendus that in the midst of one 
May 1964 meeting between Bessaih and the EEC Commision, “the French representative 
maintained a… diplomatic silence [a gardé un silence… diplomatique].”84 
                                                        
82 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid.  
83HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: EEC Council, “Aide-Mémoire du Secrétariat, 
Compte rendu de l’exposé fait par la Commission devant le Comité des Représentants Permanents le 21 
mai 1964 sur les résultats de la deuxième série de conversations exploratoires avec le Gouvernement 
algérien,” 22 May 1964. 
84 HAEU BAC-007/1971_0002: H. Sigrist, Secrétaire Exécutif adjoint, EEC Commission, to Hendus and 
Commission members, “Réunion du Comité des Représentants permanents du 21 mai 1964,” 22 May 1964. 
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In their talks with the Commission, Algerian representatives raised diverse 
policies, notably the statute covering Algerian workers in the Community (comprising 
professional training in both Algeria and Europe), guarantees of technical assistance, and 
the continuation of financial aid (including the necessity of completing projects that had 
begun under the former development fund). The Commission noted that maintaining 
preference for Algerian exports would be limited by GATT regulation and by other 
associations the EEC had formed, such that “the granting of any preference poses the 
problem of reciprocity.” Before Algeria’s independence, its workers, “being considered 
like French nationals [étant considérés comme ressortissants français],” enjoyed 
advantages like social security and family allowances; “the accession to independence 
had modified this situation, thus posing problems.” The only solution appeared to be 
attacking the problem using “the same bilateral route” as taken with “certain African 
states.”85 
The Commission’s assessment of Algerian workers’ rights may at first glance 
seem logical – these men were members of a third-party, or at best, associated state, and 
thus member states should concern themselves with their rights within a given border. 
But their reading of the trajectory of the workers’ rights is far more layered. According to 
the Commission, Article 227 of the Treaty of Rome did not intended to address Algerians 
working in the member states. However, before 1962, these workers were considered to 
be French nationals, meaning that, if the letter of the law were truly followed, the Treaty 
of Rome would indeed apply to an Algerian just as it would a Parisian or, for that matter, 
a Luxembourger citizen. What, then, did it mean that with independence, Algerian men 
                                                        
85 HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: EEC Council, “Aide-Mémoire du Secrétariat,” 22 
May 1964. 
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were effectively stripped of rights? Alternatively, what did it mean that for a period of 
five years, these men theoretically had possessed these rights, and yet were prevented 
from exercising them by both France and the other members of the Six?  
The Commission brushed off other Algerian requests. The demands for technical 
assistance and workers’ training were “desiderata” of the Algerian authorities and such 
problems would only be decided upon after the Six discussed them. These two requests 
come closest to being demands for aid that could easily be construed as responsibilities of 
the EEC to its member states. The EEC response to questions of financial aid to Algeria 
had more comfortable precedents for considering the issues. The Commission “remained 
very reserved” on the question, noting that the examples of Greece and Turkey 
highlighted the problems arising from the competence [compétence] of the member 
states. What was more, since the Yaoundé Convention’s signature, it was “no longer 
possible for the Algerian government to present new projects to the FEDOM […].” The 
Algerian reaction to this was a “rather intense shock [un étonnement assez vif], seeming 
at certain moments even to speak about acquired rights in this domain.”86 
As in all talks we have examined until this point, the May 1964 meetings did not 
settle the question of EEC-Algerian relations, either. The Commission tasked the 
Algerians with giving them the necessary precisions on their intentions. In turn, the 
Algerians declared themselves “unable to give a response until the problem – primordial 
for [Algeria] – of its relations with France had been resolved.” Only then could it 
approach the question of how the Franco-Algerian regime could be reconciled with a 
possible community regime, at which point it would be possible to take up a more precise 
position. The Commission agreed that it was forced for the moment to take no action 
                                                        
86 HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
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except to establish a calendar of future contacts, but also admitted there existed “a 
problem of the overlapping [imbrication] or harmonization” of the Franco-Algerian 
regime with any accord established between Algeria and the EEC. The Algerians, without 
committing to a set time, indicated that the end of June or early July would likely suit 
them, with the assumption that by then, they would have had conversations with the 
French government.87 
Soon after these meetings Yaker, Algeria’s head of the Economic division of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicated that his colleague Boumaza was counting on 
speaking with Minister of Finances and Economic Affairs Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. A 
French embassy administrator in Algiers noted that Yaker himself expressed hope that 
the talks would “contribute to allowing Algeria to establish relations with the EEC that 
resembled the ones from which certain associated states (he cited as examples the 19 
African countries) benefited.” Yaker also reiterated the demands for assistance – naming 
the European Development Bank – and the questions of technical cooperation and the 
labor force, which he hoped could be resolved through bilateral accords that could “be 
fulfilled by contractual relations with the Community.” Yaker’s demands demonstrate 
that Algeria’s new government believed it possible – and beneficial – to demand the 
advantages of EEC association without abandoning privileged relations with France. One 
French embassy official opined that Yaker’s demands were “somewhat naive 
statements,” revealing that by the mid-1960s, French officials saw less use in pushing 
their partners to see Algeria as European. Indeed, such a claim from Algeria could now 
                                                        
87 HAEU CM2/1964-1347 and also MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
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be viewed as fanciful or absurd by French officials eager to redraw their own borders, 
now exclusive of Algeria, within Europe.88  
Indeed, by early June 1964, it was clear to French officials that maintaining the 
status quo no longer held the benefits they once thought. Yet choosing an exit strategy 
was fraught. François Morin of the SGCI highlighted the issue in a letter sent to 
administrators in the offices of the Secretary of State Charged with Algerian Affairs, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including Wormser in the DREE), and the Ministry of 
Labor. Morin had previously addressed the challenge of maintaining in Algeria the 
regulations of the EEC on social security for migrant workers. The Minister of Labor had 
proposed to Morin writing a letter to the Commission in which “we would have made it 
known that the best solution to these difficulties to us appeared to be the suppression of 
the mention of Algeria in the aforementioned regulations.” Morin noted that he “had had, 
for [his] part, some hesitation to thus take the initiative to break from the status quo that 
we ourselves had demanded.” 89  Yet in a letter, the Secretary of State charged with 
Algerian Affairs declared, “the maintenance of the status quo will present more 
inconveniences than advantages.” This could include reinforcing the position of the 
Algerian government in its ongoing bilateral negotiations with France.90    
The solution offered by France’s functionaries responsible for Algerian relations 
was, in part, to inform the Commission that it must directly ask the Algerian government 
for answers, which “the French government, since the independence of Algeria, is no 
                                                        
88 MAEF 21QO/1462: Telegram from French Embassy in Algiers signed Louis Dauge sent to Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, to be communicated to Finances (Cabinet, DREE, FINEX [external finances?]), 30 May 
1964. The parenthetical is original. 
89 MAEF 21QO/1462: Morin, SGCI, “Application à l’Algérie des règlements nº 3 et 4 sur la securité 
sociale des travailleurs migrants,” 8 Juin 1964. 
90 MAEF 21QO/1462: Service des Affaires Générales, Affaires Sociales, within the Secretary of State 
before the Prime Minister, charged with Algerian Affairs to SGCI, “Application à l’Algérie des règlements 
nº 3 et 4 sur la securité sociale des travailleurs migrants,” 28 May 1964. 
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longer able to offer.”91 We are a long way from the assertions of the 1950s, or even of a 
year prior. What, by June 1964, had made France change its mind? Had its mind 
changed, or were different parts of its policy just coming to the fore? Independent 
Algeria’s negotiating methods with Europe reflected its own domestic and international 
concerns. France might need to decide between the French Union and Europe, or between 
Algeria and its domestic pressures, but Algeria now saw opening before it a choice 
between the grands ensembles offered by closer ties to a so-called Muslim or pan-Arab 
world, and the economic and political benefits that Europe might offer. Despite its pursuit 
of relations with the EEC, Algeria increasingly turned to its near neighbors in the 
Maghreb. In early July, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs met in Algiers with the 
ambassadors of Tunisia and Morocco, and around the same time, Algeria’s Finance 
Minister met with a Tunisian delegation and then with the Moroccan diplomat Kacem 
Zhiri. Georges Gorse suggested to his colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
these meetings and the increasingly fraternal relations between the three states signaled 
that talks between the Maghrebi heads of state were “probable and opportune” in the eyes 
of “the people.”92 
Although Sahnoun, Director of Political Affairs in the Algerian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, made clear that the path to strengthened relations between the Maghrebi 
states was not without obstacles – he instructed Algerian officials to attempt to avoid 
media attacks on the other two – he did offer some more tangible building blocks toward 
unity. Algeria “reaffirm[ed] its refusal to give aid to the subversive activities of 
opponents of the Tunis and Rabat regimes” —although the right of asylum would not be 
                                                        
91 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
92 MAEF 21QO/1462: Gorse telegram to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 July 1964. 
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undercut—and Sahnoun brought up the problems of economic cooperation at the 
“Maghrebi level [l’échelle magrebine],” notably regarding industrialization.93 
The most notable site of cooperation, it seemed, was in seeking a common 
approach to relations with the EEC:  
The Algerian government has realized the fragility of its current position. 
Knowing that the privileged status quo through which its commercial exchanges 
with France would quickly cease to be compatible with the commercial relations 
it hoped to develop with the Common Market, it wishes both to better understand 
the current state of negotiations between its neighbors and the EEC and to 
contemplate [envisage] with them, in a long-term perspective, a common 
objective.94  
Despite Algeria’s claims of uniqueness, which echoed France’s colonial-era policy and 
mirrored the status quo that Europe seemed partial to maintaining, Algeria’s leaders, it 




In under a decade, leaders claiming to speak for Algeria had presented it in turns 
as undeniably French; worthy of approaching the EEC on its own; and as a partner in a 
burgeoning North African ensemble. Such shifts are evidenced in the planning for a 
variety of futures, none of which were realized. Algerian men would never enjoy the 
labor privileges in Luxembourg that their metropolitan counterparts could expect; the 
development aid promised under Article 227 would never fully materialize; and the 
Maghreb did not yield the united political body its champions had imagined. Yet the 
frenzy Ben Bella stirred by sending his letter to Brussels speaks to the possibilities of the 
                                                        
93 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
94 MAEF 21QO/1462: Ibid. 
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moment of decolonization, when it was not entirely clear why Algeria could not be a part 
of Europe and, indeed, whether such an association might be useful to the whole of the 
EEC. Even as Algerian domestic and international goals led its leaders to drift farther 
from Brussels and into the pull of Cairo and the Maghreb, the conversations sparked by 
Ben Bella, and by France’s earlier pushes for Eurafrica, did have an appreciable impact 
on the associated territories and overseas departments that remained within France’s 
sphere of influence. This impact will be addressed in the conclusion of this work, 
particularly with regards to France’s approach to the DOM in the wake of Algerian 
independence. 
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Conclusion 
 
Eurafrica, but Where? (1965-1975) 
 
The Algerian war will soon be entering its sixth year. No one among us in November 
1954, no one in the world, suspected that after sixty months of fighting, French 
colonialism would still not have released its clutch and heeded the voice of the Algerian 
people. 
 
With these words, Frantz Fanon opened his 1959 L'An Cinq de la Révolution 
Algérienne.1 As his book went to press, many officials in France were only just coming to terms 
with the possible loss of French Algeria. Then, as in 1848, many members of the French 
administration remained convinced that Algeria composed a fundamental part of France. I have 
interrogated how and why French officials attempted to maintain control in Algeria, even as the 
war grew costly and unpopular. They weaponized an emerging diplomatic tool—European 
integration—as a means of holding fast to the crown jewel of France's empire. This approach to 
imperialism, with claims of a Eurafrican society linking the continents of Europe and Africa 
through trade, aid, and even the movement of people, upends traditional histories of the postwar 
era that discuss European integration and decolonization as wholly distinct processes. Rather, 
imperial goals helped to shape integration schemes. 
As I write the final lines of my dissertation, in March 2017, news headlines hint at codas, 
though developments are so recent that it is difficult to take stock. The British Prime Minister 
Theresa May has announced that Britain will begin the process of formal exit from the European 
Union within the month. The Netherlands has opened a diplomatic row with Turkey, ostensibly 
to stave off far-right political critiques, but highlighting the divide between migrant laborers 
without European citizenship rights and the EU populations who move freely. The latter come 
                                                        
1 Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, 23. 
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from Turkey, the same country that not even sixty years ago was slated, along with Greece and 
ahead of Britain, to be the next member of the EEC.2 The human tragedy of the migrant crisis 
has revealed the limitations of a so-called borderless Europe, challenging the porous nature of 
those borders in quite a different way than France’s policy positions in the postwar era.  
I will conclude by demonstrating that a consideration of the triangle of France, Europe, 
and Algeria forces historians to recalibrate how they typically analyze Franco-African relations 
after 1960. The standard historiography of this period highlights two features. First, that France 
maintained economic ties with Algeria, demonstrating a French attempt at “goodwill” that would 
be appreciated across the Third World—inclusive of Latin America and Asia. Second, that de 
Gaulle and, on the ground, Jacques Foccart pursued extended development aid to the Third 
World in order to bolster France’s position in the Cold War.3 I will challenge this first claim by 
demonstrating, in a way that carries over from the previous chapter, the degree to which French 
officials looked to wipe their hands clean of Algeria in certain “cooperative” domains by the 
mid-1960s. And I will argue that the second claim can only be understood if the EEC is brought 
into story, with an eye toward France’s particular legacy with its former colonies and a look at 
how Britain’s Commonwealth changed the conversation.  
The historian Yves Montarsolo argues that the Six answered the question “Europe until 
where?” by recognizing Africa only as “a ‘market,’ a ‘periphery.’”4 However, this dissertation 
has argued that the limits of Europe were malleable. The case of Algeria reveals the other 
                                                        
2 See, for example, CAOM 81 F 2256: Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Commerce Intérieur et 
Extérieur, Premier Ministre Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires Algériennes, “Association de la Turquie à la 
Communauté Economique Européenne,” 9 April 1960; CAEF B 0062126 (formerly B 25343): Ministère de 
l’Economie et des Finances, Direction des Finances Extérieures, Comptes-rendus de réunions des conseillers 
financiers français à Paris, 18 May 1960; and for a striking visual (a cartoon of the Six as jolly men, arms 
outstretched to meet personified Greece and Turkey), CAOM 81 F 1811: Communauté Européenne, January 1960: 
5. 
3 For an overview of the standard description of post-colonial Gaullist policy toward Africa and the developing 
world, see Martin, General de Gaulle’s Cold War, 74-94. 
4 Montarsolo, L’Eurafrique, 261. 
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possible shapes that Europe could have taken. Episodes of administrative wheeling and dealing, 
at turns dominated by political one-upmanship or handwringing, challenge the assertion that the 
European project only comprised nation-states or that the federalist visions promoted in the 
postwar did not have a durable legacy. 
Discussed side by side, ideas for European integration and Eurafrica demonstrate the 
range of futures planned for, and the variety of understandings of who should unite with whom, 
particularly in the postwar era. Such organizations offered administrators and planners a variety 
of ways to understand and delineate economic cooperation between European states or between a 
unified European body and the African colonies of particular member states (mainly, but not 
exclusively, France). They could serve to bolster feelings of nationalism or community, or to 
enact economic or diplomatic policies. I have argued that the French administration saw 
Eurafrican policy, inscribed in integrated Europe’s founding documents, as a method of 
maintaining control of the empire even while ceding some authority in both Africa and Europe. 
Officials in the postwar did not uniformly view such types of decisions with approval. In the 
1950s, disputes over the establishment of an African regional office of the World Health 
Organization (excluding North and East Africa) revealed French officials’ reluctance to share 
decision-making authority. Jessica Pearson argues that this challenged “the legitimacy of their 
colonies in Africa.”5 
Yet the founding of the EEC is not an anomalous attempt to harness imperial power 
through international or supranational channels. Mark Mazower, analyzing the division of 
Ottoman territories between Britain and France after World War I, demonstrates the 
“internationalist reinforcement of empire,” in which, guided by British colonial interests, 
                                                        
5 Jessica Pearson-Patel, “French Colonialism and the Battle against the WHO Regional Office for Africa,” Hygiea 
Internationalis 13, 1 (2016): 77-78. 
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European and American statesmen operated under the assumption of the “durability of empire.”6 
These assumptions did not die in the Second World War, and the goal of maintaining imperial 
order carried over into the foundation of the United Nations. While the UN gradually became a 
key site for asserting anti-colonial claims, this longer imperial history is critical. I have argued 
that well into the postwar era, even as African statesmen were invited (and elected) to the halls of 
France’s National Assembly and other government positions, the French continued to take the 
durability of their Eurafrica as a given. Rather than assuming the inevitability of any one sort of 
future organization between individual nation-states, we must analyze the range of shapes a 
nation-state might take in light of domestic and international imperatives. 
Even after the formal independence of France’s African holdings—including Algeria—in 
the early 1960s, French and European officials continued to operate under the assumption that a 
particular Eurafrican zone, predicated on trade and aid, did still exist. This is clearest in the 
Yaoundé and Lomé accords and can even be located in recent French decisions to intervene in 
Africa, such as Operation Serval in Mali (2013-2014).7 However, trade and military links are not 
simple recreations of late-19th century colonial practice. They reflect evolutions in old 
relationships, tied up in decades of claims to European responsibility to Africa, today altered by 
decades of independence and the varieties of alternative diplomatic and trade ties now open to 
both European and African states. Indeed, France after the loss of Africa was by no means a 
simple hexagon. And the limits of European regulation remained far from clear.  
 
                                                        
6 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 46, 23. 
7 Guiliano Garavini characterizes the first Yaoundé Convention (1963) as part of a “new grand idea that would bring 
[France] a global role equal to de Gaulle’s ambition.” As this dissertation has shown, such ideas were anything but 
new; Yaoundé must be seen as a continuation of the policies of EEC-African relations that French administrators 
had advocated for the previous decade. Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, & the 
Challenge from the Global South, 1957-1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48. Benedikt Erforth, 
“Mental Maps and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Eurafrique and the French Military Intervention in Mali,” 
European Review of International Studies (Forthcoming). 
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The “Rest” of “France” 
On July 3, 1962, the day de Gaulle recognized Algerian independence, he sat down with 
Adenauer in Paris to discuss European integration. Marking the news of the day, Adenauer said 
Algeria’s new status “frees France […] to devote itself more easily to its great tasks in Europe 
and the world.”8 What did the map of this “free” France look like? Algeria’s independence did 
not spell the end of France’s overseas presence. Guyana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and la 
Réunion maintained their status as DOM.  
As the previous chapter noted, by 1964, French officials appeared decidedly less 
interested in privileging ties with Algeria above those of the EEC. However, the policies they 
had pushed for over the past decade would have lasting effects. In January 1965, an 
administrator in the SGCI wrote that “French tactics” after the Treaty of Rome’s signing had 
created “dangerous precedents,” namely that the question of applying Treaty regulations to the 
DOM was to be approached piecemeal. This was due to “the impossibility of cutting off 
[trancher] the problems unique to Algeria, which in the Treaty of Rome was completely 
assimilated to the Overseas Departments. Discretion was necessary.” The administrator argued 
that with Algeria “settled,” the question of applying the Treaty to the remaining DOM could be 
tackled. 9  The SGCI administrator worried that the uneven application of Treaty of Rome 
regulation overseas, due in no small part to the fraught nature of incorporating Algeria within 
that regulatory sphere, would now negatively impact the DOM’s trade prospects. He warned that 
there “is no obvious reason in the eyes of our partners” to address only parts of the Treaty 
“because it suits French financial interests […].” However, he argued that the other members of 
                                                        
8 “De Gaulle à Adenauer: ‘L’union franco-allemande permet une vaste organisation de l’Europe,’” L’Indépendant, 
July 4, 1962, 12.  
9  AN 19950190/7: Premier Ministre, Comité Intérministeriel pour les questions de coopération économique 
européenne, Secrétariat Général, "Note: Projet de règlement relatif à l’organisation du marché européen du sucre," 
25 January 1965. 
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the Six might still find “political and intelligible reasons […] to want to totally assimilate […] 
the European territory of the Community and the far-off departments of the French Republic.” 
However, this administrator’s tactic for encouraging such cooperation was a marked departure 
from the French diplomatic pressure recounted in previous chapters. Rather than forcefully call 
for such assimilation during EEC meetings, he reasoned that: 
[…] to deal with this problem, the common agricultural policy negotiating room does not 
seem like the most appropriate place. It is a much broader problem and seems to require 
more discretion. Discussion in the heart of Brussels [l’enceinte bruxelloise], under the 
inevitable surveillance of journalists, can have disadvantages when it comes to questions 
centered on the assimilation of certain French [citizens] from across the seas to French of 
the European continent.10 
His solution was action taken by the French toward the other member states, but seemingly on an 
individual, or bilateral, level. This could avoid unpleasant discussions about France’s “many 
current financial demands,” which was important as by June, he expected that the EEC would be 
pushing for sugar regulation while “presenting several very heavy” demands on European 
expenditure.11 This shift from multilateral pressure to bilateral negotiations suggests that by the 
mid-1960s, the French were ready to adopt new approaches for the European project, or even to 
sidestep Europe-wide decision-making in favor of older bilateral diplomatic discussions. 
Being “freed” from Algeria appeared to have an impact not just on how the French would 
pursue European policy, but how they understood the tasks ahead of them. Internally, French 
administrators began to blame Algeria for the issues facing incorporating the DOM into the EEC. 
The same day that the administrator discussed above warned against discussing the DOM in 
Brussels, another argued that Treaty of Rome regulations had not been extended to the DOM in 
the past because of the “problems that the total application of certain provisions in Algeria would 
have posed for our partners […], notably those related to free labor circulation.” Optimistically, 
                                                        
10 AN 19950190/7: Ibid. 
11 AN 19950190/7: Ibid. 
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he declared that “[t]hese problems having disappeared, the case of the DOM will undoubtedly be 
easier to sort out.” The administrator repeatedly referred to the DOM as an “integral part of the 
French Republic.” This insistence, still to be validated through international accord, just as 
Algeria was only years earlier, was an unspoken benefit of extending the Treaty of Rome to the 
Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. The benefits he acknowledged for France were the opening of 
the movement of labor, the Social Fund, and European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (Fonds européen d’orientation et de garantie agricole, FEOGA), particularly for sugar to 
the DOM. The advantages for France’s partners appeared decidedly less advantageous: the 
extension would allow for the “harmonization of social systems,” meaning salary parity for men 
and women. The other advantage for France’s partners would be France’s “renunciation of the 
benefit of the FED.” In other words, while France gained economic assistance through FEOGA, 
the Social Fund, and the political and economic benefits of labor circulation that affirmed the 
DOM’s status as “French,” France’s partners would enjoy the benefit of France no longer 
claiming FED funding for the DOM.12 
As in the era of l’Algérie française, labor circulation remained puzzling. Here, the 
administrator hinted at a sort of preterition (Chapter 4). He noted that under Articles 48 and 49 of 
the Treaty of Rome, free movement of labor clauses did not apply to the DOM. However, he 
mused: 
We can however ask ourselves if theoretically, the free movement of labor implemented 
by Regulation 38 does not apply to DOM nationals, since according to our domestic law, 
they are nationals of the French Republic. 
 
                                                        
12  AN 19950190/7 and CAEF B-0067657/1: Premier Ministre, Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de 
Coopération Economique Européenne, Secrétariat Général, "Note: Application du Traité de Rome aux DOM," 25 
January 1965. 
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In this case, the application of these texts to the DOM would concern only movement in 
the direction of the other EEC states to the DOM.13 
In effect, this administrator went from acknowledging that the Treaty did not apply fully in the 
DOM, a suggestion that the DOM were not just like any other part of France, to suggesting that 
because DOM residents were technically French citizens, the French could gloss over their 
current exclusion from free labor circulation and immediately launch into a policy allowing EEC 
member state laborers to migrate to the DOM. What was more, the administrator emphasized 
that by 1967, the right of establishment, meaning the right of Europeans to settle permanently in 
another member state, should also be extended to DOM nationals, just as establishment in the 
DOM should be extended to citizens from the other members of the Six. Through this agreement 
of reciprocity, he argued, “[o]ur partners, it appears, have accepted the thesis that the DOM were 
France,” negating the necessity of a special text.14 It thus appears that the DOM replaced Algeria 
as the unnamed French overseas beneficiary of European aid. However, that was not the attitude 
shared by all administrators in overseas France.  
In early March 1965, the office of Louis Jacquinot, Minister of State for DOM-TOM, 
circulated a note urging the French administration to include the DOM within the FEOGA. 
Jacquinot’s office was particularly concerned about DOM sugar manufacture, calling the 
integration of the DOM into FEOGA “the fundamental [essentiel] problem at the present time.” 
The problem appeared as delicate as it was important. On the one hand, it would require FEOGA 
to cover “the losses incurred on the export of surplus sugar, whereas in the present system, this 
loss is met by the producers with the partial support of the state budget.” Unsaid by the ministry, 
this risked further alienating France’s partners as agricultural policy was being negotiated. And 
yet, were the DOM not included in FEOGA, any financial policy that set the DOM apart “would 
                                                        
13 AN 19950190/7 and CAEF B-0067657/1: Ibid. 
14 AN 19950190/7 and CAEF B-0067657/1: Ibid. 
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create a distinction” between DOM and continental French sugar, “with all the risks which such 
a discrimination could bring for the future of the sale of DOM sugar on the market of the 
Community or even of the metropole.” This, the ministry warned, would “represent a very 
marked regression” for how DOM sugar was currently treated on the French market.15 
The ministry’s administrator showed a keen awareness of the hesitance of some of 
France’s partners, noting that the DOM’s sugar production could cause a surplus and lead to 
“heavy financial burdens for the Community.” However, the French should stand their ground, in 
a complex dance of economic and political pragmatism:  
Yet, on the political level, it cannot be discussed that the Overseas Departments are an 
integral part of the French Republic and therefore an integral part of the European 
Economic Community. 
 
 Consequently, from an economic perspective, it is also unquestionable that if French 
sugar production is liable to pose problems of surplus and financial costs to the European 
Economic Community, under no circumstances can the responsibility be solely ascribed 
to the Overseas Departments, but must be considered as a problem that will be solved on 
the national level.  
 
Lastly, if we consider the problem from the perspective of financial burden, we find that, 
in the case of a financial regime particular to the Overseas Departments, the charge 
would entirely fall to the French budget, while in the case of the total integration in 
FEOGA, this charge would have a community character. Without a doubt, our partners 
will invoke the case of the Overseas Departments in order to demand an additional 
contribution from France to FEOGA, but in principle, it does not seem that this 
contribution can be higher than what the French budget alone would assure for a regime 
specific to the Overseas Departments. In any case, for the case of equal financial 
expenditure, the political problem would not be posed.16 
The minister acknowledged that he was discussing major spending; at the moment of his writing, 
the DOM’s export expenses tallied 20 million francs for the marketing year. Thus, the solution of 
enforcing the DOM’s place within EEC regulation would serve French political interests, if make 
no appreciable difference in their economic expenditures. This would avoid a list of unsavory 
                                                        
15 AN 19950190/7: Ministère d’Etat, Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer, "Note concernant la situation de la 
production sucrière des départements d’Outre-Mer à l’égard de la Communauté Economique Européenne," 5 March 
1965. 
16 AN 19950190/7: Ibid. 
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possibilities, including placing DOM sugar in a “hybrid situation” and “creating an extremely 
unfortunate and serious [fâcheuse et lourde] discrimination between various parts of the French 
Republic.”17 
This language of hybridity and discrimination is a direct echo of criticisms leveled within 
France coming from the outright exclusion from (Tamzali, Chapter 2) and uneven application of 
(Pouderoux, Chapter 4) European regulations in Algeria. Jacquinot had served as France’s 
Overseas Minister for three governments during the Fourth Republic, with his last term ending in 
June 1954. Perhaps his experience watching the efforts of his successors, particularly Gaston 
Defferre, to include the DOM-TOM in the EEC impacted the emphasis he placed on ensuring 
that such uncomfortable and confusing situations would be avoided in the future. This lesson-
learning seemed to come with a hint of optimism. In that same period, French ministers also 
claimed that determining how the remaining DOM might relate to the EEC had become easier 
without the Algerian question, rather than the Algerian question steering the choices made in the 
previous decade, as Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrated. The acceptance of new geopolitical 
realities came only after a few years of Algeria’s independence. For example, a missive from the 
Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in mid-March 1965, the time had arrived to alleviate issues 
pertaining to the Treaty of Rome’s application in the DOM. This was thanks to the “now settled” 
Algerian “affair, which had for a long time disturbed the work, because the fate of the DOM was 
linked to that of Algeria in Article 227 of the Treaty […].”18 
The contention that the DOM’s French character could not be questioned is evidence of 
how strongly French administrators came to view the loss of Algeria as inevitable and necessary, 
albeit in a timeframe that extended into the early period of Algerian independence. It also 
                                                        
17 AN 19950190/7: Ibid. 
18 AN 19950190/7:  Ministère de l’Agriculture, Direction des Industries Agricoles et de l’Organisation, "Application 
du Traité de Rome aux DOM," 15 March 1965. 
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suggests the continuity of a geographic logic of “Europe” that extended well beyond the 
continent; Algeria was now naturally “out,” yet the Frenchness of the DOM could not be 
disputed. The French transformation from advocate of continued Algeria-EEC ties to relatively 
silent witness to the end of those discussions is indicative of the other political and economic 
motivations alive in the French camp as it explored other possible trade and political ties by the 
mid-1960s. Yet it is clear that the French still thought close relations with Algeria were possible, 
if increasingly frustrating. As one Foreign Affairs Ministry administrator complained, while 
Morocco and Tunisia had formally pursued negotiations from June 1965, Algerian authorities 
still had not set a timeline for talks. Rather, “during exploratory conversations, [they] gave the 
impression of being in no rush, and on the contrary, [being] very ‘greedy’ [gourmands].” The 
Algerians appeared big-headed in this administrator’s eyes: 
Indeed, they claimed to be able to obtain, from that moment, satisfactory prospects not 
only from the point of view of the trade regime, but also regarding financial assistance 
and labor.19 
Yet 1965 would prove difficult for France’s relationship with all three Maghrebi states. 
Reflecting on the evolution of Algerian-EEC relations two years later, in 1967, one French 
administrator linked the challenges of Maghrebi-EEC diplomacy to the July 1965 empty chair 
crisis, which stemmed from French fears about the EEC’s control over the budget, particularly in 
light of the common agricultural policy. 20 He did not mention Boumediene’s coup and the 
ousting of Ben Bella, nor a Franco-Algerian partnership for exploiting Algerian oil established 
that very month. 
                                                        
19 MAEF 0034SUP/90: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Politiques, Afrique du Nord, Sous-
Direction Algérie, "Note: L’Algérie et la CEE," 24 January 1967. 
20 Gilbert, European Integration, 79-83. 
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Just as the Algerian question forced the French to ask their partners to understand a much 
more sweeping geography of Europe, so too did the remaining DOM’s relations to the EEC 
invite introspection and diplomatic squabbles. The remaining overseas holdings posed a peculiar 
set of questions for EEC officials. Take la Réunion, a tiny island east of Madagascar. As a 
department of France, it might seem that la Réunion, like Corsica—another island department—
would represent an extension of the European Economic Community into the waters of the 
Indian Ocean. In practice, it was not so simple.  
In 1962, Maurice de la Giroday & Compagnie, located in the departmental capital of la 
Réunion, Saint Denis, hired the German Mr. Erb as a “representative” of Volkswagen and 
Mercedes. Soon after, Erb was joined by his countryman, a Mr. Horsting, who was posted to 
Saint-Pierre. Both had moved with their wives.21 By late June 1965, it came to the attention of 
the West German Embassy in Paris that the Prefecture of la Réunion denied the men’s requests 
for visa renewal, effectively meaning they would be required to leave the island by August of 
that year.22 The West German embassy’s initial inquiry into the denial, at the behest of the 
company and of the men, who were worried by the “peu motivée” decision, asked for the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to intervene and encourage the prefect to change the decision.23 The 
Giroday company had appealed to the German embassy, calling Erb and Horsting, both 
“‘spécialistes diplômés’ classés dans ‘les cadres supérieurs,’”  “indispensible” and 
                                                        
21  AN 20040335/4: Préfecture de la Réunion, Cabinet to M. le Ministre d’Etat chargé des Départements et 
Territoires d’Outre-Mer, Cabinet & Secrétariat Général, “Expulsion de la Réunion de deux ressortissants 
Allemands,” 10 August 1965. 
22 AN 20040335/4: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Direction of Administrative Conventions and Consular Affairs to 
Ministre d’Etat chargé des Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer, “Expulsion de la Réunion de deux 
ressortissants allemands,” signed Heuman (Chef du Service des Conventions administratives et des unions), plus 
two attached documents, 8 July 1965. 
23 AN 20040335/4: Two document attached to 8 July 1965. Ambassade de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Direction of Administrative Conventions and Consular Affairs, Administrative 
Conventions and International Unions, 29 June 1965 and Ambassade de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note Verbale, 30 June 1965. 
 
Brown • Conclusion 219 
“irreplaceable” in their role instructing local (“indigène”) mechanics working for Giroday. Such 
qualifications, the embassy insisted, were “nonexistent” [introuvable] in la Réunion as well as in 
France, yet the prefecture of la Réunion would not prolong their residency permits (nor those of 
their wives) because of the current state of la Réunion’s labor market. 
The response of la Réunion’s officals, and Paris’ decision to back them, reveals the limits 
of application of European law in the furthest corners of “France.”24 Here, free circulation of 
labor would confront the economic realities of extrametropolitan territory. La Réunion’s sub-
prefect defended the decision, emphasizing the “very particular situation of this department,” 
including the high birth rate and the “endemic” underemployment of the local workforce. 
Because of this, he explained, the administration had pursued with “a certain severity” limits to 
the introduction of metropolitan and foreign workers into jobs that could be taken up by the 
Réunionnais themselves. Further still, the Réunionnais official was incredulous of Erb’s and 
Horsting’s invaluable nature. Giroday had received the right to hire Erb under the condition that 
his stay be limited to the terms of his work contract. The sub-prefect opined that it seemed “hard 
to believe” that after three years, Erb had not managed to train a single Réunionnais mechanic 
who would be capable of replacing him.25 
The situation in la Réunion in some ways echoed the recent worries France had expressed 
over French Algeria’s—and then independent Algeria’s—relationship with Europe (Chapter 5). 
Over the coming months, the exchange became triangular, with West German officials appealing 
                                                        
24 Karis Muller has written extensively on these peripheries. See, for example, “Shadows of Empire in the European 
Union,” in The European Legacy 6, 4 (2001): 439-451; “‘Concentric Circles’ at the Periphery of the European 
Union,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 46, 3 (2000): 322-335; and “Between Europe and Africa: 
Mayotte,” in European Integration and Post-Colonial Sovereignty Games, edited by R. Adler-Nissen and Ulrik Gad, 
(London: Routledge, 2012): 187-203. See also Benoît Trépied, "La décolonisation sans l'indépendance? Sortir du 
colonial en Nouvelle-Calédonie (1946-1975)," Genèses 91 (2013): 7-27. 
25 AN 20040335/4: Préfecture de la Réunion, Cabinet to M le Ministre d’Etat chargé des Départements et Territoires 
d’Outre-Mer, Cabinet & Secrétariat Général, “Expulsion de la Réunion de deux ressortissants Allemands,” 10 
August 1965. 
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to the French in Paris, who in turn attempted to appease both la Réunion, which was cautious to 
not anger the metropole, and West Germany, a key ally. Hugues Vinel, chief of staff for the 
Ministre d’Etat responsible for overseas affairs voiced concerns to the French Ministry of Work. 
While he saw the necessity of “quell[ing] immigration in an already overpopulated department, I 
do not wish to adopt such a measure with regards to nationals of an EEC partner without having 
serious juridical reasons motivating it […].” Further, he worried that it could spark retaliatory 
measures against French nationals working or hoping to work in West Germany. Vinel’s concern 
about the implications for EEC movement is instructive. His query and the triangular arguments 
surrounding the German mechanics are very much a product of the same debates that surrounded 
Italian protectionism and French fears about a European settler saturation in the larger African 
labor market. 
By December, however, Paris had come down firmly on the side of la Réunion. Early that 
month, the Director General for Work and Employment told Vinel’s office that he “entirely 
share[d] the point of view” of the Prefect of la Réunion, which was justified given the 
employment situation on the island. Unemployed Réunionnais should be given priority or at least 
(and this was added in with a pen), foreign firms must “engage in the local training of 
technicians.” Going further, he reminded the Overseas officials in Paris that Regulation 38/65 
relative to the free movement of laborers within the EEC did not apply to the DOM or TOM. Erb 
and Horsting would have to leave la Réunion.26 
 How should this decision be understood? On the one hand, it suggests the dominance of 
domestic concerns in France, including the importance of appeasing a departmental cohort 
                                                        
26  AN 20040335/4: Ministère du Travail Direction Générale du Travail et de l’Emploi S/Direction de la 
Réglementation de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration to Le Ministre du Travail à Monsieur le Ministre d’Etat 
Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer Secrétariat Général des Départements d’Outre-Mer Cabinet, “Situation de 
Messieurs HORSTING et ERB, de nationalité allemande,” 3 December 1965. 
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before turning to EEC partners. One the other hand, it reinforces the contradictions in France’s 
understandings of its own borders and, by extension, those of Europe. Like Algeria before it, la 
Réunion was France, but only sometimes. EEC labor regulations were subsumed by local 
protocol, at the risk of angering a major supranational partner and neighbor.  
In the Réunion mechanics discussion, as with earlier debates about Algeria, an image of 
Eurafrica emerges that is, if we are using judicious terms, ambivalent. Or perhaps we are better 
served discussing Eurafricas. Indeed, confusion and conflict were in some ways hallmarks of the 
policy. We have seen examples of this throughout this work. A note circulated by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the late summer of 1956 emphasized that during a meeting of members of the 
Six in May of that year, the ministry made clear that France would not participate in a common 
market that excluded the overseas territories. But the very next sentence in the document limited 
the inclusion, pointing out that  
[T]he difference in the economic structure between the six European states and the 
overseas territories and states makes a pure and simple inclusion of the latter in the 
Common Market on equal footing as the metropole impossible. This total inclusion 
cannot be imagined until a more advanced stage of development in the overseas 
territories and states.27   
Inclusion, with an asterisk, would enervate French Union leaders like Senghor and later confuse 
French and European administrators. What is more, it risked overseas holdings’ already 
ambiguous juridical statuses at the very moment that French officials most needed to impress 
upon their public and the wider world the inherent Frenchness of those territories. 
 Historians must analyze the decisions and motivations behind trade and economic 
policies because they reveal so much more about the contexts in which such choices and deals 
were made. French officials successfully convinced their European partners to sign a version of 
                                                        
27 MAEF 20QO/719: “Note d’Information sur les Territoires d’Outre-Mer et le Marché Commun,”  undated by 
likely August 1956.  
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the Treaty of Rome that incorporated France’s overseas holdings – including a clause that 
explicitly named Algeria – and allowed for the gradual extension of EEC trade regulations into 
those territories. This had real results, including lowering some trade barriers and drawing 
European-wide funds into industrial development across French Africa. It also raised 
uncomfortable questions about who could count as European. And critically, for French officials, 
it offered a supranational tool through which to reassert the French quality of Algeria. De 
Gaulle’s veto of Great Britain’s entry into the EEC has already been chronicled by his many 
biographers, historians of European integration, and international historians.28 For the purposes 
of my study, the French conviction that Britain could not be a faithful member of a European 
partnership because of its Commonwealth responsibilities is noteworthy because, of course, 
France spent over a decade insisting that its own empire would join with France as it entered that 
very partnership. As Dutch frustration in Chapters 4 and 5 showed, France’s partners 
increasingly viewed such an attitude with disdain and sought both to enlarge Europe to include 
Britain and to pressure France to make fewer claims for its colonial holdings. But this European 
dance, in fact, drew the attention of the very holdings that were often drawn into question.  
 
An Exit? 
By the mid-1970s, Algeria no longer maintained the unique status upon which France had 
once insisted. The EEC Council increasingly attempted to implement a “global Mediterranean 
approach” for the three Maghrebi states. The Algerian authorities expressed interest defining 
such a relationship, presumably in part to clarify their trade position, which differed depending 
                                                        
28 Alex May argues that by the time Britain was accepted into the enlarging EEC, the Commonwealth was less of an 
issue for it. In this version, then, it was Britain’s diminishing emphasis on its own vestiges of empire, rather than 
French changes of heart, that shifted the conversation. Alex May, “The Commonwealth and Britain’s Turn to 
Europe, 1945-73,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 102, 1 (2013): 29-39. 
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on which member of the Six was concerned.29 Yet the Algerians could no longer count on the 
support of France, which had been so strong when Algeria was still a juridical part of France. 
Indeed, by the mid-1970s, the French were outright hostile to Algeria’s requests for maintaining 
a close relationship. In November 1977, a majority of the French senators declared themselves 
unable to ratify newly concluded accords between the EEC and Mediterranean states. They cited 
the presence of “a certain number of our compatriots” held as hostages in Algeria.30 Presumably, 
these senators were thinking of six French citizens taken hostage in Mauritania seven months 
earlier, and whom Polisario Front guerilla fighters pushing for the independence of the Western 
Sahara would release in December.31  
 In June 1972, Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, addressed the 
Belgian Royal Institution of International Relations’ Interuniversity Center of Independent 
Research. Perhaps fittingly for a speech in Brussels, his topic was “Algeria and Europe: 
Perspectives on Cooperation.” Bouteflika, who would become president of Algeria in 1999 and 
who remains so at the time of this writing, offered “some reflections” on the issue of current 
relations between Algeria and the EEC. According to Bouteflika, “the heart [nœud] of the 
problem” was that despite a decade of Algerian independence, “certain” Western European 
administrators, taken by “nostalgic dreams […], have not lost the hope to perpetuate a degree of 
domination through new methods.”32 He insisted that Algeria “did not differentiate itself from 
the other countries of the Third World,” yet emphasized its unique geographic position and its 
                                                        
29 AN 20000293/4: Communautés Européennes, le Conseil, Note: "Projet de schéma pour un exposé des motifs 
concernant les Accords de coopération entre la Communauté, d’une part, et chacun des pays du Maghreb, d’autre 
part," 7 January 1977 (emphasis original). 
30 AN 20000293/4: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Politiques, Afrique du Nord et Levant, 
telegram, "Accord CEE/Algérie," 17 November 1977. 
31 This was two years after Carlos the Jackal landed in Algiers with his OPEC hostages. Jonathan Kandell, “French 
Hostages Say Algerians Held Them,” The New York Times, 28 December 1977. 
32 CAOM BIB AOM 20730/1972: Abdelaziz Bouteflika, “L’Algérie et l’Europe: Perspectives de Coopération,” 
Chronique de Politique Etrangère 25, 2 (1972): 200. 
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particular history of decolonization.33 Indeed, arguing that the Algerian War left traces of trauma 
and destruction, as had the decades of colonial rule before it, Bouteflika argued that: 
Instead, thanks to their realism, the Algerian people made the deliberate choice to 
overcome natural feelings that could have been theirs and showed that they were ready to 
engage with the path of a real cooperation.34 
Bouteflika would go on to tell his audience that Algeria “was integrated, despite itself [malgré 
elle] in the Treaty of Rome, before describing some of the transformations of Algerian-EEC 
relations, from relative integration in the early 1960s to the labeling of Algeria as a “third party 
state” by some EEC members only a few short years later.35 
 Bouteflika’s recounting of history should remind us of the key moments highlighted in 
this work. By mid-1962, Algeria was independent. Throughout the nearly eight-year war, 
members of the FLN and other nationalist organizations did not address Eurafrica or future ties 
with France. The war was fought with the goal of severing such ties and ending over a century of 
l’Algérie française. Yet late in 1962, the government of a now independent Algeria did make 
overtures to the EEC, pointing out in a letter to Brussels that the territory was explicitly named in 
the Treaty of Rome. Within three years, talks on this question fizzled, but we should take 
seriously that for these three years, it seemed possible that an independent, majority Muslim state 
located on the continent of Africa seemed poised to enjoy the benefits of EEC membership. A 
treaty ostensibly about trade had the potential to extend a certain type of European identity 
beyond the borders of Europe. The denial of its application in Algeria, then, perhaps foreclosed 
the possibility of such an identity surviving, but only in the late 1960s. 
                                                        
33 CAOM BIB AOM 20730/1972: Ibid., 202. 
34 CAOM BIB AOM 20730/1972: Ibid., 203. 
35 CAOM BIB AOM 20730/1972: Ibid., 209-210. 
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 When we examine European integration through the lens of Eurafrican integration, not 
an integration limited to the European continent, we see before us a fuller version of the postwar 
possibilities for relations between Europe and Africa. This version undermines the heroic 
postwar story and reasserts empire into contemporary understandings of the foundation of 
Europe and the European project. The history of European integration is an imperial history. 
Only by recognizing the importance of Algeria to France in these negotiations can we begin to 
challenge the claims that resonate today of irreconcilable cultures or definitive geographic 
boundaries. 
Although France’s insistence that Algeria was part of France and therefore should be 
included in the European project gradually quieted, we must further investigate how North 
Africa and especially Algeria were bound up in France’s larger Eurafrican project. This was a 
French-driven project, and takes us far from the contemporary rhetoric about pure divisions of 
worlds or cultures. The agricultural official Pouderoux insisted that Algeria was the natural site 
of Europe’s “internal expansion” because he viewed Algeria as inherently French, and therefore 
a part of Europe. The long, deadly struggle fought by Algeria’s nationalists naturally reminds us 
that such a conviction was held by the French government and, until late in the war, by the 
French public, too, but not by many Algerians themselves. But to me, reading Pouderoux’s 
conviction, at once a statement of geographic expansion and an assertion of the possibility that 
Europe could exist outside of “European” territory, is proof that Europe has never only meant 
one thing.  
Such ambiguous notions of political borders and geographical limitations (or openings) 
upend claims made today of strict lines between “civilizations” and should give us pause as we 
attempt to make sense of contemporary interrogations of Europe’s borders and citizenship 
 
Brown • Conclusion 226 
regimes. Imperial policy, often promoted by the French government, influenced how European 
institutions would approach trade and labor migration. If we believe that six nation-states joined 
together to form these supranational organizations, we are wrong. By adjusting the unit of 
analysis from nation-state to empire, a new, more accurate understanding of trade and labor 
policy, and of the very shape of “Europe,” emerges. In economic, political, and geographic 
terms, Europe was never only on the continent.  
Such an investigation helps situate this policy in its historical moment, including Western 
concerns about the spread of Communism and the coming wave of trade negotiations embodied 
by the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. A consideration of Algeria also helps point to the 
primacy of French domestic concerns, privileged over the rhetoric of supranational cooperation 
and European partnership during the moment of European integration. Indeed, when we consider 
the French reasoning behind Eurafrica, which included maintaining a firm grip on trade and 
markets and reaffirming the metropole’s role as the leader of an empire, we see a policy that is 
strikingly inward looking. For France, Algeria was a logical extension of the metropole, and 
therefore, a part of Europe. That is, until it wasn’t. The confused attempts at implementing a 
Eurafrican vision attest to this moment of conflict between France’s domestic exigencies, as it 
faced insurgency in Algeria, and its outward-looking goals as it gazed towards its European, or 
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